• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.161-196
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• 2018

The major object of this study is to analyze the political development of Myanmar's civilian government on the concept of defective democracy, and to investigate the main actors who delayed or stymied political development and their interrelation. In doing so, this study suggests the tasks required for political development overcoming the current political structure and behavior. The civilian government, which was launched in 2016, failed to achieve positive political development by following the behavior of military authoritarianism in terms of exercise of power and decision making structure. On the perspective of the government, delegative democracy and domain democracy have been strengthening since one person has taken over all political power and hesitate to take horizontal accountability for each power organizations. The military, which is responsible for national defence and security seeks illiberal democracy and exclusive democracy, keeping on an undemocratic constitution by the military and Burman ethnocentrism. The reasons why defective democracy has been occurred are that the lack of a group to run a democratic institutions and the limitation of power structure that fails to adhere to the principle of civilian control to the military due to long-term military rule. Therefore, there is a need for military's come back to barracks and transform the power structure to democratic of the civilian government which is tamed an authoritarian order for the political development in Myanmar. In order to achieve this, this study concludes that setting up a empowered democratic government is required.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.185-212
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• 2017

The National League for Democracy (NLD) has restored a civilian government since the military had taken political power in 1962 as a result of general elections on 7, November 2015. But Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could not take part in the presidential election due to some restraints in constitution, so new government created the state counsellor position and the ministry of sate counsellor's office against military's resistance. It never publicized whether the military has to back to barracks including abolish of military's occupying the parliament seats. The ruling party is still taking laissez-faire to the military's political and economic role. The National level Ceasefire Agreement called the 21st Panglong conference launched in the end of August for a week, but stakeholders only insisted their demands. Rohingya issue is not involved in the 21st Panglong conference which aims to achieve national unity. The U.S. fully lifted a comprehensive sanction toward Myanmar since 1993, Japan promised huge grant assistance succeeding the former quasi civilian government. China strived to restore alienated relations of two countries. Although Korea kept Official Development Assistance, the summit which was planed two times in 2016 did not hold. The civilian government announced twelve points of developmental agenda in July 2016, instead of destroying the national development policy of the Thein Sein government. This agenda only showed the direction of policy not road map which was the same trend of the former government. The main direction of economic development stressed agriculture but manufacture like light industry was ignored.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.213-247
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• 2018

Thailand in 2017 the public sentiment has turned against the military government. The four pledges the military declared immediately after the 2014 coup, restoration of democracy, addressing of divisive politics, eradication of corruption, and stimulation of the economy have all failed. In the same year, however, Thai military junta began to recover it's diplomatic relationship with western countries including US and EU owing to promulgation of the new constitution endorsed by King Maha Vajiralongkorn and the lavish funeral of late King Bhumibol Adulyadej which was attended by huge number of condolence delegations from around the world including US Defense Secretary James Mattis. Since the 2014 coup, US has sanctioned the country under military junta led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha for urging them back to the barracks. EU also joined this sanction measures. US signaled change in it's policy when General Prayuth got the chance to visit US and meet President Donal Trump in 2017. General Prayuth Chan-o-cha's military junta could start to restore it's reputation internationally. Domestically, he used absolute powers based on section 44 of the interim constitution, also guranteed in the new constitution. Oversea and national human rights groups have criticized that the interim constitution for permitting the NCPO, Thai military junta's official name, to carry out policies and actions without any effective oversight or accountability for human rights violations. On 1 December 2017, Thailand marked the one-year anniversary of King Maha Vajiralongkorn's accession to the throne as the country's new monarch, Rama X. In the first year of King Rama X's reign, arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonment under Article 112 of Thailand's Criminal Code (lese-majeste) have continued unabated in Thailand. NCPO has continued to abuse Article 112 to detain alleged violators and curb any form of discussion regarding the monarchy, particularly on social media. In this worsening human rights environment General Prayuth Chan-o-cha enforced continuously campaign like Thai-style democracy- an effort to promote largely autocratic 'Thainess' in such a way that freedom of expression is threatened. It is a resurgence of 'Sarit Model'. In the beginning of 2017 Thai military government raised the slogan of 'opportunity Thailand' in the context of 'Thailand 4.0' project which attempts to transform Thai economy based on industry-driven to innovation-driven for recovering robust growth. To consider freedom and liberty as a source of innovation, 'Thailand 4.0' led by 'Sarit Model' without democracy would be skeptical.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.87-92
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• 2012

In the early 2012, European Union proposed new legal framework, including the right to be forgotten, for the protection of personal data. The new Proposal articulates kind of sweeping new privacy right and there has been debates on its potential threat to free speech in the digital age. While the situation is similar in Korea, I want to introduce the right to be forgotten in the Proposal. Then, I will analyze current legal system in Korea regarding the new privacy right and suggest some guidelines in searching direction for the coming legislation with respect to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should not have been promulgated without considering fully its effect on the free speech, especially in the society where the voice toward direct democracy or movement toward participation of the citizen, mainly through cyber space or Social Network Services, has risen much higher in Korea. Especially, the new right seems not to cover the control of data subject on a third party where the third party expressing his opinion by posting himself other's personal data on his blog or others.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.213-261
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• 2018

On May 9, 2018, regime change took place in Malaysia. It was the first regime change that took place in 61 years after independence in 1957. The regime change was an unexpected result not only in Malaysian experts but also in political circles. Moreover, the outcome of the election was more shocking because the opposition party was divided in this general election. The regime change in Malaysia was enough to attract worldwide attention because it meant the collapse of the oldest regime in the modern political system that exists, except North Korea and China. How could this have happened? In particular, how could the regime change, which had not been accomplished despite opposition parties' cooperation for almost 20 years, could be achieved with the divided opposition forces? What political implications does the 2018 general election result have for political change and democratization in Malaysia? How will the Malaysian politics be developed in the aftermath of the regime change? It is worth noting that during the process of finding answers, a series of general elections since the start of reformasi in 1998 tended to be likened to a series of "tsunami" in the Malaysian electoral history. This phenomenon of tsunami means that, even though very few predicted the possibility of regime change among academia, civil society and political circles, the regime change was not sudden. In other words, the regime in 2018 was the result of the desire and expectation of political change through a series of elections of Malaysian voters last 20 years. In this context, this study, in analyzing the results of the election in 2018, shows that the activation of electoral politics triggered by the reform movement in 1998, along with the specific situational factors in 2018, could lead to collapse of the ruling government for the first time since independence.