• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
• /
• 2018.05a
• /
• pp.17-18
• /
• 2018

최근 게임이론 분야에서는 인공에이전트들 간의 공진화를 활용해 교섭게임 현상을 관찰하고 있다. 본 논문에서는 공진화를 활용한 실세계 교섭게임 관찰을 보다 더 현실과 유사하게 묘사하기 위해 교섭게임 단계별 비용을 고려한다. 각 교섭게임 단계에서 협상이 결렬되면 다음 단계로 넘어 갈 때 추가적인 비용이 발생하여 게임 참여자 모두 몫이 줄어든다. 시뮬레이션 실험 결과 단계별 비용이 증가 할수록 협상이 빠른 단계에서 이루어지는 것을 확인하였다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.14 no.11
• /
• pp.549-557
• /
• 2014

Recently, analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issues in field of game theory. In this paper, we observe a bargaining game using co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. In oder to model two artificial agents, we use a particle swarm optimization and a differential evolution. We investigate algorithm parameters for the best performance and observe that which strategy is better in the bargaining game under the co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. Experimental simulation results show that particle swarm optimization outperforms differential evolution in the bargaining game.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
• /
• 2015.05a
• /
• pp.55-56
• /
• 2015

근래에 게임이론 분야에서 진화계산 기법을 사용한 분석은 중요한 이슈이다. 본 논문에서는 교섭게임에서 입자군집최적화와 차분진화알고리즘 간의 공진화 과정을 관찰하고 상호 경쟁에서 얻는 이득을 비교하여 두 알고리즘의 성능을 분석한다. 실험결과 입자군집최적화가 차분진화알고리즘에 비해 교섭게임에서 더 우수한 성능을 보임을 확인하였다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.20 no.11
• /
• pp.292-300
• /
• 2020

According to the development of artificial intelligence technology, attempts have been made to interpret phenomena in various fields of the real world such as economic, social, and scientific fields through computer simulations using virtual artificial agents. In the existing artificial agent-based bargaining game analysis, there was a problem that did not reflect the cost incurred when the stage progresses in the real-world bargaining game and the depreciation of the bargaining target over time. This study intends to observe the effect on the bargaining game by adding the cost incurred in the bargaining stage and depreciation of the bargaining target over time (bargaining cost) to the previous artificial agent-based bargaining game model. As a result of the experiment, it was observed that as the cost incurred in the bargaining stage increased, the two artificial agents participating in the game had a share close to half the ratio and tried to conclude the negotiation in the early stage.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.14 no.8
• /
• pp.293-303
• /
• 2016

Analysis of bargaining games utilizing evolutionary computation in recent years has dealt with important issues in the field of game theory. In this paper, we investigated interaction and coevolution process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation in the bargaining game. We present three kinds of evolving-strategic agents participating in the bargaining games; genetic algorithms (GA), particle swarm optimization (PSO) and differential evolution (DE). The co-evolutionary processes among three kinds of artificial agents which are GA-agent, PSO-agent, and DE-agent are tested to observe which EC-agent shows the best performance in the bargaining game. The simulation results show that a PSO-agent is better than a GA-agent and a DE-agent, and that a GA-agent is better than a DE-agent with respect to co-evolution in bargaining game. In order to understand why a PSO-agent is the best among three kinds of artificial agents in the bargaining game, we observed the strategies of artificial agents after completion of game. The results indicated that the PSO-agent evolves in direction of the strategy to gain as much as possible at the risk of gaining no property upon failure of the transaction, while the GA-agent and the DE-agent evolve in direction of the strategy to accomplish the transaction regardless of the quantity.

• Proceedings of the Korea Water Resources Association Conference
• /
• 2006.05a
• /
• pp.1352-1356
• /
• 2006

우리나라에서 물과 관련된 분쟁은 민주화와 지방분권화가 가속화됨에 따라 갈등의 주체뿐만 아니라 전개양상까지도 다양하게 변화되고 있다. 최근에는 이 같은 갈등구조가 심화되고, 다양한 형태로 표출됨에 따라 사회불안요인으로까지 확대되고 있어 합리적이고 효율적인 분쟁해결을 지원하기 위한 방법론이 필요한 실정이다. 본 연구에서는 대안적 분쟁해결(ADR, Alternative Dispute Resolution)의 기법 중 하나인 조정(mediation)과정에서의 조정안 도출을 위해 게임이론을 적용하였다. 게임이론에 의한 합리적 해는 제시된 조정안에 객관성을 부여함으로써 의사결정과정의 신뢰성을 향상시킬 것으로 기대된다. 본 연구를 통해 제시한 방법론을 지역 간물 배분과 관련한 가상의 분쟁상황에 적용하였으며, 동적완비정보게임(dynamic complete information game)에서의 교섭게임(bargaining game)으로 구성한 뒤, 경기자(players) 간 배분비율과 배분량을 도출하였고, 이를 편익함수에 의한 양 경기자의 부족편익과 초과편익을 비교하여 그만큼의 편익 차를 보상해주는 조정을 모색하였다. 본 연구는 제3자(third party)에 의한 조정안 제안 시 객관적이고 합리적인 해를 제공하여 이해당사자들이 합의를 이끌어 내는 데 크게 기여할 수 있을 것으로 사료된다.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.32 no.3
• /
• pp.172-179
• /
• 2006

Over the past few years, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on modeling the bargaining game using artificial agents on within-model interaction. However, very few attempts have been made at study on between-model interaction. This paper investigates the interaction and co-evolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents in the bargaining game. We present two kinds of the artificial agents participating in the bargaining game. They play some bargaining games with their strategies based on genetic algorithm (GA) and reinforcement learning (RL). We compare agents' performance between two agents under various conditions which are the changes of the parameters of artificial agents and the maximal number of round in the bargaining game. Finally, we discuss which agents show better performance and why the results are produced.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.35 no.7B
• /
• pp.991-1000
• /
• 2010

The Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) has been proposed to accommodate frequent mobility of the Mobile Node. HMIPv6 can effectively reduce the signaling overhead and latency. However, it has a problem that the registration of a mobile node concentrates on the furthest MAP(Mobility Anchor Point) when the mobile node enters into a new domain. This paper proposes a new load distribution mechanism by using the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. The main advantage of the proposed scheme can prevent load concentration from being registered to the specified MAP based on the weight value according to the available resource-ratio of a MAP. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can improve network performance under widely diverse traffic load intensities.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
• /
• v.10 no.4
• /
• pp.93-100
• /
• 2021

The Ethereum shard system for solving the scalability problem of the blockchain has a load balancing issue, which is modeled as a graph partitioning problem. In this paper, we propose an adaptive online weighted graph partitioning algorithm that can negotiate between two utility of the shard system using the game theory's bargaining solution. The bargaining solution is an axiomatic solution that can fairly determine the points of conflict of utility. The proposed algorithm was improved to apply the existing online graph partitioning algorithm to the weighted graph, and load balancing was performed efficiently through the design considering the situation of the sharding system using the extension of Nash bargaining solution, which is extended to apply solution to non-convex feasible set of bargaining problem. As a result of the experiment, it showed up to 37% better performance than typical load balancing algorithm of shard system.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
• /
• v.10 no.4
• /
• pp.21-29
• /
• 2010

International construction contractors are often faced with the situation of working in an unfamiliar construction environment. Under FIDIC rules, the contractor has the right to make a claim requesting the consulting engineer for an adjustment to the contract price or the time for completion when a part or parts of the works have changed, or in the event of unforeseeable conditions. Contractors generally have more access to the costs and time implications of such a change or unforeseeable conditions than the consulting engineer or outside neutrals. Due to such an asymmetry of information, the contractor may be motivated to dispute frivolous claims of less merit, expecting erroneous judgments by the consulting engineer or the neutrals. In this paper, a claiming behavior model is presented by using game theory and experience data to study the manner in which frivolous claims develop into disputes. The model also analyzes the impacts of DAB/DRB upon the frivolous claims.