• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.341-368
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• 2016

Asserting a sentence of the form "p but I do not believe that p" sounds inappropriate, and even absurd or contradictory. The problem that Moore's paradox raises is to explain why asserting such a sentence is absurd despite the fact that there is apparently no logical contradiction in it. Many of the influential accounts of Moore's paradox try to locate its source in the nature of belief or in the nature of assertion. In this paper, I argue that these accounts are not satisfactory, and develop and defend a novel account. According to this account, the source of Moore's paradox should be located in self-reference. Self-reference is constituted by a certain disposition to form second-order beliefs. A subject who is ready to assert "p but I do not believe p" fails to conform to the disposition that is constitutive of self-reference, while at the same time referring to the relevant individual with "I."

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.287-322
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• 2014

We put forward a scheme of the theory of analysis, and G. E. Moore's theory of analysis is reconstructed. As C. H. Langford pointed out, Moore's theory commits to the paradox of analysis which says that if a analysis is correct then it is not informative, and if it is informative it is not correct. For, according to his theory, analysing statement is necessarily true identity statement and have some information. Moorean responses which is given by Max Black, Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, and Wilfrid Sellars rely on the distinction between the information about concepts and linguistic entity. These approaches are deficient in dealing properly with the difference in concepts as analysandum and analysans. Also, non-Moorean resolutions asserted by Myers, King, Black, and Earl are examined.