• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.189-231
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• 2013

The purpose of this paper is to show that Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox do not conclusively refute supervaluationism. I will achieve this purpose on the basis of local validity. In general, people regard supervaluational validity as global validity. And D-introduction, which is premise of Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox, is justified only if we assume global validity. But it cannot correctly grasp supervaluational semantics, especially semantic character of D-operator. So I will show that validity of supervaluationism is local and define global validity by local validity. Strategy of this paper is to protect supervaluationism against Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox by minimal modification of supervaluationism and to prove that supervaluational logic is not revisionary and weak for solving the sorites paradox.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.145-184
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• 2016

Williamson(1994) proved incompatibility of Gab Theory and Tarski T-schema. But this does not means that Gab Theory could not involve intuition on truth that is expressed by T-schema. I will show that Gab Theory and mutual entailment of 'p' and 'it is true that p'(p⊨T

and T

⊨p) are compatible. It will draw that Gab Theory can involve minimal intuition on truth. After all what I want to reveal is logical space for Gab Theory through the compatibility of the mutual entailment and negation of the Principle of Bivalence. To prove the compatibility, I will present a consequent relation which should be accepted whenever we accept Gab Theory and demonstrate Gab Theory and the mutual entailment imply following two thesis; 1) not-T

and T are not equivalent. 2) p entails T

but not-T

does not entails not-p.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.126
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• pp.141-165
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• 2019

The ability hypothesis about black-and-white Mary once enjoyed the status of the "received view." But its popularity has declined since then. There seem to be two reasons for this. One is Martine Nida-Rümeline criticism against the ability hypothesis, where he tries to show that what Mary learns upon release is more than a bunch of abilities. The other is Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's criticism. They argue that the abilities Mary acquires amount to "knowledge-how", which in turn is reduced to "knowledge-that." This essay aims to defend the ability hypothesis against these criticisms, and thereby restore the status of the ability hypothesis. As for the first criticism, it is argued that the kind of knowledge Mary acquires other than the abilities is "demonstrative knowledge," which not only poses no threat to physicalism, but also is orthogonal to phenomenal knowledge. As for the second criticism, it is argued that by ruling out "the ability to imagine experiences," the ability hypothesis can survive Stanley and Williamson's criticism.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.10
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• pp.126-136
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• 2019

The film born by Lumiere brothers in 1895 was not the first. Edison, who invented the Kinetograph four years ago, has already made dozens of films. But it has been relatively undervalued. That's because the platform for projecting a movie was through a single person viewer called Kinetoscope. However, the physical characteristics of the film itself are the same as those of modern films, and have a unique aesthetic distinction compared to other early films. The subject is entertainment-oriented, and the image is characterized by contrast effect. In addition, even before the birth of the film, it shows the important creative elements and genres pursued by fictional films, and has industrial production systems and experts. If Lumiere's film is the beginning of a documentary film that portrays the fact, Edison's film deserves historical value as the beginning of popular film, which is the hallmark of modern cinema.