• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.135-154
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• 2010

This paper considers a duopoly where switching costs exist. The analysis proves that temporal price reductions can be pure strategy equilibrium where firms earn more profit than in a regular price strategy. Greater profits result from price discrimination in temporal price reductions. The equilibrium is contrasted with previous studies, which explain temporal price reductions as a result of mixed strategy. In a given model with an assumption about forming switching cost, firms can control their range of loyal consumers by properly setting their regular and promotional prices. The model shows that temporal price reduction tends to raise the regular price and decrease the range of loyal consumers.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.28 no.10
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• pp.229-239
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• 2023

This study aims to explore the impact of algorithmic price discrimination on negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) through the lens of attribution theory. It also examines the mediating roles of intentional attributions and negative emotions, as well as the moderating effect of price sensitivity. For this study, 772 consumers who had purchased flight tickets completed a questionnaire survey, and the collected data were analyzed and tested using SPSS 27.0 and AMOS 24.0 software. The research findings reveal that algorithmic price discrimination has a significant positive impact on intentional attributions, negative emotions, and NWOM. Specifically, deliberate attributions and negative emotions mediate the relationship between algorithmic price discrimination and NWOM, while price sensitivity positively moderates the relationship between negative emotions and NWOM. Therefore, companies should consider disclosing algorithm details transparently in their marketing strategies to mitigate consumers' negative emotions and implement targeted strategies for consumers with different levels of price sensitivity to enhance positive word-of-mouth.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.33
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• pp.33-35
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• 1998

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.139
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• pp.66-73
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• 2008

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.127
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• pp.88-96
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• 2006

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.239-273
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• 2007

Bunker-C is sold at the different price in the market for international bunkering and for export, though the quality of bunker-c is not much different in two markets. The price difference in two markets tends to increase since 2002 in Korea. This study shows that there is a possibility for a structural change in the price difference in two markets in Korea around June, 2002. In the search for possible explanations for this structural change, empirical analyses found that the price difference in Singapore, which had not have any explanatory power before June, 2002, has explained the price difference in Korea after July, 2002. Other explanatory variable for the price difference was the growth rate of crude oil price in the previous period. The empirical results suggest that the price difference in bunkering market and export market might be explained by the price discrimination which is adopted as a competitive strategy by oil companies in competing with Singapore.

• 프린팅코리아
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.132-135
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• 2014

성숙기에 접어든 인쇄산업은 인쇄기술 향상으로 생산설비의 성능차이가 거의 없어진 가운데 가격과 빠른 납기만이 차별의 수단이 되고 있다. 이런 가운데 가격경쟁은 인쇄사의 수익성 악화로 이어지고 있다. 이를 타개하기 위해 인쇄사들이 전문분야를 중심으로 분업화하거나 품질 보증을 비롯한 시큐리티 시스템을 구축해야 한다는 목소리가 커지고 있다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.933-936
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• 2014

The government has the duty to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. In order to promote competition we have to address the asymmetry in the information as possible and to ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it virtually distort the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by avoiding their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy could be transferred to down the price of cell phone and charges and it would be a benefit to consumers. Separate notice of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a developed policy but it was too late. It, the market price close to that from perfect competition structure, is plausible, ultimately.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2004.05a
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• pp.378-382
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• 2004

전력 거래 체제에 관한 기존의 연구들은 분석의 편의를 위해 복잡한 전력 시스템을 너무 단순화하여 현실성을 좀더 반영해야 할 필요가 있었다. 본 논문에서는 양방향 입찰의 전력 도매 경쟁 시장에서 선도 계약 시장의 도입과 가격 결정 방식의 변화가 장기적으로 전력 가격의 수준 및 변동성, 그리고 발전 회사들의 이윤과 같은 시장 성과에 미치는 영향에 대해 실제 데이터를 적용한 객체 기반모형 시뮬레이션을 통하여 분석하였다. 시뮬레이션 결과, 선도 계약 시장이 도입되는 경우 전력 가격은 상승하며 투자가 활발하게 발생하고, 가격결정방식이 단일 가격에서 차별 가격으로 바뀌는 경우 전력 가격과 가격 변동성이 감소하였다.