• Title/Summary/Keyword: 미.중 무역갈등

Search Result 4, Processing Time 0.021 seconds

Factors Influencing Chinese Coastal Shippers' Carrier Selection Amid the U.S.-China Trade Conflict and the COVID-19 Pandemic (미·중 무역 갈등과 팬데믹 상황에서 중국 연안 화주의 컨테이너 선사 선정 요인 분석)

  • Zhu, Xinyuan;Park, Byungin
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
    • /
    • v.40 no.3
    • /
    • pp.187-210
    • /
    • 2024
  • This study examines the factors influencing container shipping carrier selection among coastal shippers in China amid the pressing external challenges posed by the U.S.-China trade conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, during a period when China is implementing policies to open its maritime market. Using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to analyze survey data, the research identifies multi-modal transportation services, carrier operational capabilities, and logistics risk management as key determinants. Notably, salesperson professionalism, cargo safety, and fleet stability during peak periods emerged as critical factors for shippers. The disruptions caused by the trade conflict and the pandemic have heightened shippers' focus on risk management and transportation reliability, further emphasizing the importance of carrier service quality and operational capabilities. This study underscores the need for carriers to strengthen their risk management capacities and enhance service quality in response to shifting global conditions. Additionally, the findings suggest that policymakers should consider regulatory adjustments to mitigate uncertainties in the shipping industry. Future research should delve deeper into the long-term impacts of external shocks on carrier selection decisions.

Post-corona and semiconductor industry: The risk of separation of the semiconductor value chain triggered by Corona 19 and the response strategy of the Korean semiconductor industry (포스트 코로나와 반도체 산업 : 코로나19로 촉발된 반도체 밸류체인 분리 위험과 한국 반도체 산업의 대응전략)

  • Kim, Kiseop;Han, SeungHun
    • Journal of Technology Innovation
    • /
    • v.28 no.4
    • /
    • pp.127-150
    • /
    • 2020
  • The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the third pandemic in history after the Hong Kong flu and swine flu. The outbreak of Corona 19 dramatically reduced exchanges between countries, while rapid contagion created a time gap in economic fluctuations by country. In January 2020, the trade dispute between the US and China entered into a consensus phase, but the economic decoupling phenomenon caused by Corona 19 made it difficult for China to balance trade with the US and made it difficult to comply with the terms of the trade dispute agreement between the US and China. President Trump attributed the responsibility for the spread of Corona 19 to China, and pointed out that the cause of the economic downturn was the infringement of Chinese trade secrets and illegal copies, and protectionism arose. As a result, China protested fiercely, and the conflict with the United States deepened. The US has declared trade sanctions on Huawei and SMIC, which are key companies in China's semiconductor industry, and is predicting the risk of a disconnection of the semiconductor value chain between the US and China. The separation of the value chain of the semiconductor industry has the potential to have a big impact on the semiconductor industry, a structure that is highly specialized and monopolized by certain countries and companies in the value chain. This paper aims to deal with the risk of disconnection in the semiconductor value chain between the US and China reignited by Corona 19, the impact and change of the global semiconductor industry value chain, and the response strategies of Korean semiconductor companies.

An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea : Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions (대북경제제재의 효과성과 미래 발전 방향에 대한 고찰: 해상대북제재를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Sang-Hoon
    • Strategy21
    • /
    • s.46
    • /
    • pp.239-276
    • /
    • 2020
  • The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
    • /
    • v.5 no.1
    • /
    • pp.1-53
    • /
    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

  • PDF