• Title/Summary/Keyword: 국제투자분쟁해결

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Challenge through Annulment of ICSID Arbitral Awards (ICSID 중재판정의 취소를 통한 불복)

  • Kim, Yong Il;Oh, Hyon Sok
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.31 no.1
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    • pp.3-22
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    • 2021
  • This article examines the Challenge through Annulment of ICSID Arbitral Awards. Either party may request annulment of the award by applying in writing addressed to the ICSID Secretary-General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The annulment proceedings must focus on the award itself. Because committees have no inherent supremacy over the arbitral tribunal, they should not review the tribunal's findings on evidence, damage, interest, and cost findings. Otherwise, the parties would have, in effect, two opportunities, and that will almost certainly weaken the reliability of the entire ICSID system. In short, because of the limited scope of review under ICSID annulment and because annulment is not an opportunity for the parties to re-try the case, committees should not allow new arguments or new evidence. Since an annulment committee is not a court of appeals, it cannot create a new res judicata. Committees can only decide not to annul an award, thus confirming the existing res judicata or annul the award, in which case the affected decision ceases to be res judicata. An obvious annulment decision stipulating which particular findings of the award remain res judicata should prevent any uncertainty in resubmission proceedings.

Substantive and Procedural Issues of the Lone Star Case With a Focus on the ICSID Arbitral Award (론스타 사건에 대한 실체적 및 절차적 쟁점 분석 - ICSID 중재판정을 중심으로)

  • Sok Young CHANG
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.33 no.1
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    • pp.23-49
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    • 2023
  • An ICSID award on Lone Star case has been rendered finally on August 31st, 2022 after almost ten years since the Lone Star Funds submitted the request for arbitration against the Republic of Korea in 2012. The Lone Star case is the first investor-state dispute settlement(ISDS) case brought against Korea, and this case, also known as "eat and run" case, has given rise to heated debates for years. Moreover, as the ICSID tribunal has ordered Korea to pay the Lone Star Funds the sum of USD 216.5 million plus interest in the award, this case has become once again the subject of controversy. Any arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in dispute have not been disclosed until recently, however, as the memorials and the award are now open to the public, it has become possible to realize the assertions of each party and the decisions of the tribunal in detail. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the main issues of the Lone Star case with a focus on the ICSID award. By examining the substantive and procedural issues of the case one after the other, it might be able to understand the whole picture of the case and prepare for the remaining procedures of this case and other upcoming cases as well.

The Formation and Ratification of ISDS in International FTA and Its Characteristics -with a special emphasis on KORUS FTA, NAFTA & AUSFTA- (국제자유무역협약에서 ISDS의 생성과 비준에 관한 연구 -KORUS FTA, NAFTA 및 AUSFTA를 중심으로-)

  • Hahn, Jae-Phil
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.409-431
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    • 2012
  • This article deals with the nature of ISDS along with the admissibility thereof, for the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. ICSID as an organization of World Bank Group, has been established in 1966 and as of May in 2011, 157 nations ratified its convention. As for the Republic of Korea(ROK) it has been involved in the problematic situation with regard to ISDS of the KORUS FTA in negotiation with the United States. The ruling Grand National Party is pushing the FTA for ratification including ISDS. However, the opposition party, the Unified Democratic Party rejected the ISDS with a view to a toxin infringing on its judiciary sovereignty. The ROK has invested in the US 3.5 times more than the US did in Korea up to now. As a result, it seems that the ROK is more concerned about ISDS than the US is, considering that exhausting local remedy through the US local courts, applying even a municipal ordinance in their decisions which will be unsatisfactory toward the ROK side. The ROK is now struggling with the ISDS as a political issue between the ruling party and the opposition party mostly based on sovereignty with a reference on AUSFTA which excluded the ISDS. Australian model about ISDS has been impacted by the experience from the NAFTA which allowes direct claims against each other(the US against Canada and Canada against the US). It seems not to be much sympathy for developed countries because it has long been held to standards for pressing on developing countries. Australia is also struggling with ISDS from the political point of view likewise the ROK. And the ISDS is destined to the political situations established within the domestic countries among the political parties in relation with the acceptance or rejection of thereof.

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Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Treaties (국제투자조약상 포괄적 보호조항(Umbrella Clauses)의 해석에 관한 연구)

  • Jo, Hee-Moon
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.19 no.2
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    • pp.95-126
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    • 2009
  • One of the controversial issues in investor-state investment arbitration is the interpretation of "umbrella clause" that is found in most BIT and FTAs. This treaty clause requires on Contracting State of treaty to observe all investment obligations entered into with foreign investors from the other Contracting State. This clause did not receive in-depth attention until SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines cases produced starkly different conclusions on the relations about treaty-based jurisdiction and contract-based jurisdiction. More recent decisions by other arbitral tribunals continue to show different approaches in their interpretation of umbrella clauses. Following the SGS v. Philippines decision, some recent decisions understand that all contracts are covered by umbrella clause, for example, in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina and Enron Corp. V. Argentina. However, other recent decisions have found a different approach that only certain kinds of public contracts are covered by umbrella clauses, for example, in El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentina and CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina. With relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, most of tribunals have the position that the contractual remedy should not affect the jurisdiction of BIT tribunal. Even some tribunals considered that there is no need to exhaust contract remedies before bringing BIT arbitration, provoking suspicion of the validity of sanctity of contract in front of treaty obligation. The decision of the Annulment Committee In CMS case in 2007 was an extraordinarily surprising one and poured oil on the debate. The Committee composed of the three respected international lawyers, Gilbert Guillaume and Nabil Elaraby, both from the ICJ, and professor James Crawford, the Rapportuer of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, observed that the arbitral tribunal made critical errors of law, however, noting that it has limited power to review and overturn the award. The position of the Committee was a direct attack on ICSID system showing as an internal recognition of ICSID itself that the current system of investor-state arbitration is problematic. States are coming to limit the scope of umbrella clauses. For example, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT detailed definition of the type of contracts for which breach of contract claims may be submitted to arbitration, to increase certainty and predictability. Latin American countries, in particular, Argentina, are feeling collectively victims of these pro-investor interpretations of the ICSID tribunals. In fact, BIT between developed and developing countries are negotiated to protect foreign investment from developing countries. This general characteristic of BIT reflects naturally on the provisions making them extremely protective for foreign investors. Naturally, developing countries seek to interpret restrictively BIT provisions, whereas developed countries try to interpret more expansively. As most of cases arising out of alleged violation of BIT are administered in the ICSID, a forum under the auspices of the World Bank, these Latin American countries have been raising the legitimacy deficit of the ICSID. The Argentine cases have been provoking many legal issues of international law, predicting crisis almost coming in actual investor-state arbitration system. Some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, already showed their dissatisfaction with the ICSID system considering withdrawing from it to minimize the eventual investor-state dispute. Thus the disagreement over umbrella clauses in their interpretation is becoming interpreted as an historical reflection on the continued tension between developing and developed countries on foreign investment. There is an academic and political discussion on the possible return of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. The paper will comment on these problems related to the interpretation of umbrella clause. The paper analyses ICSID cases involving principally Latin American countries to identify the critical legal issues arising between developing and developed countries. And the paper discusses alternatives in improving actual investor-State investment arbitration; inter alia, the introduction of an appellate system and treaty interpretation rules.

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A Study on the Effectiveness of Investment Protection in North Korea (대북 투자보호의 실효성 제고 방안에 대한 고찰)

  • Hyun-suk Oh
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.33 no.2
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    • pp.53-83
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    • 2023
  • The investment agreement prepared at the beginning of inter-Korean economic cooperation in 2000 can be evaluated as very ineffective as a product of mutual political and diplomatic compromise rather than an effective protection for our investment assets. South Korean companies suffered a lot of losses due to the freezing of assets in the Geumgang mountain district and the closure of the Kaeseung Industrial Complex, but they did not receive practical damage relief due to institutional vulnerabilities. Currently, North Korea is under international economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, so it is true that the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation is far away, but North Korea's human resources and geographical location are still attractive investment destinations for us. Therefore, if strained relations between the two Koreas recover in the future and international economic sanctions on North Korea are eased, Korean companies' investment in North Korea will resume. However, the previous inter-Korean investment agreement system was a fictional systemthat was ineffective. Therefore, if these safety devices are not reorganized when economic cooperation resumes, unfair damage to Korean companies will be repeated again. The core of the improved investment guarantee system is not a bilateral system between the two Koreas, but the establishment of a multilateral system through North Korea's inclusion in the international economy. Specifically, it includes encouraging North Korea to join international agreements for the execution of arbitration decisions, securing subrogation rights through membership of international insurance groups such as MIGA, creating matching funds by international financial organizations. Through this new approach, it will be possible to improve the safety of Korean companies' investment in North Korea, and ultimately, it will be necessary to lay the foundation for mutual development through economic cooperation between the two Koreas.

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The Problems and Countermeasures of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (투자자-국가간 분쟁해결제도의 문제점과 대응방안)

  • HONG, Sung-Kyu
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.68
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    • pp.89-121
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    • 2015
  • Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

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Annulment System of ICSID Arbitral Award (ICSID 중재판정 취소제도)

  • Kim, Sang-Chan
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.25 no.2
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    • pp.71-96
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    • 2015
  • This paper deals with the annulment of the ICSID(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) arbitral award. The annulment of the ICSID is characterized by the fact that it can be made possible through the special committee of ICSID only. The annulment of the ICSID was constructed on the premise that it is not an appeal procedure. However in the initial period, it was strongly criticized as it allowed new trials or duplicated many of the functions of an appeal and it broke down the boundary between the two systems. Although the trend seemed to be corrected through its 2nd and 3rd generations, it was still criticized for functioning as a new trial. It is approaching its 4th generation. On the other hand, with the activation of investment agreement arbitration based on ICSID and FTA, a certain degree of consistency is required for the ICSID arbitralaward. Also, with the emphasis on the public features of the arbitration for the investment agreement, the necessity of an appeal system is presented. The ICSID Secretariat published the "Opinion on the Appeal Procedure" in 2004 but as the system was criticized as too early due to the cost allocation problem and others, its adoption of an appeal procedure has been delayed. This paper focuses on how the currently incomplete ICSID arbitration judgment annulment system shall be used. Although it is still hardto expect the quality and consistent arbitral award annulment in the ICSID, this paper suggests that the "annulment without the actual new trial" using the restricted authority of a special commission in a creative way shall be pursued rather than just the actual new trial with or without annulment, thus going back to the original concept of the ICSID arbitral award annulment.

Introduction of Human Rights Arguments in ISDS Proceeding (ISDS 절차에서의 인권의 권리 주장)

  • Shin, Seungnam
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.85-114
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    • 2022
  • When human rights disputes are related to the cross-border investments treaties, the investment arbitral tribunals are confronted with the question of how to adjudicate connected human rights violations. The traditional structure restricts arbitration proceedings to the parties named within an investment treaty, i.e., Investor-Claimant and State-Respondent. If human rights issues occur, States must act as proxies for citizens with human rights claims. This effectively excludes individuals or groups with human rights concerns and contradicts the premise of international human rights law that seeks to empower human rights-holders to pursue claims directly and on an international stage. The methods for intorducing human rights issues in the context of investment arbitration proceedings are suggested as follows: First, human rights arguments can be introduced into ISDS by the usual initiator of investment disputes: the investor as the complainant. Especially, if the jurisdictional and applicable law clauses of the respective international investment agreements are sufficiently broad to include human rights violations, adjudicating a pure human rights claim could be possible. Second, the host state may rely on human rights argumentation as a respondent of an investor claim. Human rights have played a role as a justification for state measures undertaken to comply with human rights laws. Third, third party interventions by NGOs and civil society groups as amici curiae may act as advocates for affected populations or communities in response to the reluctance of governments to introduce their own human rights duties into the investment dispute. Finally, arbitrators have also referred to human rights ex officio, i.e., without having a dispute party referring to the specific argument. This was mainly the case in the context of determining the scope of property rights and the existence of an expropriation. As all U.N. member states have human rights obligations, international investment laws must be presumed to be in conformity with the relevant human rights obligations.

A Case Study on the Resolution of International Investment Disputes Caused by Aggravation of Political and Economic Situation of the Host State - Focusing on the case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (투자유치국의 정치.경제상황 악화로 인한 국제투자분쟁의 해결에 관한 사례연구 -CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic 사건을 중심으로)

  • Oh, Won-Suk;Hur, Hai-Kwan
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.36
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    • pp.87-109
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    • 2007
  • This Comment explores the ICSID case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, awarded on May 12, 2005. The Part II of this Comment first describes the relevant facts of the case including the some background for readers' understanding and the Part III summaries the claimant's requests and the decisions rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Award. At Part IV, the Comment addresses the issue of determinating laws applicable to the merits of dispute in case that the parties of the case have not chosen a governing law, and at Part V, takes a close look into three main issues of (i) the indirect expropriation of the investment, (ii) the breach of fair and equitable treatment and (iii) the protections under umbrella clauses. In this CMS case, we see first that while the Tribunal affirmed that any indirect expropriation can occur from incidental interference depriving the foreign investor of the use or reasonable-to-be-expected economic benefit even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State, the Tribunal denied the occurrence of indirect expropriation in this case by holding that the Government of Argentina has not breached the standard of protection laid down in the Treaty. Secondly, however, regarding the issue of fair and equitable treatment, we see that the Tribunal, finding Argentina's breach of obligations, affirmed that the foreign investor can expect the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, which can give the foreign investor certain degree of foreseeability. Thirdly and finally, we see that, on base of the effect of the umbrella clause, the Tribunal recognized the obligation of the host State undertaken not to freeze the tariff regime or subject it to price controls and not to alter the basic rules governing contracts between the foreign investor and the host State without the first's written consent. However, the protection under the umbrella clause is available only when there is a specific breach of rights and obligations under BIT or a violation of contract rights protected under BIT.

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