• Journal of Ethics
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• no.86
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• pp.321-347
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• 2012

This study is to investigate the theoretical background of the content system for an integrated approach to multi-cultural education. It has been expanding to children from general family even though started to support children from multi-cultural family. Most of multi-cultural education programs would be their purpose as building the multi-cultural citizenship even though various multi-cultural education have been introduced. These programs had limited to apply western multi cultural education into Korea school, and Their focuses were not who is person to be morally educated in the multi cultural society. Thus, this study put emphasis on the necessity of and developed the content system for an integrated approach to multi-cultural education.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.141
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• pp.63-84
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• 2017

In the twentieth century Anscombe's 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" argued that duty-based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent for they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver". Concepts such as "morally ought", "morally obligated", and "morally right" require a legislator as the source of moral authority. In the past God occupied the role, but systems that dispense with God are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful employment of those concepts. Aristotle's virtue ethics can do so without appealing to any such lawgiver, and ground morality in the well being of human moral agents. Therefore Anscombe recommends a return to the eudaimonistic ethical theories of the ancients as secular approaches. Eudaimonia is a central concept in Aristotelian ethics, along with the terms "aret?"(translated as virtue or excellence) and "phronesis"(translated as practical wisdom). In Aristotle's works, eudaimonia was used as the term for the highest human good, and so it is the aim of practical philosophy to consider what it really is and how it can be achieved. Eudaimonia is a Greek word commonly translated as well-being, happiness, welfare or "human flourishing". As Aristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life which is objectively desirable, and means living well. Everyone wants to be eudaimon. And everyone agrees that being eudaimon is related to faring well and to an individual's well being. But the really difficult question is to specify just what sort of activities enable one to live well. Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of "virtuous activity in accordance with reason," this is a necessary condition of eudaimonia, the pleasure accompanied by virtuous activities is a sufficient condition. Hence we have a more accurate translation of eudaimonia with a review the practical meaning of eudaimonia, and the correlation between eudaimonia and arete, pleasure.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.323-347
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• 2017

In the 1980s, traditional analytic epistemology was abuzz with proposed solutions to the Gettier problem, responses to skepticism, newly minted objections to a variety of internalist and externalist theories of justification, and enthusiastic criticisms of foundationalism and coherentism. Debates over competing analyses of knowledge and justification raged. Since then, virtue epistemology has become a diverse and increasingly well-established field. I think that most researchers in Korea will feel the name "virtue epistemology" itself as strange or unfamiliar. It is primarily because virtue epistemology has a brief history. So, virtue epistemology did not present many opportunities for its introduction to Korean researchers. Another reason is that the name of "virtue epistemology" itself has a strangeness or unfamiliarity. Since the concept of "virtue" has mainly been used in moral or ethical contexts, virtue ethics is very familiar to most people. In contrast, the name of "virtue epistemology", combining "virtue" with "epistemology", is strange to many people. This paper primarily aims to introduce virtue epistemology in our philosophical society. What is it? How is virtue epistemology different from traditional analytic epistemology? What is the nature of virtues in virtue epistemology? What are the advantages, urgent tasks, and prospects of virtue epistemology? Focusing on these questions, I seek to understand the background to the rise of virtue epistemology, the differences and relations between virtue epistemology and traditional epistemology, and the nature of virtue and the main theories in virtue epistemology.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.23
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• pp.193-239
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• 2014

본 논문은 대순사상의 선화(善化)사상을 살펴보고 그 주체성을 밝히는데 목적이 있다. 『전경』에서는 어떻게 선을 드러내고 행하며 더 나아가 선으로 중생을 교육하고 천하를 교화하는가 하는 선화의 문제를 다루고 있는데, 이는 곧 대순진리회의 핵심 사상으로 볼 수 있다. '선화'사상은 세 가지 내용으로 설명할 수 있다. 첫째, 도덕적 의미에서 만물을 도와서 교화시키거나 만물을 크게 이롭게 하는 속성을 가지고 있다. 둘째, 상선(上善)의 덕 외에도 상선의 법이 필요한데, 이는 '선을 행하는 목적'에 부합하고 또한 선을 행하는 법칙을 지키는 실천방법과 절차를 말한다. 셋째, 가장 높은 차원에서의 '선'은 윤리도덕의 단계를 초월한다. 이에 대순진리회의 '선화'사상을 살펴보면 첫째, 대순진리회의 목적인 무자기, 포덕천하, 광제창생, 보국안민, 지상천국건설에 나타난 문자의 표면적 의미와 내재적 의미는 모두 '선화'의 내용에 포함된다. 둘째, 대순진리회 목적의 실현은 그 종지와 신조에 의거하는데, '합덕·조화·해원'과 사강령(四綱領)과 삼요체(三要諦)에도 '선화'의 의미가 포함되어 있다. 셋째, 대순진리회의 목적은 도인들의 구체적 행위를 통해 실현되는데, 수도와 공부의 필요성과 규범 속 그리고 상제와 도주 조정산(趙鼎山)의 창교(創敎)나 선교(宣敎) 등 구체적인 실례에서도 '선화'의 원칙이 분명하게 드러나 있다. 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 전형적이고 신성한 종교 도덕적 특징과 일상생활의 의미가 담긴 사회 윤리적 특징이 있으며, 또한 윤리를 초월하고 진선(盡善)을 추구하는 궁극적 목적의식과 이론적 깊이가 있다. 대순진리회 '선화'사상의 주체성과 이론구조를 분석하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상에서는 무엇보다 윤리 도덕적 측면에서의 선의 배양과 실천을 중시한다. 둘째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 윤리도덕의 선을 실천하는 법문(法門)을 제시하였다. 셋째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 수도의 최종 목적인 대선(大善)·지선(至善)·진선(盡善) 등을 추구하고 실현할 것을 강조하였다. 선화사상이 나타내는 핵심인 '선덕'과 이로부터 발전된 '선행선법(善行善法)'이 결국 윤리도덕의 차원을 초월하였음을 알 수 있다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.123
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• pp.239-264
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• 2018

In order to understand the whole picture of virtue epistemology with knowledge-action theory, I will first examine contours between concepts like capacity, character and intellectual virtues in relation to the notion of virtue. At first, my $na{\ddot{i}}ve$ question is why smart people do such bad things without any shame. This question would be either ethical or epistemological because epistemology is viewed as a normative discipline and intellectual agents and communities should be considered as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation. This is the core idea of virtue epistemology. The stance virtue epistemology views virtues as a solution to the justification of knowledge is similar to the knowledge-action theory in the East Asian intellectual tradition. But, their core issues are different from each other. Thus, I will explain how to differ from one another and analyze such concepts as capacity, character, and intellectual virtues in the Analects. I will insist that capacity and character without normative disciplines cannot be intellectual virtues leading to right actions.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.43
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• pp.107-139
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• 2014

Tasan Chong Yak-yong has criticized Zhu Xi's metaphysical viewpoints of human being. Therefore he revealed his viewpoint of human being and the theory of moral practice through his thoughts about the Lord of Heaven and human nature with spiritual inclination toward goodness. He has drawn the Lord of Heaven into Confucianism again. Heaven as the Lord endows human being with a nature that enjoys virtues and detests vices. It watches human being's good and evil. Here we can say Heaven is a outer efficient cause of moral behavior. According to Tasan, human being has its own 'self directed weight'自主之權 so that he can make a judgment and decision about what to do. Therefore we have to do manifest this moral inclination which is a inner efficient cause of moral behavior. That is to say, we must follow the order of daoxin道心 inside our mind. If we did go against it, our mind would be uncomfortable. Now through the method of so-called shu恕 we need to put filial piety孝 fraternal respect弟 compassion慈 into practice. These three moral practices represent the spirit of reciprocity in Confucianism. These lead us to make an achievement of ren仁, representative virtue in the theory of moral practice. Our moral practice means the fulfillment of humanity. This is the way to serve Heaven. Tasan insists that theses are the core thoughts of Confucius and Mencius.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.96
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• pp.39-70
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• 2012

In order to locate Kant's concept of the highest good within ethics and the theory of moral religion, it needs to be approached with some qualifications: there are two rough ways to be suggested. The first way is to focus on the concept of the highest good that is explained in terms of the happiness in proportion to a rational being's virtue or to his/her worthiness to be happy. But the happiness determined in the sense outlined above would be (increasingly or decreasingly) changeable according to each one's individual morality-this is what is meant by each one's 'worthiness' here-, and would not be seen as the perfect one. It might even be said that this kind of happiness is possible in a sensible world generally taken, if the existence of God thought of as harmonizing natural phenomena and the moral order is successfully presupposed. The other way is to understand the concept of the highest good literally: in this view, the highest good shows that a rational being's character is completely appropriate to the moral law and for him/her, its corresponding idea, i.e., the perfect happiness, is considered with full justification. But the highest good in the sense sketched above-along with the existence of God and the immortality of the soul-is expected to be realized only in an intelligible world generally taken. This means that it should be appraised as an ideal of the highest good that includes the so-called 'physical happiness' specified in terms of the first way as its element. In this regard, it is seen to be somewhat restricted. Between the two concepts of the highest good already touched upon, the highest good of the possible world would be the one established in terms of the first way. In other words, it is not the highest good in an intelligible world, but the highest good in this world. Of course, it is true that we cannot help but assume the existence of God-a being as higher, as moral, as most holy, and as omnipotent-in order to explain the highest good in this world (namely, in order to establish the possibility of the combination of the happiness and the worthiness). For as long as both morally good acts and the happiness are considered to happen in a natural world, the cause of the nature (i.e., the existence of its creator), that is, God, must be able to be presupposed. In this vein, Kant interprets that most people view that the key of the Bible is to show that the best world which is characterized by an intelligible or heavenly kingdom is also actually feasible in this world. The wish of the people who have the morally good character is that God's kingdom comes and his will is properly achieved in this world. But we cannot know what God really does in order to realize his world in this world. Nonetheless, we are fully aware of what we should do in order to make ourselves a member of his world. It is specified like this: we should do our ethical duties and further proceed to establish an ethical community. Viewed this manner, it is concluded that an ethical community is not a merely ideal thing like the kingdom of the ends, but a human apparatus or institution that exists in this world.

• 한국체육학회지인문사회과학편
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• v.55 no.3
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• pp.15-25
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• 2016

This study attempted an eco-ethical approach to the sporting body, focusing on Toegye's Gyeong. A causes for the conflict between man and nature is a wrong view of nature derived from human desire. Toegye thought that the problem of desire could be overcome through Gyeong. Eco-ethical approaches of Toegye's gyeong thought are possible for the following reasons: First, because Toegye's gyeong is completed in nature. Second, because Toegye's gyeong emphasize human responsibility (consideration) for nature. Third, because gyeong is related to the ability to practice morality. Meanwhile, Toegye understood 'preserving the body well' as self-preservation and at the same time, as the meaning of a natural principle of following the laws of nature. From this perspective, the sporting body has meanings of physical fitness and mental health and at the same time, an aspect of ecological values of understanding man and nature as a single network and following the order of nature. Acquisition of Gyeong through the sporting body suggests the practice of 'gyeongsin (respect for the body)' and 'hwalgyeong (preservation of the ecological environment).' When human beings do physical exercise with nature, they proceed to the stage of building up the virtue of yosan yosu (finding happiness in mountains and water) through nature preserving the ecological environment (hwalgyeong) beyond staying at the stage of gyeongsin.

• Korean Educational Research Journal
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• v.40 no.2
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• pp.17-33
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• 2019

This study examines the fundamental ethics of practice that Dasan Jung Yak-yong(1762-1836) argued at the book, "Dàxuégōngyì大學公議, The Public debate of Great Learning", by investigating the relationship between main agents of education. "Dàxuégōngyì", the book that Dasan wrote when he was 53 years old at his exiled place, Gangjin. As the title suggested, Dàxuégōngyì, it could be recognized as the impartial view based on the critical perspective to Zhūxǐ(朱憙)'s opinion. Zhuxi focused on the importance of "Great Learning 大學" as a study of the Great people and argued that "Great Learning" is the study for all the people should learn. On the other hand, Dasan claimed that "Tàixuézhīdào太學之道" in "Great Learning" is the study for the prince, not for the normal people. And he also interpreted "Dàxué 大學" as the school for teaching prince. In addition, "Great Learning" suggested the three practical principles; to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. However, Dasan argued different way and emphasized three ethics of practice; filial piety(孝), admiration(弟), mercy(慈) and regarded as illustrious virtue of "Great Learning." He denied the three principle of "Great Learning" that Zhuxi reorganized and suggested including renovating the people(新民), and provided that close to the people(親民) is one of the main principles of "Great Learning." According to Dasan, if the king practices these three ethics of practice including filial piety, admiration, and mercy, so that the people will practice these ethics voluntarily. In other words, he indicated that the practice of three ethics is not only for the prince in the loyal family, but also for principles to educate the people in the nation. Thus, three ethics by Dasan including filial piety, admiration, and mercy could be recognized as the symbol of humanity. In other words, Dasan's three ethics in "Great Learning" can be recognized as the practical principles including educational issues and educational interactions. If these three ethics can be referred as the symbol of humanity as mentioned above, the implicit educational interactions are specifically constructed within the basic assumptions. Therefore, it is possible to clarify the specific ethics of practice by the indicating specific subjects and objects in the educational interactions between these three ethics of practice. Also, it helps more clear comprehension about the "Dàxuégōngyì大學公議, The Public debate of Great Learning", by Dasan.