• Title/Summary/Keyword: 슈타켈버그 게임

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Adaptive Network Pricing Scheme based on the Stackelberg Model (슈타켈버그 모델을 이용한 적응적 네트워크 가격 결정 기법에 대한 연구)

  • Jung, Woo-Suk;Kim, Sung-Wook
    • Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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    • v.37 no.2
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    • pp.94-98
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    • 2010
  • In this paper, we formalize a new adaptive online price control scheme based on the Stackelberg game model. By using the hierarchical interaction strategy, control decisions in each mechanism act cooperatively and collaborate with each other to satisfy conflicting performance criteria. In addition, our dynamic online approach is practical for real network implementation. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can adaptively adjust the network price to approximate an optimized solution under widely diverse network situations.

An Anti-Virus Vaccine Selection Model Based on Stackelberg Game (슈타켈버그 게임 기반 Anti-virus 백신 선택 모형)

  • Sung, Si-Il;Choi, In-Chan
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.19 no.1
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    • pp.135-144
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    • 2009
  • This paper deals with an information security problem that involves the strategies of both an attacker and an administrator of a web-based system. A game-theoretic model for the problem, based on an Stackelberg game environment, is presented. In the model, the administrator selects a set of anti-virus vaccines to cope with potential system attackers and the intruder chooses attacking modes that are most effective against the administrator's chosen set of vaccines. Moreover, the model considers a number of practical constraints, such as a budget limit on the vaccine purchase and a limit on the system performance. In addition, two different scenario analyses are provided, based on the results of the proposed model applied to a simulated pseudo-real-world data.

Game-Based Content Caching and Data Sponsor Scheme for the Content Network (콘텐츠 네트워크 환경에서 게임이론을 이용한 콘텐츠 캐싱 및 데이터 스폰서 기법)

  • Won, JoongSeop;Kim, SungWook
    • KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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    • v.8 no.7
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    • pp.167-176
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    • 2019
  • Recently, as the types of services that can be enjoyed in mobile telecommunication networks such as social networks and video streaming are increasing, mobile users(MUs) can access mobile contents easily by consuming mobile data. However, under a mobile telecommunication environment, MUs have to pay a high data fee to a network service provider(SP) in order to enjoy contents. The 'data sponsor' technique, introduced as a way to solve this problem, has attracted attention as a breakthrough method for enhancing contents accessibility of MUs. In this paper, we propose an algorithm that determines the optimal discount rate through the Stackelberg game in the data sponsor environment. We also propose an algorithm to design edge caching, which caches highly popular content for MUs on edge server, through many-to-many matching game. Simulation results clearly indicate that the profit for CP's content consumption is improved by about 6~11%, and the profit of CP according to the ratio of edge caching is improved by about 12% than the other existing schemes under data sponsor environment.

An Analysis on the Generation Market Using Stackelberg Game Equilibrium (슈타켈버그 게임을 이용한 발전경쟁시장의 균형 분석)

  • Kim, Jin-Ho;Park, Jong-Bae;Park, Jun-Ho
    • Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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    • 2005.07a
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    • pp.775-777
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    • 2005
  • In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

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