• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2004.05b
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• pp.533-536
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• 2004

선발사업자 또는 지배사업자의 접속자금 지원 방식은 주로 이 사업자들의 시장 영향력에 대응하여 유아기 산업을 보호가기 위해서 도입되었다. 비대칭 유무선접속료에도 해당되며 유선서비스에서 이동서비스로 지원하는 과도한 접속자금 지원은 이동서비스 시장의 급성장으로 인하여 그 정당성을 상실하고 역으로 시장경쟁의 왜곡현상을 불러오게 되었다. 본 연구에서는 과도한 비대칭 유무선 접속료로 인한 “접속지원자금” 규모를 알 수 있는 방법을 살펴보고자 한다. 또한 영국, 프랑스, 독일을 중심으로 과도한 비대칭 유무선 접속료에 따른 시장 경쟁 환경을 분석하고 이를 해소할 수 있는 방안을 살펴보고자 한다.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.123-132
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• 2014

Internet is composed of many independent networks referred to as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and each provider is generally interconnected based on a commercial agreement. Though many countries are engaged in deregulation in internet interconnection, there is still debate whether the large ISPs are unwilling to peer with small providers, have incentives to lower the quality of data transmission of transit operators or set the interconnection charge regarding the actual costs incurred by the interconnection. Korean government introduced regulations in internet interconnection after observing noticeable anti-competitive behaviors from 2005. This paper analyzes whether there is margin squeeze problem/market concentration, and suggests political proposals in Korean regulation status.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.47-89
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• 2020

We introduce a simple theoretical model to analyze the welfare impact of a competition policy in the natural gas market in South Korea. An incumbent monopolistic firm currently owns essential facilities, but the competition policy mandates that the firm provide open access to any entrant firm, charging an access fee. When no regulation is imposed on the fee pricing, this policy increases social welfare as well as the profit of the incumbent firm. When the pricing is regulated, however, social welfare depends on whether there is information asymmetry between the government and the firm regarding the operating cost of the facilities. If the government has complete information, social welfare can be maximized by choosing the optimal prices. Otherwise, the government has to set the prices based on the information that the firm delivers. We formulate a Bayesian game to analyze this case and identify a set of perfect Bayesian equilibria to compare social welfare.