• Title/Summary/Keyword: 美國國防部

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The Status of North Korean Airspace after Reunification (북한 공역의 통일 후 지위)

  • Kwon, Chang-Young
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.287-325
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    • 2017
  • Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

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A study on Operation Rules of Korean Air Defence Identification Zone (한국 방공식별구역 운영규칙에 관한 고찰)

  • Kwon, Jong-Pil;Lee, Yeong H.
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.189-217
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    • 2017
  • Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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