• Title/Summary/Keyword: 사보타지

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Current Status and Prospect of Techniques for Identification of Sabotage Targets (에너지 시스템의 사보타지 표적 인식 기법의 현황 및 전망)

  • Kim, Seong-Ho;Choi, Y.;Jung, W.S.;Kim, K.Y.;Yang, J.E.
    • Proceedings of the Korea Society for Energy Engineering kosee Conference
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    • 2007.11a
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    • pp.288-293
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    • 2007
  • 미국 911 테러 발생 이후로, 국가 기반시설(예: 송/배전 전력망, 석유/가스 파이프라인, 원자력 발전소, 정보통신 시설, 교통 시설, 금융 시설, 매스미디어 시설 등)에 대한 테러리스트의 사보타지 리스크를 관리하는 도전문제에 정부 차원이나, 기업 차원에서 국내외적으로 뜨거운 이목이 집중되고 있다. 그 가운데 에너지 시스템, 특히 원자력 발전소의 물리적 보안은 국가 안보 차원에서 매우 중대한 이슈가 되고 있다. 이는 사보타지로 인한 이러한 시스템의 파손이 국민, 작업자, 또는 외부 환경에 방사성물질 누출과 같은 중대한 결말을 초래할 수 있기 때문이다. 원전과 같은 복잡 시스템에서 설계 기준 위협이 초래할 수 있는 이러한 결말은 그 시스템의 특정 핵심 표적(예: 부품, 구역, 자산, 행위, 인원)의 방호를 통해 효과적으로 방어될 수 있다. 다시 말하면, 표적 인식에서는 어떻게 방어할 것인가에 앞서서 무엇을 방어할 것인가를 다루려는 것이다. 이 연구의 주요 목적은 여태까지 개발된 다양한 표적 인식 기법의 개발 추세를 소개하고 향후 전망을 제시하는 데에 있다. 이를 통해 표적 인식 기법의 수월성, 신뢰성, 및 경제성을 제고할 수 있으리라 본다. 표적 인식 기술의 활용성 측면에서 볼 때, 표적 인식은 하드웨어 적이거나 소프트웨어적인 방호 시스템의 설계에 필수적이므로, 신뢰성 높은 표적 인식은 다음과 같은 긍정적인 파급 효과를 줄일 수 있다: 1) 사보타지 리스크 감소에 직간접적으로 기여할 수 있다; 2) 제한적인 보안 재원을 효율적으로 할당할 수 있다; 3) 보안 대응군대의 훈련 시나리오를 개발할 수 있다; 4) 발전소 규제요건인 안전조치 계획을 비용이나 보안 측면에서 향상시켜 국민 안심(public easiness)을 도모할 수 있다. 향후에는 보다 더 광의적인 복잡 시스템 사이에서 상호 연계적인 사보타지에 대한 표적 인식의 기법들이 점검될 필요성이 있다고 본다.

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A Study on Trend of Aviation Terrors and Countermeasures (항공테러의 추세와 대응에 관한 연구)

  • Choi, M.S.;Choi, Y.C.
    • Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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    • v.13 no.3
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    • pp.117-128
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    • 2005
  • Since terrorist attacks on the United States in 9/11, the aviation terror has been rapidly reduced while having an enormous amount of expenses invested in the aviation terror prevention. The aviation terror indicates itself the problem, and by the same token, the aviation terror prevention requires a huge investment. However, the available resources are limited, which raises concern over the effective use of the limited resources. Therefore, in order to contribute to the establishment of effective aviation security measures, this study examines and analyses the aviation terror types and changes, with the forecast of the aviation terror types with high occurrence potentiality, and suggests the countermeasures for the aviation terror prevention.

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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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International Law on the Flight over the High Seas (공해의 상공비행에 관한 국제법)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.26 no.1
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    • pp.3-30
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    • 2011
  • According to the Article 86 of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) the provisions of high seas apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. Article 87 also stipulates the freedom of the high seas. International laws on the flight over the high seas are found as follows; Firstly, as far as the nationality of the aircraft is concerned, its legal status is quite different from the ship where the flags of convenience can be applied practically. There is no flags of convenience of the aircraft. Secondly, according to the Article 95 of UNCLOS warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military(or state) aircraft over the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. Thirdly, according to the Article 101 of UNCLOS piracy consists of any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft. We can conclude that piracy can de done by a pirate aircraft as well as a pirate ship. Fourthly, according to the Article 111 (5) of UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only military aircraft, or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. Fifthly, according to the Article 110 of UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an authorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. Sixthly, according to the Article 1 (5)(dumping), 212(pollution from or through the atmosphere), 222(enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the atmosphere) of UNCLOS aircraft as well as ship is very much related to marine pollution. Seventhly, as far as the crime on board aircraft over the high seas is concerned 1963 Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(Tokyo Convention) will be applied, and as for the hijacking over the high seas 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(Hague Convention) and as for the sabotage over the high seas 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(Montreal Convention) will be applied respectively. These three conventions recognize the flag state jurisdiction over the crimes on board aircraft over the high seas. Eightly, as far as reconnaissance by foreign aircraft in the high seas toward the coastal States is concerned it is not illegal in terms of international law because its act is done in the high seas. Ninthly as for Air Defence Identification Zone(ADIZ) there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention. The legal status of the foreign aircraft over this sea zone might be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states whether this zone is legitimate or illegal. Lastly, the Arctic Sea is the frozen ocean. So the flight over that ocean is the same over the high seas. Because of the climate change the Arctic Sea is getting melted. If the coastal states of the Arctic Sea will proclaim the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) as the ocean is getting melted, the freedom of flight over that ocean will also be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states.

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