• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.57-75
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• 2019

In investigating how set-off defenses matter in arbitration, one should take into account that it is not permitted against the parties' will for arbitrators to rule on the disputes that are not the subject of an arbitration agreement, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties involved, because it is considered that the parties intend to solve only the disputes which are the subject of the agreement by arbitration. Also, one should keep in mind that the parties must settle the disputes that are the subject of an arbitration agreement by arbitration when they conclude the agreement, and it is not allowed against the parties' will to resolve the disputes in other ways. The parties may agree whether the respondent can request for arbitration on the counterclaim, which is his/her claim against the claimant, and whether the respondent can raise a plea for a set-off that his/her claim against the claimant is a counter obligation. Failing on such agreement, the respondent may submit a counterclaim when his/her claim and the claimant's claim are the subject of the same arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal may rule on the counter obligation when the arbitration agreement, which becomes the basis for the claimant' claim, has an effect on the counter obligation. Where the claimant fails to raise an objection even after he/she becomes aware that the respondent has requested for arbitration or has raised a plea for set-off by providing his/her claim which is not the subject of the arbitration agreement as a counterclaim or a counter obligation, the arbitral tribunal may rule on the respondent's claim against the claimant. On these occasions, the arbitral tribunal has to guarantee the parties an opportunity to defend themselves by pointing out those situations. It will meet the purposes of arbitration systems to rule out the jurisdiction of the courts when the plaintiff alleges the existence of the arbitration agreement, in case the respondent raises a plea for set-off based on his/her claim which is not the subject of the arbitration agreement in the litigation procedures. However, where the plaintiff fails to allege the existence and conducts pleading in the court with regard to the counter obligation, the court must not reject the respondent's set-off defense because of the existence of the agreement.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.