• Korean Business Review
• /
• v.21 no.1
• /
• pp.1-17
• /
• 2008

This article examines the establishment of the game theoretic model for the cleaner vehicles and analyzes the established model. We discuss the way to represent the players' preferences over the outcomes to make the model applicable in real practice. In this article we employ the real data to represent the preferences. In the analysis of the model we consider various scenarios and discuss how we can use GAMBIT, which is a game theory analysis software, to find solutions in each proposed scenario.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.5 no.4
• /
• pp.107-126
• /
• 2006

The voluntary agreement between industries and government on the recycling of wastes has been analysed. The agreement is one of the threatened voluntary agreements. Theoretically these agreements make it possible to fulfill recycling goals with minimized cost. It is the objective of this paper to evaluate the efficiency of the voluntary agreement on recycling wastes by examining of Nash Equilibrium. In the first place, the equilibrium of a bilateral agreement between the representative of industries (association of firms) and government will be analysed to confirm if cost minimization strategies by the association result in a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium. This is followed by an analysis of a multilateral agreement among the members of the association to see how the equilibrium and efficiency conditions change. We tried to find some implications that the result of the analysis casts on the environmental policy matters.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2006.07a
• /
• pp.357-358
• /
• 2006

전력 산업이 자유화되고 경쟁을 통해 효율성을 증가시키려는 시도가 이루어지고 있다. 전력이 시장을 통해 거래되는 형태가 완전경쟁에 가까울수록 사회후생이 증가한다는 것이 알려져 있다. 하지만 발전 회사가 시장지배력을 행사하여 가격을 경쟁가격에서 벗어나게 함으로서 자신의 이익을 취하려 할 때 시장의 효율성은 감소하게 된다. 시장 지배력을 감소시키는 한 수단으로서 발전회사에 선도계약을 부과하는 방법이 있다. 발전 회사에 선도계약을 부과하는 방법을 사용할 때 어떤 회사를 선도계약 부과대상으로 삼을 것 인지와 계통의 송전제약 통에 대한 고려가 필요하다. 이에 대한 연구가 2모선 계통에 대해 게임이론의 혼합균형 개념을 통해 부분적으로 이루어져 있다. 본 논문에서는 3모선 계통에서 선도계약의 영향을 분석하고자 한다. 본 논문의 해석 결과에 의하면 3모선 계통에서도 선도계약은 상황에 따라 시장지배력의 감소 혹은 증가를 모두 불러올 수 있으며 기대사회후생에 부정적 영향 뿐 아니라 부정적 영향 역시 줄 수 있다.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.303-311
• /
• 2022

Recently the telemedicine platform firms which have been temporarily permitted since COVID-19 outbreak have increasingly provided online prescription drugs delivery, causing concerns among incumbent providers of medicine, some of whom began to take aggressive actions again them. In this study, using game theoretic market entry - deterrence model, we show that although the incumbent medicine provider can effectively deter entry by the telemedicine platform firms by its preemptive action, accommodation could be a optimal action when telemedicine platform firms already have penetrated the market with their being permitted to do business due to the COVID-19. However, for the incumbent to cooperate for the successful change in the retail market for medicines, policies like placing a ceiling on the maximum number of taking prescriptions by the pharmacists a day in the telemedince platform network, providing favorable exposure of community pharmacists on the telemedicine platform user interface, and allowing community pharmacies to participate as shareholders of the telemedicine platform firms in its initial public opening of capital, are suggested.