• Title/Summary/Keyword: 분점정부

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민주화 이후 국회생산성 추이 분석: 대통령 - 의회관계를 중심으로

  • O, Seung-Yong
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.16 no.1
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    • pp.101-144
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    • 2010
  • 이 연구는 국회 원내 생산성의 평가 범주를 법안심사, 예 결산심사, 국정감사의 3개 범주로 나누고, 법안심사, 예 결산심사, 국정감사의 산출물을 국회의원에게 투입된 비용으로 나눈 결과를 역대 국회별 정부유형별로 비교하여 민주화 이후 국회생산성의 추이를 종합적으로 평가했다. 국회 원내 생산성을 측정해본 결과, 정부유형이 법안심사, 예 결산 심사, 국정감사 생산성에 영향을 미치고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 단점정부는 법안심사에서 대통령과 집권당에 우호적인 환경을 제공해 줌으로써 전체 법안 가결의 생산성이 높아진다. 그러나 예 결산 심사의 생산성은 정부예산의 수정률이 낮아짐으로써 생산성이 낮아지고, 국정감사 역시 행정부의 정책집행에 대한 지적사항을 반대당 지배 국회보다 적게 산출함으로써 생산성이 낮아진다. 반면 분점정부는 대통령과 집권당에게 비우호적인 입법 환경을 제공함으로서 법안심사의 생산성은 낮은 반면, 정부 예산안의 삭감비율이 높아지면서 예 결산 심사의 생산성은 높아지고, 국정감사에서 행정부에 대한 다수의 시정요구를 함으로써 국정감사의 생산성 역시 높아진다. 결국 생산성의 높고 낮음이 문제가 아니라 생산성의 내용이 중요하다. 생산성의 '절대값'보다 생산성의 내용과 성격에 대한 이해가 선행되어야 하는 이유가 여기에 있다.

The Characteristics and Limitations of 'Automatic Submission of Budget Bills to Plenary Session', Article 85-3 of the National Assembly Act (국회법 예산안 자동부의제의 성격과 한계)

  • Jung, Jinwung
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.103-133
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    • 2018
  • This paper examines whether the budget making process has improved since the Automatic Submission of Budget Bills to Plenary Session Act was enacted. The budget bill was passed before the Dec. 2 deadline from 2014 to 2016. Several researchers, therefore, concluded that the clause is in favor of the ruling party and the majority party. However, this study confirmed that the argument is valid only under the condition of unified government. In other cases, the government party can have a limited impact on the budget-review process, and the aspects of the budget screening process are similar to those before the Act was enforced. Under the conditions of the divided government and two-party system, it is difficult that the budget bill is passed by the legal deadline. In the case of the divided government and multi-party system without majority party, the third party exerts a very significant influence on the budget-review process.

Counter-Honeymoon Elections and Presidential Party's Advantages: Russia and Colombia (황혼선거와 집권당의 선거이득: 러시아와 콜롬비아)

  • Lee, JunHan
    • International Area Studies Review
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    • v.12 no.2
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    • pp.327-349
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    • 2008
  • This essay ascertains the relationship between counter-honeymoon elections and presidential party's electoral advantages. In order to achieve this goal, this study briefly reviews the literature relevant to this subject. And this study empirically tests the impacts of the couter-honeymoon elections on the electoral results by analyzing the official election outcomes in Russia and Colombia. This essay concludes the implications of the study.

Re-examining the Effects of Partisan Politics on Welfare Expenditures in Korean Local Governments (지방정부 복지지출에 미치는 정치요인의 영향 재고찰)

  • Kim, Beomsoo;Lee, Byung-Jae
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.203-239
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    • 2018
  • Responsible government can be achieved when social cleavages are institutionalized via political competition and social interests are represented by responsible parties. This paper aims to investigate the factors that determine welfare expenditures in Korean local governments by analyzing partisanship and political competition factors simultaneously in the same model. This paper also argues that the relationship between the political factors and welfare expenditures in local governments is not linearly increasing as the previous studies claim. This paper examines the welfare expenditures in Korean municipality-level local governments in 2007, 2011, and 2015. The primary findings are: 1) the partisanship of the head of local government and the party distribution of local assembly members have meaningful effect on the welfare expenditures and the divided governments do not show significantly different effect on welfare expenditures from unified governments, which is contrary to the extant studies, 2) the partisan effects of the head and the local assembly vary according to the levels of municipalities (Gu, Gun, and city), mainly due to the difference in types of revenues and expenditures and 3) the relationship between seats shares of progressive parties in local assembly and the welfare expenditure is not linearly increasing one. The effect of seats shares of progressive parties dramatically begins to increase when the seats shares are in 40%-60%. With these findings, this paper highlights the conservative nature of head of local governments with Hannara party (or Saenuri Party), the conservative leaning of independent candidates, and the conservative orientation of local assemblies in the regions dominated by Democratic Party (and its equivalents).

The Political Environment and the President's Influence for Policy toward North Korea: Focusing on the process of 'Special Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the West Sea' policy making (대북정책 결정의 정치적 환경과 대통령의 영향력 : '서해평화협력특별지대' 정책결정 과정을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Yoon Young;Choi, Sun
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.31-66
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this study is to analyze the institutional factors and the political environment in which the influence of the president is limited in South Korea's decision making process of the policy toward North Korea. Although the president has the highest decision-making power over policy toward North Korea as a head of state, the president's influence is not always absolute. Many reasons, such as bureaucratic government through the separation of power, the political environment such as divided government or the remaining term of the president,and the specificity of policy act as factors limiting the president's influence on policy toward North Korea. This study analyzed the dynamics of the decision making process of the 'Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the West Sea' which was planned by the agreement between the two Koreas in 2007, and examined the influence of the president, limited by the institutional environment and political conditions in the process.