• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.181-211
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• 1993

증권관리위원회에 신고된 내부자거래는 6개월이내 단기투자에 따른 이익을 회사에 반환하여야 하므로 단기정보를 이용할 가능성이 낮다. 따라서 Fischer(1992)는 상장회사의 임원과 주요주주 등의 주식거래를 증권관리위원회에 신고하도록 하는 제도는 미공개 내부정보를 이용한 내부자거래를 방지하는 효과적 인 방법이라고 주장하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 증권거래소에 신고된 내부자의 거래자료와 상장기업의 기업정보공시자료를 이용하여 내부자의 주식거래가 미공개 내부정보를 이용하고 있는 지를 검토하였다. 1989년부터 1992년까지 4년간 증권거래소에 신고된 상장회사 내부자의 주식거래 중 거래후 1개월내에 기업정보의 공시가 있는 경우를 연구대상으로 한 실증분석결과 이러한 내부자의 주식거래가 일반적으로 미공개된 기업정보를 이용하고 있지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 내부자의 주식 매수 또는 매도후 기업정보 공시시 주가가 상승 또는 하락하는 경우가 각각 약 50%를 차지하고 있으며 내부자의 주식거래후 정보공시 빈도 수도 기대치보다 낮았다. 또한 주식거래에 따른 내부자거래이익은 매도시에는 내부자의 주식거래후 공시된 정보 내용에 따라 결정되며, 정보공시시 주가가 상승하는 비율이 약 50%이고 내부자거래이익이 0보다 작아 매도이후에 주가가 하락할 것이라는 예측은 지지되지 않았다. 내부자거래후 200 거래일까지 누적초과수익률을 분석한 결과에서도 매도시에는 정보이용 가능성이 있지만 매수시에는 내부자거래이익이 작아 정보이용 가능성이 없었다. 또한 내부자종류에 따른 내부자거래이익이 차이가 없어 증권거래소에 신고된 내부자의 주식거래는 곧 공개될 기업정보의 이용과는 관련이 적은 것으로 생각된다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.189-206
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• 2002

실명제 실시 이후인 1993년부터 1995년까지 증권거래소에 보고된 내부자 주식거래자료를 분석하여 내부자 거래의 정보효과를 보고자 하였다. 내부자 거래를 이용하면 대체적으로 내부자가 매수나 매도한 이후 주가 움직임을 예측할 수 있었으나 매수와 매도 포트폴리오의 움직임에서 차이가 발견되었다. 내부자 거래이익의 결정요인을 분석하였으나 외국의 연구와는 달리 내부자 유형에 따른 초과수익률의 차이점은 발견되지 않았다. 내부자 거래 연구에서와 같이 장기적인 성과를 연구할 경우 벤치마크의 선정이 매우 중요하다는 것을 본 연구에서 보여주고 있다. 특히 사건일 전의 주가움직임이 상승 추세를 따르면 시장모형의 경우 편의의 발생가능성이 커지는 것을 보여준다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.139-153
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• 1991

This paper examines the pecuniary effects stemming from insider trading in the equities of firms targeted for acquisition. Illegal exchanges by those having advantageous information are found to result in excessive returns to stockholders of the sought firms. However, unusual market activities are not typical immediately subsequent to the illegal trading date, suggesting that nonpublic information is synthesized by market mechanisms with sufficient speed so that others cannot profit by imitating the better informed traders. The obtained evidence does not support the contention that insider trading on nonpublic information harms the outsider stockholders of involved firms.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.213-233
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• 2013

The aim of this paper is to reveal the ethical problem of insider trading. 'Insider trading' refer to obtaining information from non-public sources such as private acquaintances about trade secret, using it purposes of enhancing insider's financial advantages. And sometimes such a practice can be conducted fraudulently. Therefore, the focus of this paper will be on fairness or justice arguments against insider trading. And all kinds of discussion this paper are to focus the underlying consideration behind these arguments, that is, the underlying consideration about violation of ethical standards of fairness. First, one of these arguments argues that insider trading does necessarily involve defrauding general investors such as general employees, general stockholders. And economic power and unjust advantage of insider can be exercised to the detriment of this non-insider's interests. Second, another argument argues that insider trading undermines competition which is the principle of any free market. And insider trading is not only a complication in the free market mechanism, but also thwarts free competition which free markets depend. Third, the final argument argues that insider trading will be made something unfair about the concept of equal access to information. This argument argues, therefore, that to permit insider trading would be to set up stock market trading rules that are unfair to non-insiders.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.153-169
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• 2018

Previous e-financial anomalies analysis and detection technology collects large amounts of electronic financial transaction logs generated from electronic financial business systems into big-data-based storage space. And it detects abnormal transactions in real time using detection rules that analyze transaction pattern profiling of existing customers and various accident transactions. However, deep analysis such as attempts to access e-finance by insiders of financial institutions with large scale of damages and social ripple effects and stealing important information from e-financial users through bypass of internal control environments is not conducted. This paper analyzes the management status of e-financial security programs of financial companies and draws the possibility that they are allies in security control of insiders who exploit vulnerability in management. In order to efficiently respond to this problem, it will present a comprehensive e-financial security management environment linked to insider threat monitoring as well as the existing e-financial transaction detection system.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.1-41
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• 2005

In the literature, much research has been focused on the relationships between financial policies and corporate valuation, including the effects that internal equity and capital structure have on corporate value, as well as how capital structures, investments and dividends relate to one another. However, comprehensive studies considering three facets of financial policies, namely capital structures, investments, and internal equity altogether, are scant. This study follows 361 companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, excluding financial institutions, from 1996 to 2002. Using 3SLS methods, an empirical analysis was conducted of the relationships among capital structures, investments, dividends, and internal equity and the results are summarized. Capital structures were found to be negatively related with investments, while investments were mainly related to dividends. Dividends were positively related with internal equity, simultaneously affecting capital structures. We were not able to find any clear evidence of a direct relationship between internal equity and capital structures; however they seemed to be indirectly related. Thus, there seems to be mutual relationships between financial policies and internal equity.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.255-260
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• 2009

The purposes of this study is to verify whether insider trader get the excess return using inside information. For this we divide inside traders into four groups according to their ownership: maximum shareholder, main shareholders, 5% shareholders and executives. Also we categorize inside traders into three groups: personal investor, foreign investor and institutional investors. After insiders trade their stock, excess return is reported for 20days and the size of excess return of executives and institutional investor is larger than that of other groups. It means more strict monitoring system is needed in the domestic stock market.

• Proceedings of the Safety Management and Science Conference
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• 2009.11a
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• pp.589-599
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• 2009

The purposes of this study is to verify whether insider trader get the excess return using inside information. For this we divide inside traders into four groups according to their ownership: maximum shareholder, main shareholders, 5% sharehoders and executives. Also we categorize inside traders into three groups: personal investor, foreign investor and institutional investors. After insiders trade their stock, excess return is reported for 20days and the size of excess return of executives and institutional investor is larger than that of other groups. It means more strict monitoring system is needed in the domestic stock market.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.10
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• pp.1-6
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• 2019

As the value of technical information increases, hacking attacks are trying to steal technical information through hacking. Recently, hacking of cryptocurrency exchanges is much easier to monetize than existing technical information, making it a major attack target for hackers. In the case of technical information, it is required to seize the technical information and sell it to the black market for cashing.In the case of cryptocurrency, most hacking attacks are concentrated on cryptocurrency exchanges because it is easy to cash out and not easy to track when successful hacking. Although technology cannot be hacked, cryptocurrency transactions traded on cryptocurrency exchanges are not recorded on the blockchain which is simply internal exchanges, so insiders may manipulate the quotes and leave gaps or leak out. Therefore, this research analyzes the recent hacking attacks of cryptocurrency exchanges and proposes solutions to secure cryptocurrency trading.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.41-60
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• 2015

This paper investigates whether managerial ownership and foreign ownership have impacts on firm value, using a sample of logistics firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2014. In the Korean economy, family-controlled business groups, known as chaebol, constitute a unique governance system. To acquire investments from controlling shareholders, a logistics firm is likely to be included in family-controlled business groups. Since reform of the governance structure of logistics firms in the South Korea enables shareholder value to be maximized, we analyzed ownership effects on firm value using pooled ordinary least squares. Empirical results showed that there was a significant positive relation between managerial ownership and firm value. This study also found that there was a significant positive relation between foreign ownership and firm value. We thus show that both managerial ownership and foreign ownership can protect shareholders by positively affecting firm values.