• Title/Summary/Keyword: 예측 기간

Search Result 2,192, Processing Time 0.027 seconds

Prognostic Relevance of WHO Classification and Masaoka Stage in Thymoma (흉선종양에서의 WHO 분류와 Masaoka 병기, 임상양상간의 상관관계연구)

  • Kang Seong Sik;Chun Mi Sun;Kim Yong Hee;Park Seung Il;Eeom Dae W.;Ro Jaee Y.;Kim Dong Kwan
    • Journal of Chest Surgery
    • /
    • v.38 no.1 s.246
    • /
    • pp.44-49
    • /
    • 2005
  • Although thymomas are relatively common mediastinal tumors, to date not only has a universal system of pathologic classification not been established but neither has a clearly defined predictable relationship between treatment and prognosis been made. Recently, a new guideline for classification was reported by WHO, and efforts, based on this work, have been made to better define the relationship between treatment and pro­gnostic outcome. In the present study a comparative analysis between the WHO classification and Masaoka stage system with the clinical disease pattern was conducted. Material and Method: A total of 98 patients undergoing complete resection for mediastinal thymoma between Juanuary 1993 and June 2003 were included in the present study. The male female ratio was 48 : 50 and the mean age at operation was $49.6{\pm}13.9\;years.$ A retrospective analytic comparison studying the relationship between the WHO classification and the Masaoka stage system with the clinical disease pattern of thymoma was conducted. Pathologic slide specimens were carefully examined, details of postoperative treatment were documented, and a relationship with the prognostic outcome and recurrence was studied. Result: There were 7 patients in type A according to the WHO system of classification, 14 in AB, 28 in B 1, 23 in B2, 18 in B3, and 9 in type C. The study of the relationship between the Masaoka stage and WHO classification system showed 4 patients to be in WHO system type A, 7 in type AB, 22 in B 1, 17 in B2, and 3 in type B3 among 53 $(54{\%})$ patients shown to be in Masaoka stage I. Among 28 $(28.5{\%})$ patients in Masaoka stage II system, there were 2 patients in type A, 7 in AB, 4 in B 1, 2 in B2, 8 in B3, and 5 in type C. Among 15 $(15.3{\%})$ in Masaoka stage III, there were 1 patient in type B1, 3 in B2, 7 in B3, and 4 in type C. Finally, among 2 $(2{\%})$ patients found to be in Masaoka stage IV there was 1 patient in type B1, and 1 in type B2. The mean follow up duration was $28{\pm}6.8$ months. There were 3 deaths in the entire series of which 2 were in type B2 (Masaoka stages III and IV), and 1 was in type C (Masaoka stage II). Of the patients that experienced relapse, 6 patients remain alive of which 2 were in type B2 (Masaoka III), 2 in type B3 (Masaoka I and III) and 2 in type C (Masaoka stage II). The 5 year survival rate by the Kaplan-Meier method was $90{\%}$ for those in type B2 WHO classification system, $87.5{\%}$ for type C. The 5 year freedom from recurrence rate was $80.7{\%}$ for those in WHO type B2, $81.6{\%}$ for those in type B3, and $50{\%}$ for those in type C. By the Log-Rank method, a statistically significant correlation between survival and recurrence was found with the WHO system of classification (p<0.05). An analysis of the relationship between the WHO classification and Masaoka stage system using the Spearman correction method, showed a slope=0.401 (p=0.023), showing a close correlation. Conclusion: As type C of the WHO classification system is associated with a high postoperative mortality and recurrence rate, aggressive treatment postoperatively and meticulous follow up are warranted. The WHO classification and Masaoka stage system were found to have a close relationship with each other and either the WHO classification method or the Masaoka stage system may be used as a predict prognostic outcome of Thymoma.

Research for Space Activities of Korea Air Force - Political and Legal Perspective (우리나라 공군의 우주력 건설을 위한 정책적.법적고찰)

  • Shin, Sung-Hwan
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
    • /
    • v.18
    • /
    • pp.135-183
    • /
    • 2003
  • Aerospace force is a determining factor in a modem war. The combat field is expanding to space. Thus, the legitimacy of establishing aerospace force is no longer an debating issue, but "how should we establish aerospace force" has become an issue to the military. The standard limiting on the military use of space should be non-aggressive use as asserted by the U.S., rather than non-military use as asserted by the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union's argument is not even strongly supported by the current Russia government, and realistically is hard to be applied. Thus, the multi-purpose satellite used for military surveillance or a commercial satellite employed for military communication are allowed under the U.S. principle of peaceful use of space. In this regard, Air Force may be free to develop a military surveillance satellite and a communication satellite with civilian research institute. Although MTCR, entered into with the U.S., restricts the development of space-launching vehicle for the export purpose, the development of space-launching vehicle by the Korea Air Force or Korea Aerospace Research Institute is beyond the scope of application of MTCR, and Air Force may just operate a satellite in the orbit for the military purpose. The primary task for multi-purpose satellite is a remote sensing; SAR sensor with high resolution is mainly employed for military use. Therefore, a system that enables Air Force, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, and Agency for Defense Development to conduct joint-research and development should be instituted. U.S. Air Force has dismantled its own space-launching vehicle step by step, and, instead, has increased using private space launching vehicle. In addition, Military communication has been operated separately from civil communication services or broadcasting services due to the special circumstances unique to the military setting. However, joint-operation of communication facility by the military and civil users is preferred because this reduces financial burden resulting from separate operation of military satellite. During the Gulf War, U.S. armed forces employed commercial satellites for its military communication. Korea's participation in space technology research is a little bit behind in time, considering its economic scale. In terms of budget, Korea is to spend 5 trillion won for 15 years for the space activities. However, Japan has 2 trillion won annul budget for the same activities. Because the development of space industry during initial fostering period does not apply to profit-making business, government supports are inevitable. All space development programs of other foreign countries are entirely supported by each government, and, only recently, private industry started participating in limited area such as a communication satellite and broadcasting satellite, Particularly, Korea's space industry is in an infant stage, which largely demands government supports. Government support should be in the form of investment or financial contribution, rather than in the form of loan or borrowing. Compared to other advanced countries in space industry, Korea needs more budget and professional research staff. Naturally, for the efficient and systemic space development and for the prevention of overlapping and distraction of power, it is necessary to enact space-related statutes, which would provide dear vision for the Korea space development. Furthermore, the fact that a variety of departments are running their own space development program requires a centralized and single space-industry development system. Prior to discussing how to coordinate or integrate space programs between Agency for Defense Development and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, it is a prerequisite to establish, namely, "Space Operations Center"in the Air Force, which would determine policy and strategy in operating space forces. For the establishment of "Space Operations Center," policy determinations by the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chief of Staff are required. Especially, space surveillance system through using a military surveillance satellite and communication satellite, which would lay foundation for independent defense, shall be established with reference to Japan's space force plan. In order to resolve issues related to MTCR, Air Force would use space-launching vehicle of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute. Moreover, defense budge should be appropriated for using multi-purpose satellite and communication satellite. The Ministry of National Defense needs to appropriate 2.5 trillion won budget for space operations, which amounts to Japan's surveillance satellite operating budges.

  • PDF