• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.53
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• pp.553-591
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• 2017

This article discussed whether so-called 'foreign judgments obtained by fraud' is in breach of public policy provided in Article 217(1)(3) of Civil Procedure Act and, if so, what the specific requirements could be. The summary of the conclusion is as follows. The 'foreign judgments obtained by fraud' is against the municipal procedural public policy and then shall not be recognized. In this regard one more question comes up whether reviewing if 'foreign judgments obtained by fraud' is in breach of the municipal procedural public policy is allowed in consideration of the principle of prohibition of $r{\acute{e}}vision$ au fond. Since the principle is applied entirely in the course of the above reviewing, it is allowed only when it does not breach the principle. The two instances that the reviewing is allowed are where the defendant was not able to produce evidences of fraud during foreign procedures and where the defendant's claim of fraud without evidences was rejected by the foreign court and then evidences of fraud were found after the foreign procedure was completed. On the other hand, the specific requirements for 'foreign judgments obtained by fraud' to be against public policy are following four requirements based on principle of strict interpretation of public policy. (1) plaintiff's intention to fraud, (2) preventing the defendant from being involved in the procedure by fraud or cheating the foreign court using manipulated evidences, (3) the defendant could not present himself in the foreign court procedure due to the plaintiff's extraneous fraud or the foreign court decided wrongly due to intrinsic fraud, and (4) defendant's fundamental procedural rights were breached to the extent that recognizing the effect of foreign judgments was against justice defendant's fundamental procedural rights. These results differ from the Supreme Court 2004. 10. 28. ruling 2002da74213 in many aspects. Most of all, in my opinion there is no need to distinguish between intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud and reviewing 'foreign judgments obtained by fraud' is not in conflict with the principle of prohibition of $r{\acute{e}}vision$ au fond but the both may coexist. In this regard I expect the variation of the Supreme Court's position and hope to contribute to academia and practitioners.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.225-261
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• 2005

Under Article IV of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in order to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, a party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall supply (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. In addition, if the arbitral award or arbitration agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language, and the translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. In a case where a Vietnamese company which had obtained a favorable arbitral award in Vietnam applied for recognition and enforcement of a Vietnamese arbitral award before a Korean court, the recent Korean Supreme Court Judgment (Docket No. 2004 Da 20180. 'Judgment') rendered on December 12, 2004 has alleviated the document requirements as follows : The Judgment held that (i) the party applying for recognition andenforcement of a foreign arbitral award does not have to strictly comply with the document requirements when the other party does not dispute the existence and the content of the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement and that (ii) in case the translation submitted to the court does not satisfy the requirement of Article 4, the court does not have to dismiss the case on the ground that the party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award has failed to comply with the translation requirement under Article 4, and instead may supplement the documents by obtaining an accurate Korean translation from an expert translator at the expense of the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. In this regard, the author fully supports the view of the Judgment. Finally, the Judgment held that, even though the existence of a written arbitration agreement was not disputed at the arbitration, there was no written arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and wenton to repeal the judgment of the second instance which admitted the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. In this regard, the author does not share the view of the Judgment. The author believes that considering the trend of alleviating the formality requirement of arbitration agreements under Article 2 of the New York Convention, the Supreme Court could have concluded that there was a written arbitration agreement because the defendant participated in thearbitration proceedings in Vietnam without disputing the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement. Or the Supreme Court should have taken the view that the defendant was no longer permitted to dispute the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement because otherwise it would be clearly against the doctrine of estoppel.