• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.43
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• pp.107-139
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• 2014

Tasan Chong Yak-yong has criticized Zhu Xi's metaphysical viewpoints of human being. Therefore he revealed his viewpoint of human being and the theory of moral practice through his thoughts about the Lord of Heaven and human nature with spiritual inclination toward goodness. He has drawn the Lord of Heaven into Confucianism again. Heaven as the Lord endows human being with a nature that enjoys virtues and detests vices. It watches human being's good and evil. Here we can say Heaven is a outer efficient cause of moral behavior. According to Tasan, human being has its own 'self directed weight'自主之權 so that he can make a judgment and decision about what to do. Therefore we have to do manifest this moral inclination which is a inner efficient cause of moral behavior. That is to say, we must follow the order of daoxin道心 inside our mind. If we did go against it, our mind would be uncomfortable. Now through the method of so-called shu恕 we need to put filial piety孝 fraternal respect弟 compassion慈 into practice. These three moral practices represent the spirit of reciprocity in Confucianism. These lead us to make an achievement of ren仁, representative virtue in the theory of moral practice. Our moral practice means the fulfillment of humanity. This is the way to serve Heaven. Tasan insists that theses are the core thoughts of Confucius and Mencius.

• Journal of architectural history
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• v.10 no.4 s.28
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• pp.77-92
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• 2001

현대의 건축시기는 다원성의 시기 또는 복합성의 시기라고 불리운다. 모더니즘과 포스트모더니즘의 시기를 거치며 다양한 형태적 실험의 과정을 겪었고 수많은 이데올로기와 이론들로 무장된 논쟁의 역사도 갖게 되었다. 이러한 현대건축의 다양성은 건축디자인이라는 전문직의 사회에 기여하는 역할을 반추(反芻)함과 동시에 다변하는 인간사고의 역동성을 반영하고 있다. 건축관련 책자나 저널 등에서 흔히 발견할 수 있는 Neo-Classicism, Deconstructivism, Minimalism, High-Tech, New Moderns 등등의 건축양식들은 스타일을 지칭하는 언어라기보다는 건축적 사고를 지칭하는 언어라고 할 수 있다. 결국 건축디자인이라는 작업은 인간을 둘러 싼 건조환경의 생성에서 출발하는 것이므로 건축적 사고방식은 그 시기의 사회현상과 밀접한 관계를 맺게 된다. 20세기 말부터 불어닥친 디지털 문화의 사회변혁은 전 세계를 하나의 채널로 엮게 되었고, 이러한 영향들은 지역과 민족, 그리고 종교적인 요소들까지도 혼합하여 국경을 초월한 미래의 새로운 이상들을 꿈꾸게 되었다. 19세기 산업혁명과 함께 급속히 벨라진 인류문명의 진보는 필수적으로 세계화를 동반하는 것이고, 세계화와 지역성사이의 괴리를 통해 나타나는 문화적 비판과 충돌은 아직도 진행상태인 것이다. 세계화라는 통염은 문명의 보편성을 기반으로 하며 전통문화의 파괴가 뒤따를 수밖에 없는데, 현재와 같이 IT혁명을 통해 급속도로 빨라진 세계문화의 교류는 한 국가가 뿌리를 내리고 있는 문화적 유산이라는 토양을 포기하여야 할 단계에 와 있다고 논평할 정도이다. 여기서 건축은 문화적 상징으로 작용하게 되는데, 그것이 심미적이든 관습적이든 또는, 경제적이든 건축가는 해답의 제시라는 임무에 직면하게 된다. 20세기에 진행된 모더니즘의 건축은 구조와 공간에 대한 고전건축의 숙원을 고덕건축이 이룬 것처럼 15세기 르네상스 시대로부터 진행된 형태와 공간, 기능, 그리고 아름다움과 기술(technology) 또는 경제성 등에 대한 건축적 의문과 탐구를 일단락지었다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 모더니즘의 한복판에 Mies van der Rohe라는 거장이 깊은 발자국을 남기며 한 시대를 이루었고 그가 남긴 시대정신의 이념과 가치를 Miesianism이라고 부른다. 실용성과 도덕성을 근본으로 하는 Miesianism은 대중에 호소하는 미적 표현주의를 부정하고 지역정서를 중시하는 문맥적 접근방식을 경시함으로써 보편화라는 현상을 불러일으킨 국제주의 양식의 한 부류로 비판을 받아왔다. 즉, Miesianism의 단순하고 강렬한 외형적 요소는 그것이 내포하는 기술적 합리성이나 공간적 완결성을 무시한 채 전 세계에 영향을 미쳤고 동시에 지역적 저항을 받게 되었다. 시카고 및 전 세계의 Miesian들, 즉 Mies van der Rohe의 제자들이나 그로부터 영향을 받은 수많은 건축가들은 이러한 저항과 비판에 직면하게 되며 새로운 사고의 시대적 요구 앞에 고뇌하게 된다. 한국에서는 1978년 Mies van der Rohe의 제자인 김종성이 미국에서 서울로 돌아와 '서울건축컨설탄트'를 설립하며 본격적으로 Miesianism의 규범적 건축론을 설파하기 시작하였다. 이른바 시카고 국제주의학파의 건축전수라고 할 수 있는데 '서울건축컨설탄트'를 통하여 배출된 김종성의 제자들은 명쾌하고도 간결한 건축해법의 경험을 토대름대로의 정체성을 갖고자 노력하였으나 결국 다원적 가치를 요구하는 시대적 흐름 속에 혼란을 겪고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 본 연구는 Miesianism의 기원을 밝히고 그것의 실수와 오류를 밝힘과 동시에 현대의 여러 가지 건축유형들과 비교하여 봄으로써 Post-Miesianism의 실체와 그 미래에 대하여 고찰하여 보고자 한다. 미스의 유산이라고 할 수 있는 Miesianism의 요체는 첫째, Schinkel로부터 이어받은 시대정신의 사명감, 둘째, Berlage가 전해준 전문가로서의 도덕성을 바탕으로 하여 이루어진 기술적 합리성의 실현, 그리고 마지막으로 그 당시의 추상예술에 대한 이해로써 받아들인 nee-Suprematism의 아방 가르데적인 자세라고 할 수 있다. 그러나 이것들을 전파하고 수용하는 과정에서 미스적인 단순하고 명쾌한 외관이 더욱 강한 인상을 남기게 되었고 또한 미스가 현대성의 본질이라고 믿는 기술의 전수는 모든 외관을 동일하게 만드는 International Style로서의 보편적 획일성을 초래하였다. Mies van der Rohe의 강력하고 규범적인 dogma는 그의 제자들에게는 강렬한 카리스마로 각인되었고, Mies가 원한 것이 아닐지라도 그들을 하나의 틀 속에 가두는 영향력을 행사하였다. 2세대이든 3세대이든 기술적 합리성과 추상적 단순미라는 믿음을 맹목적으로 추종할 때 그들은 Miesian으로 남아있게 되며, 거기서 벗어났을 때 non-Miesian, 또는 배신자로 취급하기까지 하였다. 이것은 미스의 제자들에게 강한 족쇄가 되어 형태적 또는 개념적 변화의 시도를 어렵게 하였고 시대적 요구에 부응하지 못한다는 평가에 이르게 되었다. 문화의 다양성과 역동성을 인정함과 동시에 Miesianism에 대한 새롭고 시대에 적합한 해석을 기대하게 되는데, 이러한 기대 속에서 우리는 Post-Miesianism이라는 새로운 유형을 엿볼 수 있게 된다. Post-Miesianism의 징후를 현대의 다양한 건축유형에서 발견할 수 있는데, High-Tech의 구축적이고 정밀한 건축 기술적 해법과 Minimalism의 반복성을 통한 추상미의 표현 등에서 뿐만이 아니라 Post-Modernism의 인간성의 추구나 문맥적 고려, 또는 해체주의의 형이상학적이고 아방가르데적인 실험주의 정신까지조차 Post-Miesianism이 공유할 수 있는 부분이 있다고 보여진다. 또한, 미스의 영향이 2세대, 3세대의 건축가들에게 미치면서 여러 방향으로 변질되어 가는 것을 우리는 발견할 수 있으며 그러한 시대성에 적응하는 시도들이야말로 새로운 미래를 향한 Post-Miesianism의 실체인 것이다. Mies가 말하였듯이 한 시대의 끝은 그 시대가 완전히 이해되었을 때이며, 모더니즘의 숙제는 아직 해결되지 않았으므로 Miesianism의 탐구는 Post-Miesianism이라는 새로운 주제로 계속될 것이다. 이를 통하여 21세기 디지털 문명의 시대 속에서 현대건축이 안을 수밖에 없는 보편성과 지역성의 충돌이라는 문제의 해결에 한 발걸음 다가갈 수 있기를 기대하여 본다.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.4-23
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• 2020

This study examines the universal meaning of the roof-end tile, our cultural property, and especially focuses on an ontological interpretation of the "Smile of Silla" roof-end tile. In addition, the problem of good and evil read here is considered in connection with the universal problem of philosophy. The issue of good and evil is a theme in philosophy, theology, religion, and culture that will endure throughout human history in both the East and the West. Augustine and Schelling inquired deeply into the source of evil and obtained an answer to this question based on their methods, but their answer is not universal or absolute, or an answer that applies to everyone. This is because the issue of good and evil possesses both a direct relationship with every human being and a characteristic that will remain unresolved. That is to say, the metaphysical question regarding the source of evil will always be one that is open. Nietzsche, however, repudiated the morals handed down through Socrates and Christianity, and urged that we reside "beyond good and evil." This brief review argues that good and evil exists in the form of a being in itself, whether it is within our grasp or not, and reveals that good and evil is more "this-worldly" than it is "other-worldly". The roof-end tiles with facial markings passed on to us also presuppose that evil is in full force in this world and exerts its influence. This review taps into several folk methods for coping with the existence of an invincible evil that surpasses human capability and contemplates the extraordinary and creative ideas of the Silla people through their "Smile of Silla" roof-end tiles with facial markings that were used to counter evil.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.42
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• pp.259-294
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• 2014

The key concept of political thoughts of Confucianism is 'Tian(天)=the Heaven' and 'Ren(人)=the Human being'. In particular, the meaning of 'the Heaven(天)' is profoundly exclusive in Confucianism in comparison to the other concepts. It is because that 'the Heaven' is connected with 'Ri(理)' which explains the human being and the heaven metaphysically, and the discussions about those concepts have also been widening to the political field. And if the concept of 'the Heaven's nature(天命)' is excluded, it is difficult for us to discuss the essence of political thought of Confucianism. This paper argued how the politicalization of 'the Heaven' which was private dimension of monarch in the strict sense, changed to the public dimension of people in Japan in the early 18th century through some theories of the two famous philosopher, Ito-Jinsai(伊藤仁齋) and Ogyu-Sorai(荻生?徠) who belonged to the 'Kogakuha(古學派)'. The doctrines of Chu-tzu(朱子學) has hold absolute authority over the history of the oriental political thoughts. But the authority have gone through the stage of disorganization in a unique space called Eto(江戶) era of Japan. Therefore, the interpretations and concept establishments in a new dimension are naturally formed in that periods about 'Min(民)=People'. Based on discussions like this, the purpose of this paper is to study how those movements are emerged in what kinds of thinking and debating process. In part of Ito-Jinsai, this paper have reconsidered the concept of 'People' which Jinsai had thought and examined closely with critical mind about 'In(仁)=Mercy'. In case of Ogyu-Sorai, this paper have argued his political theory of 'the welfare of the people in the nation(安民天下)', in clarifying with the concept of 'the Roads of the Saint(先王의 道)' and the meaning about his declaration that "the Six Scripture(六經) is things(物)". The meaning of political view of this two philosopher is in the point to suggest some kinds of cure for problems of those days with the former days values. In the Jinsai's doctrine, that cure is 'the realization of the rule of right(王道)' based on new interpretation of 'Mersy'. And in case of Sorai, that is a form of independence of politics from morality based on 'the Roads of the Saint'.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.67
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• pp.297-325
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• 2017

In this paper, the ideological features of Mohism were examined through the analysis into the viewpoint of Mohism on justice and benefit and "universal love" based on it. Even before the viewpoint on justice and benefit became a main agenda in Confucianism, Mohism and the Hundred Schools of Thought, there had been discussions on it, and the relation between "justice" and "benefit" was generally understood as that of means and ends(本末) or that of the thing and its functions(體用). What succeeded to this tendency and set it as an individual's moral standard was the viewpoint of Confucianism including Confucius. Of course, the Confucian view was focused on the politicians or leaders of those times. Compared to which, Mohism represented the stance of their group members and pursued the interest of groups and the society rather than that of individuals. Accordingly, while Confucianism considered "justice" more important than "benefit", Mohism could understand both of them unificatively. The crucial reason why Mohism could be most active during the Warring States Period is that it had its metaphysical basis on "the disposition of Providence." Accompanying this, the viewpoint of Mohism on justice and benefit was internally reflected in its key arguments including "universal love." That is so-called "Jianxiangai, Jiaoxiangli", that is to say, "that loving each other is namely benefiting each other." On the other hand, the fact that the viewpoint of Mohism on justice and benefit, and furthermore, the ideological foundation of its ten main arguments including universal love was "the disposition of Providence" became a double-edged sword. It was because it could be easily accepted by the laborers, farmers, and craftsmen consisting of Mohism of those times, but it instead became the reason for falling into ruins since the establishment of the feudal empire of Qin and Han(秦漢). In the feudal empire, the ideology and activities of Mohism as an individual group couldn't be embraced. For example, the way to set "Heaven"(the heavenly king) above "the sovereign ruler" might be a decisive limit to the legitimacy and rationality of the regime. Moreover, the arguments by Mohism, such as "Jieyong", "Jiezang", "Feiyue" and others couldn't be taken easily by the privileged class. Therefore, Mohism couldn't do any activities as an academic school until Seojedongjeom(西勢東漸) during the Qing dynasty later, and it was different from Confucianism. In brief, ideas of Mohism including universal love ended up as an utopian idea historically, but the conception of sharing mutual interest along with mutual love and consideration with Confucianism from the position of the relatively disadvantaged in the society has a value worthy of being appreciated even today.

• Journal of Popular Narrative
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.429-462
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• 2019

This paper argues how the concept of melodrama can be articulated with the Affect Theory and Posthumanism in relation to animal or environment representation which have emerged as the new topics of the recent era. The argument will be made through the discussion of Agustin Zarzosa's book, Refiguring Melodrama in Film and Television: Captitve Affects, Elastic Sufferings, Vicarious Objects. Using a genealogical approach, the book revisits the notion of mode, affect, suffering (hysteria), and excess which have been dealt with in the existing studies of melodrama. In chapter one, he broadens the concept of melodrama as a mode into the means of redistribution of suffering across the whole society in the mechanism of the duo of evil and virtue. It is the opposition of Brooks's argument in which melodrama functions as the means of proving the distinction between evil and virtue. Chapter two focuses on the fact that melodrama is an elastic system of specification rather than a system of signification, with the perspective of Deleuzian metaphysics. Through the analysis of Home from the Hill (Vincente Minnelli, 1959), this chapter pays attention to an 'affect' generated by the encounters between the bodies and the Mise-en-Scène as a flow not of a meaning but of an affect. Chapter three argues that melodrama should reveal an unloved (woman's) suffering, opposing the discussion on the role of melodrama as the recovery of moral order. Safe (Todd Haynes, 1995), dealing with female suffering caused by the industrial and social environment, elaborates on the arguments on melodrama in relation to female hysteria with ecocritical standpoints. The rest of the two chapters discusses the role of melodrama for the limitation and extension of the notion of the human through 'animal' and 'posthuman' melodrama. It argues that the concept of melodrama as 'excess' and 'sacrifice' blurs the boundary between human and inhuman. In summary, although the author Zarzosa partly agrees with Peter Brook's notion of mode, affect and sufferings,he elaborates the concept of melodrama, by articulating philosophical arguments such as Deleuzianism, feminism, and posthumanism (Akira Lippit and Carry Wolf) with the melodrama. Thefore, Zarzosa challenges the concepts of melodrama led by Brooks, which had been canonical in the field.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.46
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• pp.189-234
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• 2023

The most common and prevailing system of virtue ethics is based around the idea of personality rather than external behavior and it grew out of the Aristotelian system of virtue ethics. The purpose of this study is to find out the characteristics of the virtue ethics found within Daesoon Thought through comparison to Aristotelian virtue ethics. This can serve as a basis to establish the virtue ethics of Daesoon Thought in further studies. The systems of virtue ethics posited by the two traditions are similar in that they are both teleological as the virtues they recognize are related to human nature in the context of certain metaphysical assumption and they both exhibit the characteristic tendencies of seeking to realize the highest human good. Therefore, in the Aristotelian context, virtues can be defined as "characteristics needed for the realization of eudaimonia," and for Daesoon Thought, virtues are "characteristics needed for the realization of the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence." The representative virtues examined in this comparative study will be the Aristotelian Golden Mean, and the the concepts of guarding against self-deception and great benevolence and great justice in Daesoon Thought. In comparison to Aristotelian virtues, these differ in three main ways. First, Aristotelian virtue is not an innate aspect of character the way it is assumed to be in Daesoon Thought wherein the original human heart bestowed by Heaven is already virtuous. Second, mental virtue in the Aristotelian context centers the mind upon reason whereas in Daesoon Thought, the heart-mind exhibits both reason and emotional concern for others. Third, eudaimonia is a concept limited to humans and their societies whereas the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence is a good that includes all beings including divine beings, animals, plants, and Heaven and Earth. Despite the differences, both require practical reason, continuous education, and effort to succeed in the cultivation of virtues and the proper implementation of virtuous living.