• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.129-156
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• 2018

Recently, a lot of articles and writings defending animal right and welfare are introduced into our society. For example, P. Singer's Animal Liberation, T. Regan's The Case for Animal Rights, and J. Rachels's Created From Animal are representative writings of animal ethics. In his books, P. Singer maintains that all animals are equal. T. Regan insisted that animals as a subject of a life have rights. J. Rachels's moral individualism is that how an individual may be treated is to be determined, not by considering his group membership, but by considering his own particular characteristics. Interestingly, they use common argument called 'argument from marginal cases' to justify their theoretical positions. If we can disclose the weakness of the argument, all kinds of animal ethics which defend animal right and welfare such as animal liberation theory, animal rights theory and moral individualism will collapse. In this paper, I will examine the concrete contexts in which Singer, Regan and Rachels make use of the argument. And I will critically examine the argument. Lastly I will show that the attempt to deny the difference of species is unsuccessful.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.476-496
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• 2005

This paper considers some significances and limitations in application of Rawls' liberal theory of justice to conceptualization of environmental and ecological justice. It first reviews Rawls' liberal theory of justice, then examines how his theory of justice considers natural resources and can be applied to develop distributive theory of environmental justice, and finally explores what kinds of problems would be generated when Rawls' theory of justice is to be extended to animals and other natural components. In Rawls' theory of justice the status of natural resources is described as a objective condition for justice, but it is argued that natural resources should be seen as a substantial component of just production and distribution. It also can be stressed that his theory of justice does not secure a just result of resource distribution, even though it has a great significance for just procedure of distribution. Finally, it seems hardly possible to extend Rawls' theory of justice to animals and other natural components to develop a Rawlsian theory of ecological justice, because liberalism and Western tradition of science on the basis of which Rawls' theory of justice has developed presuppose an ontological dualism of human beings and other natural components, and hence cannot recognize the inherent value of nature.