• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.233-249
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• 2017

This study investigates the relation of managerial ability and firm performance in case of Chaebol in Korea. We employ non-financing firms at Korean markets for the period 2000-2015. Most important decision is made by the head of Chaebol which increases firm value eventually and he has such a strong dominant power that managers belongs to Chaebol have to follow mother firm's decision directions. So it is expected that managers belongs to Chaebol have to focus on long term performance rather than short term profits, which means they concentrate their managerial ability much on the firm value. Otherwise, managers in which non-Chaebol focus their ability on periodic accounting earnings. Thus, this study examines an empirical analysis on the relation of managerial ability and firm performance and the effect of Chaebol on the relation of managerial ability and firm performance. Empirical results are as follows: First, there exists a statistically significant positive relation between managerial ability and firm performance either short- or long-term. Second, we extend this relationship into Chaebol condition and find that managerial ability of Chaebol positively influences on the firm value which is long-term performance, rather than return on assets which is short-term performance. These results imply that managers belongs to Chaebol much concentrate their ability on long-term value which is differenciated from the case of non-Chaebol samples. Chaebol is an important issue in Korea because it dominates most of Korean local economy so its' impact from small changes on our economy is big enough. Our study examining the relationships between managerial ability of Chaebol and firm performance is meaningful and it is a good signal that they concentrate their ability much on the long-term value rather than short-term profits. We expect that the results of this study will provide the academic and practical references. This study will contribute to the future research in accounting through an analysis of managerial ability which is a new measure, Chaebol, and firm value.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.11
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• pp.195-216
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• 1998

Ownership of an asset can be identified with the right to exercise "residual control" where the contract is silent about decision rights, or with the right to receive any "residual returns" that remain after contractual. obligations are fulfilled. Although the concept of "ownership" seems reasonably clear in many of the cases, the concepts of residual control and the residual returns that define ownership are actually quite elusive. For large corporations, there is really no single individual who owns both the residual returns and the residual control. Despite the limited qualifications, ownership is clearly. the most common and effective meas to motivate people to create, maintain, and improve the value of assets. In this paper, we try to clarify the relationships among financial structure, ownership, and corporate control with the concept of ownership defined as the residual control and the residual returns, Financial securities are not just claims to part of a firm's net income. They give the security holder certain rights. A careful matching of rights of control and returns can create incentives that increase total value of the firms. In the corporate firms, managers, lenders, and shareholders have different interests. And the financial structure affects how different those interests are and what decisions management will make. Managers are, in general, better informed than investors about the firm's prospects. The financial decisions by managers may affect investors' beliefs and, therefore, the price of shares and the value of the firm.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.45-73
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• 2007

The empirical results are summarized as follows : First, In relation to effects of ownership structure on firm value, there is the non-linear relationship between major(and foreign) shareholder's holdings and firm value. So the results(the compromise hypothesis) by prior researches(Morck et al. 1988 and so forth) is supported. However Institutional shareholder's holdings do not show the significant results. Second, In relation to effects of outside directors on firm value, equally the results of prior researches(Vafeas 2000, Choi et al. 2004), the higher the ratio of outside directors in the board, the higher firm value. Also there is the non-linear relationship between outside directors ratio and firm value. Furthermore, the higher the possibility of outside directors election in the board, the higher the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. As the economic importance of KOSDAQ is more increase, the researches of KOSDAQ should be more realized.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.1029-1048
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• 2009

The purpose of this study is to diagnose the level of perception of domestic construction companies about the US & Korea FTA completed in 2007. According to the survey results, the more innovative the construction company is and the stronger ownership the construction company has, the more actively preparing for FTA. Altogether, our construction companies have well recognised the inevitable impacts on the domestic construction industry. On the other hand, most of them are more or less negative about whether or not the FTA gives us a good chance to switch from domestic companies into global companies.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.1151-1156
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• 2011

Leveraged buyouts (LBO) means the acquisition of a company using bonds and loans. There are the prolific volumes of LBO transactions in the international M&A markets, and its influence to the financial market is increasingly huge. However, there are very few LBO transaction in the domestic M&A market and there are also few researches in this field due to the private nature of LBO transactions. Once a company is privatized through a LBO transaction, it is not so long before it is relisted on the stock exchange or it is resold to a third-party investor. In order to repay the borrowed money, an LBO investor may decide to end a company's private status through an exit via an initial public offering (IPO) or a takeover. In this paper, we expand Kaplan's study on the organizational status of post leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction. We find that there is a significant change starting 1986. Most notably, fewer LBOs remain private, the median holding period of the LBO was cut in half to 3.2 years and of those that exit, IPO exits had significantly shorter holding periods. Regression analysis shows that good market conditions lengthen the holding period of a LBO investment whereas the size of the transaction shortens it.

• 한국디지털정책학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2003.12a
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• pp.251-261
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• 2003

최근 정보보호의 중요성에 대한 인식이 확산되고 있음에도 불구하고 정보보호에 관한 적절한 투자가 이루어지지 않아, 효과적인 정보보호 시스템 구현이 지연되고 있다. 이는 전 세계적인 경제불황이라는 원인도 있겠지만, 정보보호 투자에 대한 정당화 논리가 부족하여 최고 경영자의 의사결정에 적절히 반영되지 않은 이유가 더 크다고 할 수 있다. 정보보호는 조직의 업무 수행에 수반되는 부대비용 개념으로 인식되어 왔으며 이 결과 ROI 와 같은 정보보호 투자에 대 한 정당화 논리를 제공하지 못해 적절한 투자가 적절히 수행되지 못하였다. 따라서 최근에는 정보보호 투자에 대한 수익과 지출간의 관계를 통한 ROSI(Return on Security Investment) 분석을 통한 정당화 논리 전개에 대한 필요성이 대두되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 ROSI 산출에 대한 접근방법을 비교 분석하고 TCO(Total Cost of Ownership)를 이용한 ROSI 방법을 제시하고자 한다. TCO는 하드웨어 가격뿐만 아니라 기술지원 및 유지 지원 인력 등을 모두 고려한 총 소유비용이다. 즉 정보보호에 대한 정확한 총 비용을 구하는데 매우 적합하다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구의 결과는 기업들로 하여금 좀 더 효과적인 정보보호 투자 정당화 수단으로서 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2014.01a
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• pp.109-110
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• 2014

본 논문에선 우선 MA(Merger and Acquision) 영역을 파악하고자 한다. MA 영역은 장비의 성능향 상 및 가격 하락과 매우 영향이 깊은 영역이다. 우리는 그 영역 중에서 장비 교체 시 원가절감 효과가 가능한 영역, 서버, 스토리지, 소프트웨어의 As-is vs To-be 원가를 비교 분석한다. 그리하여 기업의 소유자 또는 경영자가 기업 및 경영상태 전반에 대한 방향을 결정하는 의사결정 근거로 활용한다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2022.07a
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• pp.357-360
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• 2022

우리나라는 1997년 IMF 경제위기 이후 기업의 지배구조와 관련한 상법과 증권거래법 등이 수차례에 걸쳐 개정을 통한 정비가 되었다. 기업지배구조에 대한 문제는 우리나라 경우에만 한정되는 것이 아니라 미국을 비롯한 유럽 등 많은 선진국에서 중요한 문제점으로 대두되고 있는 것이 사실이다. 특히 우리나라에서 기업지배구조와 관련하여 많은 문제가 발생되고 있는 것은 지배주주와 경영진의 기업경영에 대한 감독 등이 제대로 이루어지지 않았을 뿐만 아니라 지배주주와 기업 경영진들에게 그에 책임을 제대로 묻지 않았기 때문이다. 그리고 아직도 우리나라 대부분의 기업들에 있어서 오너 경영자의 소유주식 비중이 높은 관계로 의사결정권을 독선적으로 행사하는 등 사실상 경영의 건전성을 확보할 수 없었던 것이다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 이사회가 본연의 기능을 회복하고 바람직한 지배구조를 개선하는데 있어서 걸림돌이 되는 부분을 검토하고 그에 대한 효율적인 개선안을 제시하고자 함이 연구의 목적이다.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.287-305
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• 2016

This study confirms that there is a correlation between managers' incentive-compensation system(introduction of the compensation committee) and corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, proportion of outside directors, debt ratio, competitive strength), and analyzes whether firm value is affected by corporate governance mechanisms. The purpose of this paper are empirically tested using 318 firm-year data listed on the KRX from 2001 to 2010 and 2SLS(two-stage least square method) were used for the analysis of the hypotheses. The results of empirical tests are as follows. Firstly, there is no correlation between introduction of the compensation committee and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, the results show that there is a causal relationship between some variables. Secondly, results from the analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm value, only introduction of the compensation committee and foreign investors ownership were analyzed as a positive impact on the firm value. This result means that most domestic firm don't actively used for managers' incentive-compensation system as a useful control device for improving corporate governance.