• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.71-89
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• 1999

본 논문은 대리이론에서 대리계약기간이 시간적 차원에서 대리비용을 통제할 수 있는 중요한 요인이라는 점에 착안하여 연구를 수행한 것이다. 구체적으로는 우리나라에서의 대리계약기간을 조사하고 실증적인 방법으로 대리계약기간을 결정하는 요인을 찾아보았다. 그 결과 우리나라에서 대리계약기간을 결정하는 요인은 성과적 변수보다 대리적 변수가 훨씬 높은 통계적 유의성을 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과를 통해서 우리나라 기업들의 대리문제 해결양태를 정리할 수 없었는데 주로 내부승진 경영자, 친인척 경영자, 동일지역출신 경영자 등 인적요인을 통해서 대리문제를 해결하려는 것으로 파악되었다. 대리문제해결을 위한 이러한 방법들의 유효성을 보기 위해서 다음 단계 우리나라 기업에서 대리비용의 존재여부를 실증적으로 확인하였다. 대리비용으로 과소투자의 가능성에 대해서 분석한 결과는 우리나라에서 대리계약기간의 장단에 따른 대리비용은 존재하지 않는 것으로 나타나서 우리나라 기업들이 사용하고 있는 대리문제의 통제방법은 유효하다고 추정할 수 있었다.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.18 no.8
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• pp.111-118
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• 2020

This study conducted an empirical analysis of SSE-listed companies to verify the effects of evaluation and disclosure of internal control systems on the agency costs management and controlling shareholders. Agency costs can affect the valuation of accounting information as asymmetry of information in the relationship between a company and its stakeholders, or induce financial costs as an adverse selection. If the firm's agency costs are reasonable, the valuation of the company can also move in a relatively positive direction. In this study, the evaluation information of the internal control system was analyzed through sales management ratio and equity ratio as substitute variables to analyze the relationship between management and agent costs of the controlling shareholders. In addition, independent control ratio, capital balance ratio, and company scale were used as control variables, as a result of the analysis, the evaluation information of internal control was found to be related to the agency costs of managers and governance structure. This study can be conducted to positive factors in evaluating the reliability and corporate value of accounting information according to the evaluation of internal control of SSE-listed companies and helps to understand the financial reporting environment.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.21-32
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• 2017

Motivated by the recent cases of negligent social responsibility as manifested by foreign luxury fashion brands in Korea, this study investigates whether agency costs depend on the sustainability of different types of corporate governance. Agency costs refer either to vertical costs arising from the relationship between stockholders and managers, or to horizontal costs associated with the potential conflicts between majority and minority stockholders. The firms with luxury fashion brand could spend large sums of money on maintenance of magnificent brand image, thereby increasing the agency cost. On the contrary, the firms may hold down wasteful spending to report a gaudily financial achievement. This results in mitigation of the agency cost. Agency costs are measured by the value of the principal component. First, three ratios are constructed: asset turnover, operating expense to sales, and earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation. Then, the scores of each of these ratios for individual firms in the sample are differenced from the ratios for the benchmark firm of S-OIL. S-OIL was designated as the best superior governance model firm for 2013 by CGS. We perform regression analysis of each agency cost index, luxury fashion brand dummy and a set of control variables. The regression results indicate that the agency costs of the firms with luxury fashion brand exceed those of control group in the fashion industry in the part of operating expenses, but the agency cost falls short of those of control group in the part of EBITD, thus the aggregate agency costs are not differential of those of the control group. In sensitivity test, the results are same that the agency cost of the firms are higher than those of the matching control group with PSM(propensity matching method). These results are corroborated by an additional analysis comparing the group of the companies with the best brands with the control group. The results raise doubts about the effectiveness of management of the firms with luxury fashion brand. This study has a limitation that the research has performed only for 2013 and this paper suggests that there is room for improvement in the current research methodology.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.99-110
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• 1991

본 논문은 최근 미국에서 성행되고 있는 기업합병(企業合倂)과 기업비공개화(企業非公開化)와 같은 기업재구성(企業再構成)의 동기를 대리인(代理人) 문제(間題)의 관점에서 설명하는데 그 목적이 있다. 기업합병의 경우, 취득기업의 내부자지분율(內部者持分率)이 높을수록 주주의 부(富)는 합병을 통해 증가하는 반면 내부자지분율이 낮은 기업은 합병을 통해 기존 주주의 부(富)는 오히려 감소한다. 이러한 현상은 소유경영자지분(所有經營者持分)이 낮을 수록 대리인비용이 크게 발생한다는 이론과 일관성(一貫性)이 있음을 알 수 있다. 또한 피취득기업의 주식가격은 합병정보가 공시 되기 이전 몇개월동안 크게 하락하였으나 합병 공시와 동시에 크게 상승하는 현상을 나타낸다. 그 이유는 대리인문제(代理人問題)로 설명 할 수 있다. 피취득기업의 경영자는 기업자원을 비효율적으로 운용할 것(지분(持分)의 대리인비용(代理人費用))이므로 합병공시전 주가는 하락하지만, 합병공시후에는 이러한 대리인문제가 개선될 것이므로 주가가 상승한다는 것이다. 따라서 합병의 경우, 취득기업과 비취득기업 모두 대리인문제(代理人問題)와 관련을 갖는다. 또한 1980년 이후 공개기업(公開企業)의 경영자가 자기회사 주식을 매입한 후 비공개기업(非公開企業으)로 환원(還元)다하는 현상이 유행하고 있다. 비공개기업으로 환원한 기업의 경영자는 창의적 기업활동을 통하여 기업가치를 증대시킨 후 다시 발행시장에서 신주를 발행하여 상당한 이익을 얻고 있다. 이는 공개기업으로 존속하는 경우 낮은 내부자지분율로 인해 대리인문제가 발생하므로 비공개 기업으로 전환함으로써 대리인 비용을 자기주식 취득을 통해 절감시킬 수 있는 증거로 간주된다.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.13 no.8
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• pp.3417-3426
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• 2012

This study aims to determine how ownership structure (share-holding ratio of insiders, foreigners) affects agent costs (the portion of asset efficiency or non-operating expenses) through empirical analysis. However, as existing studies on correlations between ownership structure and agent costs adopted Pooled OLS Model, this study focused on additionally formulating Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model aimed to reflect the time of data formation and corporate effects as study models based on verification results on the suitability of Pooled-OLS Model before comparative analysis for the purpose of improvement of credibility and statistical validity of the results of empirical analysis based on the premise that the Pooled OLS Model is not reliable enough to verify massive panel data. The data has been accumulated over 10 years from 1998 to 2007 after the IMF crisis hit the nation, from a subject 331 companies except for financial institutions. As a result of the empirical analysis, verification of the suitability of model has determined that the Random Effect Model is appropriate in terms of asset efficiency among agent costs items. On the other hand, the Fixed Effect Model is appropriate in terms of non-operating costs. As a result of the empirical analysis according to the appropriate model, no hypothesis adopted in the Pooled OLS Model has been accepted. This suggests that developing an appropriate model is more important than other factors for the purpose of generating statistically significant empirical results by showing that different empirical results are produced according to the type of empirical analysis.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.10
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• pp.345-358
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• 1997

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.149-182
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• 2007

This study examines the determinants of the long-run stock price performance of the firms that granted stock options between 1997 and 2002. We divide the sample into the firms run by the owner and those run by the professional manager. If the primary reason for granting stock options is reduction of the agency costs between the manager and shareholders, the effect of stock options is likely to be more pronounced in the firms run by the professional manager. We find that the long-run abnormal returns of the firms run by the professional manager are negatively associated with the shareholdings by the manager and the book-to-market value and are positively associated with the earnings growth and the size of the outstanding stock options. In contrast, the long-run abnormal returns of the firms run by the owner are negatively associated with the cash flows rate and the sales growth rate and are positively associated with the firm size. This is consistent with the argument that the agency costs arising from the conflicts between the manager and shareholders are an important determinant of the post-stock option granting long-run stock price performance only in the firms run by the professional manager. The results also suggest that stock options in the firms run by the owner are likely to be used for the purposes such as additional compensation, a signaling device, a means that reduce the agency costs within firms.

• Land and Housing Review
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.49-57
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• 2020

본 연구는 기업의 투자효율성이 투자부동산 비중에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 경영자의 사적이익 추구현상과 대리인비용이 클수록 나타나는 과잉투자성향이 기업의 투자부동산 비중을 증가시키는지 분석하였다. 이를 위해 2007년부터 2018년까지 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장의 5,781개의 기업-연도를 대상으로 분석하였으며 투자효율성은 McNichols and Stubben(2008)의 연구방법론으로 측정하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 투자 비효율성이 커질수록 기업의 투자부동산 비중이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 투자 비효율성이 높을수록 나타나는 대리인비용과 경영자의 제국건설성향이 투자부동산 비중과 유의한 관련성을 갖는다는 것을 의미한다. 둘째, 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장으로 구분하여 분석한 결과에서는 코스닥시장에서 유의성을 확인할 수 없었다. 즉, 투자 비효율성이 커질수록 나타나는 투자부동산의 비중은 유가증권시장에서 관찰되었다. 셋째, 투자 비효율성을 과잉투자와 과소투자로 구분하여 분석한 결과에서는 과잉투자성향이 증가할수록 투자부동산의 비중이 증가하였으나 과소투자와는 관련성이 나타나지 않았다. 이상의 연구결과는 그 간의 선행연구에서 주로 투자부동산과 기업 가치의 관련성에 초점을 맞추었던 반면, 대리인비용과 투자부동산 비중 간의 실증적 증거가 부족한 가운데 추가적인 학문적, 실무적 시사점을 갖는다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.439-446
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• 2016

This research examines the effect of outside director system which has been legislated after financial crisis in Korea. Outside director system is based on agency theory which assumes that a manager is selfish and opportunistic in situation where ownership and management of a firm is separated. In this situation, outside director system has an important function to monitor and keep in check a manager. Thus, we examined that outside director system works as a monitoring mechanism in Korea. And we tested that above effect is weakened in family CEO firms where it is different from assumption of agency theory in Korea. According to empirical result with 282 sample firm, it is confirmed that outside director system reduces agency cost. In family CEO firms, however, this agency cost-reducing effect becomes weak. This result suggests that outside director system needs be cautiously managed without focusing on only monitoring function.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.3-26
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• 2007

This paper analyzes the effects of asymmetric reimbursement in a delegate model where the lawyers for a citizen and a polluting firm work on a contingent-fee basis. The major findings from the paper are as follows: (i) the asymmetric reimbursement triggers environmental conflicts by increasing the citizens' expected surplus; (ii) it enhances the possibility of settlement by decreasing the magnitude of expected loss less expected surplus; (iii) settlements reduce the total litigation effort levels, thus curtailing the rent dissipation; (iv) The total litigation effort levels increase if the conflicts result in trials rather than settlements.