• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.117
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• pp.275-301
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• 2011

Die Einzelwissenschaften, zum Beispiel, die Biologie, die Psychologie, Soziologie behandeln heuzutage den Menschen. Aber sie alle behandeln den Menschen nach ihren eigenen Gesichtpunkten. Infolgedessen $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ die Einzelwissenschaften den ganzen Menschen als den Menschen nicht $ber{\ddot{u}}ksichtigen$. Jhre Anthropologien $m{\ddot{u}}{\ss}en$ daher weitgehend $beschr{\ddot{a}}nkt$ bleiben. Dagegen entwickelte Max Scheler im letzten Jahrhundert eine neue philosophische Anthropologie. Seine Anthropologie ist wirklich neu und grundgehend. Diese Anthropologie bestimmt den Menschen als Geist, Freiheit, Person. Aber Max Scheler betont allzusehr "den Geist" in seiner philosophischen Anthropologie und infolgedessen distanzierter sich vom "Leben" in seinem $Menschenverst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$. Die Verfasserin sieht hier in dieser philosophischen Anthropologie einen Dualismus zwischen den Geist und das leben. Und Verfasserin findet eine Integration von Geist und Leben in der ontologischen Anthropologie bei Edith Stein. Diese ontologische Anthropologie charakterisiert sich $folgenderma{\ss}en$. 1. Es ist eine Anthropologie des "$Ge{\ddot{o}}ffnet$-Seins." 2. Es ist eine Anthropologie des "$Gef{\ddot{u}}hlt$-Seins." 3. Es ist eine Anthropologie des "Einheits-Seins." Die Verfasserin behauptet infolgedessen die ontologische Anthropologie bei Edith Stein sei eine geeignete und $sachm{\ddot{a}}{\ss}ige$ Anthropologie.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.351-380
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• 2018

In every society, citizens must decide how to punish criminals, uphold the virtue of justice, and preserve the security of the community. In doing so, the members of society must ask themselves how they will punish those who carry out the most abhorrent of crimes. Many common responses to such a question is that death is an acceptable punishment for the most severe crimes. But to draw some theoretical distinction between a crime that deserves incarceration and a crime that is so heinous that it deserves capital punishment is subject to three errors. First, what possible line could be drawn? To decide on a particular number of deaths or to employ any standard would be arbitrary. Second, the use of a line would trivialize and undermine the deaths of those whose murderers fell below the standard. Third, any and all executions still are unjust, as the State should not degrade the institution of justice and dehumanize an individual who, although he or she has no respect for other human life, is still a living person. Simply put, all murders are heinous, all are completely unacceptable, and deserve the greatest punishment of the land; however, death as punishment is inappropriate. Also, while this article arrives at the conclusion that the death penalty is an inappropriate form of punishment, I have not offered an acceptable alternative that would appease those who believe capital offenders deserve a punishment that differs in its quality and severity. This is a burden that, admittedly, I am unable to meet. I finally conclude that the death penalty is unjustified retribution. This is the only claim that can effectively shift the intellectual paradigms of the participants in the debate. The continued use of the death penalty in society can only be determined and influenced by the collective conscience of the members of that society. As stated at the outset of this article, it is this essentially moral conflict regarding what is just and degrading that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the present operation of our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.58
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• pp.201-243
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• 2018

Understanding the theory of how a religion accepts the perspective on death is a prerequisite to grasp the identity and characteristics of such religion. Furthermore, contemplating the perspective on death, itself has a significant meaning as the contemplation provides an insight on how religion has, currently is and how it would influence the practical life of the human race. This current study compares and analyzes the perspective on death accepted by New Religions of Jeungsan, Confucianism and Taoism. By comparing the perspectives on death, this study seeks to conclude the similarity and discrepancy of New Religions of Jeungsan, Confucianism and Taoism. The objective of this study is to summarize the religious characteristic and identity of New Religions of Jeungsan, and the social role of New Religions of Jeungsan. How does New Religions of Jeungsan preach afterlife? This question implies varieties of questions including: In what shape or form does human exist in afterlife?; Does human maintain their original identity in afterlife?; What happens to relations with family members in afterlife?; What is one's role in afterlife, and what would one experience in afterlife? or Does soul transmigrate or are reborn? This current study compares the answers to these questions one by one with Confucianism and Taoism.In general, this current study was conducted with a non-religious methodology. Death can be explained in three different domains: the psychological domain explaining the individual psychological awareness upon encountering death; the philosophical-religious domain explaining the death through the philosophical understanding of the human concept; and the socio-cultural domain explaining death through the social ceremonies upon death.This current study focuses on the philosophical domain of the perspective on death accepted by New Religions of Jeungsan, with a comparison of the socio-cultural significance. To understand the perspective on death preached by New Religions of Jeungsan, It is indispensable to explain the five key elements of Hon(魂), Baek (魄), Shin(神), Young(靈) and Seon(仙) that construe death. The perspective on death preached by New Religions of Jeungsan imposes a multi layer of acceptance and overcoming. This current study complements the problems and limits of previous studies by comparison with Confucianism and Taoism. Throughout this process, this current study intends to highlight the key elements of the perspective on death preached by Deasunjinrihoe, and identify the aspects of each key element. With the sophisticated discussion of the perspective on death provided by New Religions of Jeungsan with clarity, this current study will provide grounds for future studies to extract, in detail, the aspects of the perspective on death preached by New Religions of Jeungsan, in further subjects including: discussions on death such as rituals for death, treatment of bodies, funerals, educating death, euthanasia, or suicide; discussions on the existence of hell; discussions on psychological aspects of ones who encounter death; or discussions on rebirth of those who died during the creation era. This current study will provide an overview on what kind of perspective on death does those who are faithful to New Religions of Jeungsan have and currently are living their life with.