• 사회경제평론
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• no.38
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• pp.199-240
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• 2012

According to the Post Keynesian endogenous money theory, money is created by the bank deposit which is dependent on the banks' supply of loan. And the demand for loans is dependent on investment by firms. In the money creating process, real value(or investment) and money are connected with banks' credit. In this paper, we investigated Keynes and Post Keynesian endogenous money theory with critical reviews of Hwang (2005). We came to three conclusions. First, Post Keynesian endogenous money theory is based on Keynes' theory. Second, Keynes' endogeneity of money is essentially different from that of Wicksellian. Third, focusing on the differences of the starting point of the arguments not on the conclusions, two Post Keynesian views, namely horizontalists and structuralists are compatible with liquidity preference theory in the Keynes' system.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.191-212
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• 1992

This paper discusses the role of money in the process of capital accumulation where financial markets are impeded by contract enforcement problems in the context of overlapping generations framework. In particular, in less developed countries (LDCs) creditors may know little about the repayment capability of potential debtors due to incomplete information so that financial instruments other than money may not acceptable to them. In this paper the impediments to the operation of the private finanical markets are explicitly modelled. We argue that creditors cannot observe actual investment decisions made by the potential borrowers, and as a result, loan contracts may not be fully enforceable. Therefore, a laissez-faire regime may fail to provide the economy with the appropriate financial instruments. Under these circumstances, we introduce a government operated discount window (DW) that acts as an open market buyer of private debt. This theoretical structure represents the practice of governments of many LDCs to provide loans (typically at subsidized interest rates) to preferred borrowers either directly or indirectly through the commercial banking system. It is shown that the DW can substantially overcome impediments to trade which are caused by the credit market failure. An appropriate supply of the DW loan enables producers to purchase the resources they cannot obtain through direct transactions in the credit market. This result obtains even if the DW is subject to the same enforcement constraint that is responsible for the market failure. Thus, the DW intervention implies higher investment and output. However, the operation of the DW may cause inflation. Furthermore, the provision of cheap loans through the DW results in a worse income distribution. Therefore, there is room for welfare enhancing schemes that utilize the higher output to develop. We demonstrate that adequate lump sum taxes-cum-transfers along with the operation of the DW can support an allocation that is Pareto superior to the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation.