• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.1-23
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• 2011

I take the position of the thirders on the sleeping beauty problem like Elga and criticize Lewisian halfers. In particular, I attack Franceschi's recent arguments for the halfers. In addition, I claim that Bostrom's and Kim's hybrid view is not satisfactory, because it is to pre-empt or to take the burden of proof that the problem is the genuine paradox. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to show that the thirders' argument is more intuitive than others and what the fallacies of the halfer's arguments are.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.17-53
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• 2012

Some Korean Philosophers has manifested their opinions on Sleeping Beauty problem. For example, Hasuk Song and Namjoong Kim stands for an thirder, while Hanseung Kim for a perspectivistic compatibilist. In order to fill a vacant position, I shall make an argument for halfers in this paper. My presumption is that the probability the question now given to sleeping beauty is the first question among several is greater than thirder's calculated value. Futhermore, I argue that the probability the coin landed heads on condition that the question now given to sleeping beauty is the first question is greater than 1/2.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.21-52
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• 2010

What van Fraassen calls 'Reflection Principle' is claimed to meet several counterexamples, one of which stands out in the form of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Adam Elga argues that what he believes is the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem shows that Reflection is subject to counterexamples. David Lewis proposes a different answer which preserves Reflection intact. Recently, Nick Bostrom presents a hybrid view which is supposed to allow us to keep Reflection. In proposing his hybrid view Bostrom criticizes both Elga and Lewis while taking some 'good' parts from each. He claims that Elga's view is not entirely acceptable because it presupposes the 'Self-Indication Assumption'. I shall claim, however, that Elga could avoid Bostrom's criticisms by introducing Bostrom's notion of agent-part. I believe that several probability-related puzzles including the Sleeping Beauty problem indicate a promising view concerning the way we should regard our future selves' opinions. According to this view, whether one takes the outsider stance or insider stance makes a difference in an important way that one and the same proposition is associated with different degrees of belief by one agent.