• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.168-178
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• 2015

Besides the imposition of taxes and mandatory actions, why in a special rules needed in the contract between state and civilians. The contract between the state and civilian are unlike with civilian's contract in the comparable effect, even if the effect of the agreement and the parties bear the structural nature of the self-other agreement between private economic actors and there are a variety of different specificity. In other words, the agents of the contract with the state government for control of opportunistic behavior are very specific rules exist. Through this, even if it is the relationship between state and non-mandatory private realms of the contract, even if the area forced me to the fact that the difference can be confirmed. Representative of the government of the country to understand the delegate decisions and judgments and other opportunistic behavior always seem to exist on the possibility of such devices for the pre-control needed.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.63 no.1
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• pp.343-368
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• 2011

This Study aims to criticize national pension fund governance reform plan of Korea government and to search for an alternative direction of the reform. Firstly, I examine the theoretical basis of the Korean government reform plan by clarifying limits of application of agency theory to the public pension fund governance. Secondly, I try to reconstruct principles of the public pension fund governance with an alternative theoretical view emphasizing democracy principle. Thirdly, I evaluate the government reform plan with the basis of reconstructed pension fund governance principles. The government reform plan is expected to cause retrenchment of democracy and even political autonomy. It also would make worse the problem of pension fund autonomy from the financial market and the risk of the pension fund caused by market turbulence. Finally I suggest alternative direction of the pension fund governance reform emphasizing the democracy principle. This direction contains constructing co-determination structure of the state and the civil society, escalating controling power of the governing body to the administration body, setting the limits of the roles of the state, attaining of the autonomy from the financial market, strengthening organizational and social accountability.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.17-32
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• 2020

This study analyzes the regulatory issues of stakeholders, the firm, the government, and the individual, in the data industry using the principal-agent theory. While the importance of data driven economy is increasing rapidly, policy regulations and restrictions to use data impede the growth of data industry. We applied descriptive case analysis methodology using principal-agent theory. From our analysis, we found several meaningful results. First, key policy actors in data industry are data firms and the government among stakeholders. Second, two major concerns are that firms frequently invade personal privacy and the global companies obtain monopolistic power in data industry. This paper finally suggests policy and strategy in response to regulatory issues. The government should activate the domestic agent system for the supervision of global companies and increase data protection. Companies need to address discriminatory regulatory environments and expand legal data usage standards. Finally, individuals must embody an active behavior of consent.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.1345-1365
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• 2018

Following principal-agent relationship between government and funding agency effects on efficiency and management of project, this paper suppose that project management cost rate variable on outsourcing and administration of institution, applies multiple regression analysis and logit analysis by using factors that procurement status of institutional operating expenses and each subordinates scale (Budget, subject number) and method (Top-down/Bottom-up), not a total amount, for examining factors following project efficiency analysis and way of commission. The major variables which effect on efficiency of institution are management cost scale (0.36), institutional operating expenses ratio (-0.47), way of outsourcing, the factors that affect way of outsourcing are portion of project management cost (-38.5) and institutional operating expenses rate (-11.7). This means both legal and financial stability are necessary and it is avoidable moral hazard and adverse selection on principal-agent problem.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.103-127
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• 2007

This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government's decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its scope of research to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade between 2 small open economies, we compare the political equilibrium environmental standards in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental interest group. Although the conventional finding suggests that cooperative bargaining between the two countries can attain the globally optimal level of the standard, the paper rather explains that the cooperation between the national interest groups and the hybrid case also generate the stricter standard then national interest politics usually do.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• 월간 기계설비
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• s.237
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• pp.59-61
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• 2010

정부의 국가종합전자조달 시스템인 '나라장터'가 $\Delta$동일PC입찰 $\Delta$인증서 양도 대여 $\Delta$입찰 대리인 복수등록 등의 불법 부정 입찰을 줄이기 위해 4월부터 "지문인식 전자입찰"제도를 시행한다. 조달청은 나라장터를 개장하면서 IT강국답게 PC입찰을 결정했고, 인감을 대체할 수 있는 공인인증서를 도입해 운영단계에서 불법 전자입찰을 근절코자 노력을 기울여 왔다. 하지만 온라인상의 부정적인 방법이 날로 지능화되면서 입찰질서를 어지럽히게 되자, 실제 입찰자의 신원을 최적으로 확인할 수 있는 지문인식기술을 도입하게 됐다. 이번에 개발된 지문인식입찰시스템은 지문의 외피가 아닌 진피를 인식하기 때문에 실리콘이나 OHP필름 등을 통한 지문위조를 원천적으로 봉쇄할 수 있게 됐다. 따라서 이런 최신 지문인식 기술을 이용해 온라인상에서 입찰자의 신원을 확인한 후 사전에 등록된 입찰자의 신원과 동일한 경우에만 입찰서 제출이 가능하다. 조달업체의 입찰자(대표 또는 대리인)는 4월 이전에 국내 5개 공인인증기관을 통해 지문보안토큰을 구매하고 주민등록증과 지문보안토큰을 지참해 조달청 고객지원센터를 찾아 신원을 확인한 뒤 지문정보를 등록해야 하며, 지문 정보는 최대 3명까지 보안토큰에 등록돼야 입찰할 수 있게 됐다. "지문인식 전자입찰"제도는 단계적으로 확대돼 7월에는 나라장터뿐 아니라 모든 발주기관에 적용될 방침이다.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.615-621
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• 2016

This study examines whether there is agency cost in a public R&D subsidy program by applying agency theory. If there is agency cost, the composition ratio of the government subsidy and the firm's own R&D fund would have a significant (-) effect on technological performance. Companies that received a public R&D subsidy in Korea from 2000 to 2009 were selected as a sample. Frequency analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. The independent variables was the ratio of public R&D subsidy cost to the Firm's own R&D cost, and the dependent variables were the number of patent applications and the number of patents registered. The control variables were firm size and R&D cost. The results show that there are agency problems in the government-sponsored R&D system. A future study is needed to examine how much agency problems deteriorate the efficiency of the system.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.933-936
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• 2014

The government has the duty to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. In order to promote competition we have to address the asymmetry in the information as possible and to ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it virtually distort the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by avoiding their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy could be transferred to down the price of cell phone and charges and it would be a benefit to consumers. Separate notice of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a developed policy but it was too late. It, the market price close to that from perfect competition structure, is plausible, ultimately.

• 월간 기계설비
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• s.51
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• pp.32-33
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• 1994

중국 호북대외건설 상담센타(CHIC-중국 호북대외 연합건설업 대리부) (1)CHIC는 화합, 기술축적의 정신하에 각국 정부, 민간 기업과 교류를 희망 (2)주요업무는 건축, 교통, 방직, 수력 ,기계, 선박등의 시공, 생산기술 등을 대행 (3)관리요원, 기술요원, 노무자, 전문요원의 구직 희망, (4)국내외 많은 합작기업의 투자와 교류희망