This paper is intended as an introductory essay to explain endogenous changes in the scope of firm activities in the competitive structure of a deregulated, multi-product financial industry. Recently, the global financial industry has been experiencing a widespread reshuffling in its activities, reflecting both consolidation and specialization. The spread of the universal banking system, which involves the integration of various kinds of financial activities, has resulted in the so-called financial supermarket. At the same time, the traditional set of banking activities has been unbundled into so-called financial boutiques. A relevant question is where the current reshuffling process of integration and disintegration in financial activities might lead the financial industry. However, presently popular theories of the financial industry are not really appropriate for the analysis of this issue. This paper attempts to integrate the theory of specialization [George J. Stigler, "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LIX, No.3, June 1951] and the theory of the multi-product firm [William J. Baumol, John C. Panzar, and Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York, 1982] and to apply the resulting hybrid theory, a theory on the scope of financial activity, to the financial industry. The implications of this theory for the issues raised above are formalized under five hypotheses on the reshuffling of financial activities as listed below: Hypothesis I: The differences in the organization of financial industries among countries are determined by differences in the size of the financial markets, other things being equal. Hypothesis II: A financial firm will separate those financial activities simultaneously having relatively strong economies of scale and relatively weak economies of scope (alternatively, diseconomies of scope) from other activities. Conversely, the firm will integrate those activities simultaneously having relatively weak economies of scale (alternatively, diseconomies of scale) and relatively strong economies of scope with incumbent activities. Hypothesis III: A competitive equilibrium in the deregulated financial industry will consist of both specialized and multi-product financial firms, resulting in a mixed form of specialized and universal banking systems. Hypothesis IV: As world financial markets fully integrate and all countries consequently face this single, common world market, the financial structures of individual countries will become increasingly similar. Hypothesis V: A more universal banking system will dominate the deregulated financial industry in countries with relatively small financial markets, while a more specialized banking system will dominate in countries with relatively large financial markets. However, equilibrium will ultimately be mixed, with specialized and universal banks coexisting, as stated in Hypothesis III. Based on these hypotheses, this paper interprets the historical development of specialized vs. universal banking systems in major industrial countries as a process driven by the evolution of the financial market in each country - i.e. the change in the size of the financial market over time. In addition, this paper anticipates that the final equilibrium of the world financial industry, which is currently under the pressure of financial innovations and deregulation, will be a mixed equilibrium with both specialized boutiques and universal supermarket-type financial firms, instead of an exclusively specialized or universal banking system. Future research should seek continued theoretical elaboration and empirical verification of this paper's hypotheses.