• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.37-57
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• 2017

On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.3-23
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• 2015

The Chevron saga including Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron I") and Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron II") started out of domestic litigations between TexPet and Ecuador in the early 1990s. In Chevron I, the Tribunal decided that Article 2(7) of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT on effective means of provision was breached because of undue delays in the seven legal proceedings TexPet had brought against Ecuador in respect to contractual obligations. In Chevron II, it was contended that through the actions and inactions of the judiciary and the executive, Ecuador breached her several obligations under the BIT. Ecuador objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because TexPet's investment was terminated in 1992, and because Chevron is not a party to the 1995 Settlement Agreement and 1998 Final Release. In its Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Tribunal applied a prima facie standard to the facts alleged by the Claimants but denied by the Respondent, and decided that questions in respect of the Respondent's jurisdictional objections should be joined to the merits under Article 21(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the merits phase of Chevron II, the Tribunal divided the merits of the Parties' dispute into two parts, entitled "Track 1" and "Track 2". In its Partial Award on Track 1, the Tribunal decided that Chevron is a "Releasee" under the 1995 Settlement Agreement. In a decision on "Track 1B", the Tribunal decided that the Lago Agrio complaint cannot be read as pleading "exclusively" or "only" diffuse claims, and that, to this extent, the Claimants' reliance on the 1995 Settlement Agreement as a complete bar to the Lago Agrio complaint must fail, as a matter of Ecuadorian law. The Tribunal maintained the position that the Parties' disputes on both merit and jurisdiction should be reserved for Track 2. It remains to be seen how the Tribunal addresses the Claimants' allegations of multiple denials of justice under international law against the judgments of the Respondent's Courts, together with the Respondent's jurisdictional objections in Track 2 of the arbitration.