• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.213-261
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• 2018

On May 9, 2018, regime change took place in Malaysia. It was the first regime change that took place in 61 years after independence in 1957. The regime change was an unexpected result not only in Malaysian experts but also in political circles. Moreover, the outcome of the election was more shocking because the opposition party was divided in this general election. The regime change in Malaysia was enough to attract worldwide attention because it meant the collapse of the oldest regime in the modern political system that exists, except North Korea and China. How could this have happened? In particular, how could the regime change, which had not been accomplished despite opposition parties' cooperation for almost 20 years, could be achieved with the divided opposition forces? What political implications does the 2018 general election result have for political change and democratization in Malaysia? How will the Malaysian politics be developed in the aftermath of the regime change? It is worth noting that during the process of finding answers, a series of general elections since the start of reformasi in 1998 tended to be likened to a series of "tsunami" in the Malaysian electoral history. This phenomenon of tsunami means that, even though very few predicted the possibility of regime change among academia, civil society and political circles, the regime change was not sudden. In other words, the regime in 2018 was the result of the desire and expectation of political change through a series of elections of Malaysian voters last 20 years. In this context, this study, in analyzing the results of the election in 2018, shows that the activation of electoral politics triggered by the reform movement in 1998, along with the specific situational factors in 2018, could lead to collapse of the ruling government for the first time since independence.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.37
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• pp.371-405
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• 2004

International circulation of cultural assets involves numerous countries thereby making an approach based on international law essential to resolving this problem. Since the end of the $2^{nd}$ World War, as the value of cultural assets evolved from material value to moral and ethical values, with emphasis on establishing national identities, newly independent nations and former colonial states took issue with ownership of cultural assets which led to the need for international cooperation and statutory provisions for the return of cultural assets. UNESCO's 1954 "Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict" as preparatory measures for the protection of cultural assets, the 1970 "Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property" to regulate transfer of cultural assets, and the 1995 "Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects" which required the return of illegally acquired cultural property are examples of international agreements established on illegal transfers of cultural assets. In addition, the UN agency UNESCO established the Division of Cultural Heritage to oversee cultural assets related matters, and the UN since its 1973 resolution 3187, has continued to demonstrate interest in protection of cultural assets. The resolution 3187 affirms the return of cultural assets to the country of origin, advises on preventing illegal transfers of works of art and cultural assets, advises cataloguing cultural assets within the respective countries and, conclusively, recommends becoming a member of UNESCO, composing a forum for international cooperation. Differences in defining cultural assets pose a limitation on international agreements. While the 1954 Convention states that cultural assets are not limited to movable property and includes immovable property, the 1970 Convention's objective of 'Prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property' effectively limits the subject to tangible movable cultural property. The 1995 Convention also has tangible movable cultural property as its subject. On this point, the two conventions demonstrate distinction from the 1954 Convention and the 1972 Convention that focuses on immovable cultural property and natural property. The disparity in defining cultural property is due to the object and purpose of the convention and does not reflect an inherent divergence. In the case of Korea, beginning with the 1866 French invasion, 36 years of Japanese colonial rule, military rule and period of economic development caused outflow of numerous cultural assets to foreign countries. Of course, it is neither possible nor necessary to have all of these cultural properties returned, but among those that have significant value in establishing cultural and historical identity or those that have been taken symbolically as a demonstration of occupational rule can cause issues in their return. In these cases, the 1954 Convention and the ratification of the first legislation must be actively considered. In the return of cultural property, if the illicit acquisition is the core issue, it is a simple matter of following the international accords, while if it rises to the level of diplomatic discussions, it will become a political issue. In that case, the country requesting the return must convince the counterpart country. Realizing a response to the earnest need for preventing illicit trading of cultural assets will require extensive national and civic societal efforts in the East Asian area to overcome its current deficiencies. The most effective way to prevent illicit trading of cultural property is rapid circulation of information between Interpol member countries, which will require development of an internet based communication system as well as more effective deployment of legislation to prevent trading of illicitly acquired cultural property, subscription to international conventions and cataloguing collections.