• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.108
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• pp.2-4
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• 2004

원가를 공개한다면 사실상 건설사들의 가격담합을 조장하는 결과가 되고 말 것이다. 왜냐하면 서로 경쟁사의 원가구조를 알게 되고 여기에 사회적으로 허용되는 이윤율을 알면 분양가가 얼마나 될 것인지를 짐작할 수 있어 경쟁사의 가격도 알 수 있게 된다. 그렇다면 구태여 경쟁사가 자기의 가격보다 낮은 가격으로 경쟁을 할까봐 두려워서 원가를 절감하고 나아가 가격을 낮추려는 압력이 줄어들 수밖에 없을 것이다. (중략) 이처럼 원가공개는 담합의 성공요인 중의 하나인 담합위반의 감시를 매우 쉽게 해 주고 마는 셈이다. 이런 이유로 공정거래법은 경쟁사업자들 간의 가격정보 교환을 담합의 한 수단 내지 정황증거로 보고 있다. 그런데 법령으로 가격정보의 가장 중요한 부분인 원가를 공개하라는 것은 결국 담합을 조장하여 가격경쟁을 감소시키는 결과가 될 뿐일 것이다.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.30
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• pp.9-12
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• 1998

현행 가격표시제도는 제조업자가 표시하는 공산품에 대한 공장도가격(수입품은 수입가격)표시제도, 일반상품에 대한 권장소비자가격 표시제도 및 재판매가격유지제도와 소매업자가 표시하는 소매가격표시제도로 대별된다.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
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• no.3 s.193
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• pp.46-47
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• 1997

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.102
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• pp.17-31
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• 2004

경쟁정책은 기술혁신의 양과 기술이전, 즉 라이센싱, 그리고 제품의 가격과 생산량에 영향을 미친다. 문제는 이 3개의 항목 중 어디에 경쟁정책의 초점이 맞추어져야 하는가이다. 전통적으로 경쟁정책은 생산량과 가격의 움직임에 관심을 가졌는 바, 이제 지식경제화 시대에서 특히 지적재산권 분야에서는 혁신의 확산의 경쟁적 효과에 초점을 맞추어야 할 필요가 있다. 즉 라이센싱의 경쟁적 효과를 면밀히 분석해야 하는 것이다.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.613-641
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• 2013

This paper uses the error correction model to analyse dynamic gasoline price adjustments of the four refiners. Unlike the existing studies, this model allows a refiner's asymmetric adjustment to changes in the other refiners' prices as well as in its own price and costs. With the estimation results, we can obtain the following findings. First, there are the asymmetric price adjustments to changes in exchange rate and international gasoline price, but showing opposing directions. Second, for most of the refiners, the prices respond immediately to the lagged deviation from the long run equilibrium price, but asymmetrically respond for a few refiners. Third, there are some refiners that adjust their price to the other refiners' price deviation from the long run equilibrium. For some refiners, there are competitive price adjustments to the others' price deviations. These findings imply that a refiner faces inelastic demand, intends to maintain implicitly a relative level of its own price to others, and tends to respond competitively to the others' price deviation from the equilibrium.

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
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• v.26 no.2 s.292
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• pp.64-67
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• 1994

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.523-549
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• 2015

This paper investigates an oil refiner's asymmetric behavior in the adjustments of gasoline and diesel prices to changes in his own price and his rivals' prices as well as input costs. An asymmetric error correction model which allows a firm's pricing behavior to the deviation of other firms' prices from their long-run equilibrium level is employed for estimation using weekly data for the period April 2009 to January 2015. Evidence is found that there is a significant degree of asymmetry in the adjustment of wholesale prices to changes in crude oil price. A similar result in regard to the exchange rate is also found by the data. The estimation results for firm's response to changes in other firms' prices indicates that implicit collusion could be more easily exploited in the wholesale petroleum market as results of firms' interaction with each other and anticipation of rivals' pricing behavior. A few refiners show competitive price adjustment in response to the upward deviation of the others' prices from their equilibrium level.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.79-90
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• 2019

As an increasing number of cloud service providers begin to provide cloud computing services, they form a competitive market to compete for users. Due to different resource configurations and service workloads, users may observe different response times for their service requests and experience different levels of service quality. To compete for cloud users, it is crucial for each cloud service provider to determine an optimal price that best corresponds to their service qualities while also guaranteeing maximum profit. To achieve this goal, the underlying rationale and characteristics in this competitive market must be clarified. In this paper, we analyze price competition in the multimedia cloud service market with two service providers. We characterize the nature of non-cooperative games in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market with the goal of capturing how each cloud service provider determines its optimal price to compete with the other and maximize its own profit. To do this, we introduce a queueing model to characterize the service process in a multimedia cloud data center. Based on performance measures of the proposed queueing model, we suggest a price competition problem in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market. By solving this problem, we can obtain the optimal equilibrium prices.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.618-632
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• 2016

In Korea's drama industry, a production factor has several prices, not one, bucking the general economic theory. The price changes depending upon the broadcaster, the producer, and even the genre. The price gets determined by such factors as the scarcity, the substitutability, the overall budget size, and so on. For star actors, the price stands for their popularity and ego, which makes them strive so desperately for a higher pay than competitors. The rise of the production factor price has outpaced that of the production budget, to cause undesirable structural problems. It is deemed that the running guarantee could be a way to rationalize the pricing system for production factors in Korea.