• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.21 no.1
• /
• pp.93-127
• /
• 2012

We estimate how much KEPCO can save their loss and how much social welfare can be increased by applying the real-time pricing instead of current regulated retail price in the electricity market in order to analyze the problem of the regulated retail price which is fixed below the marginal cost. We estimate the demand functions of peak time and off-peak time in summer (June to August) and winter (December to February). We construct the supply function based on hourly step-wise linear marginal cost functions, too. We find that the increase of social welfare will be 67 billion won in summer if the fixed retail price is changed into the real-time pricing scheme. The total 705 billion won will be transferred from consumer surplus to producer surplus and the rest (67 billion won) will be saved from the reduction of deadweight loss among KEPCO's loss. In winter, the increase of social surplus will be 225 billion won and 1,174 billion won of KEPCO's loss will be transferred from consumer surplus. As a result, we conclude that the regulation of the retail price in the electricity market induces the social welfare loss and KEPCO suffers a huge loss.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
• /
• 2002.11a
• /
• pp.693-696
• /
• 2002

이동전화시장은 제공되는 서비스와 거래주체 등에 따라 소매시장과 도매시장으로 분류된다. 특별히 도매시장에 해당되는 이동착신요금은 최종수요자에게 이동전화서비스를 제공하기 위한 사업자간 거래로서 원가에 근거하여 산정 되도록 규제되고 있다. 그리고 원가에 근거한 방식으로는 장기증분원가방식(TSLRIC: total service long run incremental costs)에 따른 요금산정방식이 최근 통신선진국을 비롯하여 도입 추진 중에 있다. 한편 호주에서는 이러한 추세와 다르게 최근 이동착신요금을 장기증분원가방식이 아닌 소매가격벤치마킹 (retail benchmarking)방식을 적용토록 하였다. 이러한 이유는 호주의 이동망 시장이 다른 통신선진국과 달리 경쟁의 정도나 상황이 다름에 기인한다. 따라서 본 고에서는 이동망 착신요금산정방식으로 고려될 수 있는 적절한 방식들에 대한 검토와 호주의 이동망시장상황과 이에 적합한 요금산정방식을 검토 분석하여 국내 이동망 시장에 주는 시사점을 도출한다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2009.07a
• /
• pp.575_576
• /
• 2009

최근 전력산업의 구조적인 측면에서는 수직적 형태의 분리 및 경쟁 도입, 그리고 민영화를 통한 효율 증진 등 전력산업 개편이 전세계적으로 이루어지고 있다. 전력산업의 개편 과정에서 전력공급자(ESP)는 불완전한 시장으로 인한 재정적인 위험에 직면한다. ESP가 재정적인 위험에서 근본적으로 벗어나기 위해서는 합리적인 전기 소매 가격의 책정이 필요하다. 본 논문에서는 현재 적용되고 있는 고정 소매 가격제에 대한 문제점을 제시하고 이를 극복하기 위해서 전기 공급 도매 가격의 변동성을 예측함으로써 헤징을 통한 새로운 요금제의 도입의 필요성을 제안하는 것이 본 논문의 목적이다. 본 논문에서 소개될 새로운 요금제인 Critical Peak Pricing(CPP)에서 전기 공급 도매 가격의 변동성의 예측은 CPP 요금을 적용하는데 중요한 역할을 담당하는 지표로 활용된다. CPP 요금을 적용함으로써 ESP의 재정적인 위험을 최소화하고 수요 탄력성이 반영되어 전기 소비자들과의 관계 향상 또한 유도될 수 있다.[4],[6]

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
• /
• s.301
• /
• pp.28-31
• /
• 2016

올 4월 일본의 전력소매 시장이 전면 자유화됐다. 자유화 이전에는 전국 10개 전력회사가 각자 지역에 대해 전력 공급을 독점하였기 때문에, 주택용 전력 소비자가 다른 전력사의 전기를 구입하는 건 불가능했다. 하지만 현재에는 소비자가 자유롭게 전력회사를 선택할 수 있다. 전면자유화 이후 가장 눈에 띄는 변화는 전력소매 사업자 증가, 다양한 요금제 출시 및 새로운 결합상품의 등장이다.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.32 no.11B
• /
• pp.700-708
• /
• 2007

This paper considers an incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry with respect to the sale of retail and access services. This regulation scheme induces the monopoly carrier who owns bottleneck facilities to adopt socially optimal outcomes when providing access and retail services. It is well known that upstream carriers can realize an integrated level of profit, without integration, by means of a two-part tariff. First, this paper introduces a framework for regulating an access and retail price combined with budget balancing. Second, this paper introduces two-part tariff (price discrimination) scheme for both access (upstream) and retail (downstream) services and discusses the resulting implications for incentive regulation when the regulator has incomplete information about cost functions. By imposing a self-selection mechanism, the regulator can induce firms to adopt socially optimal prices in both access and retail markets.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
• /
• 2004.10a
• /
• pp.632-635
• /
• 2004

통신사업자들은 설비사용에 대해 최종사업자나 서비스 공급자에게 사용량 기준인 종량요금제를 부과해 왔으나 특히 유선전화의 경우 월별 정액제로 지불하는 용량기반 요금제로의 움직임을 보이고 있다. 따라서 본 고에서는 향후 유무선망 도소매 서비스의 요금제도의 방향을 검토해 보고 국내외 사례를 통해 요금제 변화사항이나 이슈 등을 살펴보았다.

• Informatization Policy
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.88-107
• /
• 2011

This paper proposes a prepaid system promotion policy for the 3G(WCDMA) MVNO with regard to the newly included paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 32 (User Protection) and Article 38 (Provision of Wholesale Telecommunications Services) of the Telecommunication Business Act, which was revised on March 22, 2010. As of June 2011, there are only a few prepaid system subscribers to the mobile communications service due to various limitations, including prepay, interconnection, carrier selection, the MVNO policy, and number portability. However, overseas communications service regulatory agencies and service providers are increasingly presenting policies and strategies for mobile prepaid plans, in order to accommodate the various customer demands that are increasing the use of smart phones and data. This paper advances various proposals concerning promotion of the prepaid system by the 3G MVNO under the current Telecommunication Business Act, including separation of the prepaid data system and the mobile network; introduction of a monthly fixed-rate hybrid prepaid system, a top-up system and USIM system; introduction of mobile network carrier selection; differentiated retail discounts between prepaid and post-paid prices; revision of the retail discount policy for wholesale provision; increase in the number of mandatory service providers; and in-depth consideration of the introduction of a number portability policy for the prepaid and post-paid systems.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.15 no.5
• /
• pp.1007-1017
• /
• 2011

It is important to set the new interconnection system under NGN. The traditional interconnection system is based on traffic, but this is not suitable for IP based service. Therefore, it is needed to ensure the universal access to network without trouble about the network topology. This paper prepares the evaluation criteria and evaluates the alternatives. Specifically, we deduce the alternatives and evaluates the alternatives of interconnection settlement system based on the condition of efficient interconnection, the retail price and access charging model, and the previous studies evaluating and examining the various alternatives. Finally, we evaluate each alternatives by the criteria.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.37 no.6B
• /
• pp.453-463
• /
• 2012

The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.

• International Area Studies Review
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.231-248
• /
• 2014

The relationship between market structure and social welfare outcomes has received considerable critical attention in the field of competition policy research. In particular, it is necessary to study in greater depth the impact of market power on social welfare in the telecommunications industry, which is highly likely to form a monopolistic market structure. This is because, when market powers are concentrated on few upper carriers, there are negative effects on social welfare due to an excess of profits. Against this background, the present study investigates the relationship between the market structure of the mobile communications industry (the level of market power) and social welfare outcomes (the retail rate cut) through an international comparison. The results demonstrate that both the market structure and competition status of the Korean market have had significant gaps in global trends. It also points out that the monopolistic market structure (when the leading provider has more than 50% of the market share) has significantly negative effects on consumer welfare (the retail price cut). In addition, the findings of this study suggest that the direction of competition policy should focus on not only improving market concentration(HHI), but also on mitigating the monopoly of power of a dominant operator.