• Title/Summary/Keyword: 렘데시비르

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The Study of Comparative Legal Review According to Data Exclusivity of Pharmaceutical Marketing Authorization - In preparation for the development of drugs and vaccine of COVID-19 - (의약품 자료독점권(Data Exclusivity)에 대한 비교법적 고찰 - COVID-19 치료제 및 백신 개발을 대비하여 -)

  • Park, Jeehye
    • The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.223-259
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    • 2020
  • With COVID-19 spreading rapidly around the world, research and development issues on treatments and vaccines for the virus are of high interest. Among them, Remdesivir was the first to show noticeable therapeutic effects and began clinical trials, with each country authorizing the use of the drug through emergency approval. However, Gilead Co., Ltd., the developer of Remdesivir, received a lot of criticism from civic groups for submitting the application for the marketing authorization as an orphan drug. This is because when a new drug got a marketing authorization as an orphan drug could be granted an exclusive status for seven year. The long-term exclusive status of an orphan drug comes from the policy purpose of motivating pharmaceutical companies to develop treatment opportunities for patients suffering from rare diseases, which was not appropriate to apply to infectious disease treatments. This paper provides a review of the problems and improvement directions of the domestic system through comparative legal consideration against the United States, Europe and Japan for the statutes which give exclusive status to medicines. The domestic system has a fundamental problem that it does not have explicit provisions in the statute in the manner of granting exclusive status, and that it uses the review system to give it exclusive status indirectly. In addition, in the case of orphan drugs, the "Rare Diseases Management Act" and the "Regulations on Examination of Items Permission and Reporting of Drugs" provide overlapping review periods, and despite the relatively long monopoly period, there seems to be no check clause to recover exclusive status in the event of a change in circumstances. Given that biopharmaceuticals are difficult to obtain patents, the lack of such provisions is a pity of domestic legislation, although granting exclusive rights may be a great motivation to induce drug development. In the United States, given that the first biosimilar also has a one-year monopoly period, it can be interpreted that domestic legislation is quite strictly limited to granting exclusive status to biopharmaceuticals. The need for improvement of the domestic system will be recognized in that it could undermine local pharmaceutical companies' willingness to develop biopharmaceuticals in the future, and in that it is also necessary to harmonize international regulations. Taking advantage of the emergence of COVID-19 as an opportunity, we look again at the problems of the domestic system that grants exclusive rights to medicines and hope that an overall revision of the relevant legislation will be made to establish a unified legal basis.