• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.40 no.6 s.111
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• pp.671-693
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• 2005

This paper is to explore critically environmentalism, especially in terms of environmental justice, suggested or implied in theory of liberalism which has been the ideological foundation of contemporary society. It begins with a brief look at liberal perspective in a broad sense, then interprets in-depth the classical liberalism of J. Locke, libertarianism (esp. R. Nozick) and utilitarianism (including cost-benefit analysis) from the environmental point of view. And finally it considers liberal pluralism and other alternative theories of pluralism, especially communitarianism (esp M. Walzer), postmodern pluralism (esp. I. Young), and cultural pluralism (esp. C. Taylor) in order to overcome limitations of liberal environmentalism and to find out some clues for theory of environmental justice. In conclusion, this paper argues that we need to transfer from liberalism (including liberal pluralism) to critical pluralism in oder to develop a proper understanding of environmental problems and to conceptualize a desirable theory of environmental justice.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.97-133
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• 2018

In his unpublished article, "Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?," $G{\ddot{o}}del$ criticizes what he calls the 'syntactical interpretation' of mathematics by Carnap. Park, Chun, Awodey and Carus, Ricketts, and Tennant have all reconstructed $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ arguments in various ways and explored Carnap's possible responses. This paper first recreates $G{\ddot{o}}del$ and Carnap's debate about the nature of mathematics. After criticizing most existing reconstructions, I claim to make the following contributions. First, the 'language relativity' several scholars have attributed to Carnap is exaggerated. Rather, the essence of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ critique is the applicability of mathematics and the argument based on 'expectability'. Thus, Carnap's response to $G{\ddot{o}}del$ must be found in how he saw the application of mathematics, especially its application to science. I argue that the 'correspondence principle' of Carnap, which has been overlooked in the existing discussions, plays a key role in the application of mathematics. Finally, the real implications of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ incompleteness theorems - the inexhaustibility of mathematics - turn out to be what both $G{\ddot{o}}del$ and Carnap agree about.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies
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• v.41 no.1
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• pp.227-249
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• 2010

The purposes of this article are to criticize social services, and to consider alternative caring policies and social economic regime to cope with caring blank, in the view point of A. Gorz. According to Gorz, in the value of growth of capitalism, people who are in charge of household affairs and caring work make inroads into the wage market. At this point, as caring blank is occured, social services are emerged. These new aspects are 'Commodification and Rationalization of Private Life'. This article suggests alternative ideas to these aspects. First, universal care giver·breadwinner model, second, the dominance of eco-reason and shorter working hours.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.80-105
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• 2003

본 연구는 기존 브랜드자산의 구성개념과 구성개념들 간의 관계 연구들을 비판적으로 검토하여 첫째, 브랜드자산의 구성개념을 재정립하여 브랜드자산을 구성하는 세부적 구성요소를 제시하고 둘째, 브랜드자산 형성과정에서 세부적 구성 요소들 간의 인과적 관계를 제시하고 셋째, 세부적 구성요소를 측정하기 위한 척도를 제시하며 넷째, 전략적 브랜드자산 구축 즉, 브랜드자산이 기업의 핵심전략으로 한 단계 더 성숙하기 위해서는 기업측면에서 어떠한 요인이 중요한가를 확인하고 이에 대한 이론적·실무적 시사점을 제시하고자 하였다. 본 연구에서는 브랜드자산이 기업성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미친다는 기존 연구들과 같은 견해를 가지나, 기업성과로 연결되기 위한 브랜드자산의 구성개념과 형성과정에 있어서 기존 연구의 의문점을 제기하고, 그에 따라 연구가설과 연구모형을 설정하였다. 연구모형과 연구가설을 검증하기 위하여 스포츠브랜드와 컴퓨터브랜드의 2가지 카테고리를 대상으로 설문을 배포하여 311부를 회수하였으나 불성실하게 응답한 3부를 제외하고 308부를 실증분석에 이용하였다. 연구결과 브랜드의 지각된 품질, 리더십, 인지와 연상과 브랜드자산의 관계에서 존중, 차별성, 만족, 전환장벽, 애호도가 중요한 매개적 역할을 하고 있음을 알 수 있었다.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.1-30
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• 2009

Frege's logicism has been frequently regarded as a development in number theory which succeeded to the so called arithmetization of analysis in the late 19th century. But it is not easy for us to accept this opinion if we carefully examine his actual works on real analysis. So it has been often argued that his logicism was just a philosophical program which had not contact with any contemporary mathematical practices. In this paper I will show that these two opinions are all ill-founded ones which are due to the misunderstanding of the theoretical place of Frege's logicism in the context of contemporary mathematical practices. Firstly, I will carefully examine Cantorian definition of real numbers and Frege's critiques of it. On the basis of this, I will show that Frege's aim was to produce the purely logical definition of ratios of quantities. Secondly, I will consider the mathematical background of Frege's logicism. On the basis of this, I will show that his standpoint in real analysis was much subtler than what we used to expect. On the one hand, unlike Weierstrass and Cantor, Frege wanted to get such real analysis that could be universally applicable. On the other hand, unlike most mathematicians who insisted on the traditional conceptions, he would not depend upon any geometrical considerations in establishing real analysis. Thirdly, I will argue that Frege regarded these two aspects - the independence from geometry and the universal applicability - as those which characterized logic itself and, by logicism, arithmetic itself. And I will show that his conception of real numbers as ratios of quantities stemmed from his methodological maxim according to which the nature of numbers should be explained by the common roles they played in various contexts to which they applied, and that he thought that the universal applicability of numbers could not be adequately explicated without such an explanation.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.273-294
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• 2012

In my previous article "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals" and "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals and Hasuk Song's Objections", I argued that the so-called Uncontested Principle is not uncontestable. According to the Uncontested Principle, an indicative conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' logically implies a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$'. In his recent paper "On the Recent Controversies surrounding the Uncontested Principle" Wonbae Choi presents three objections to my claim. First, my denial of the Uncontested Principle implies rejecting modus ponens. Second, my denial of the Uncontested Principle is tantamount to taking the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional as weaker than those of a material conditional, which are usually taken to be the weakest among conditionals. Third, my view that we can warrantedly assert '$A{\rightarrow}C$' even when 'A ${\therefore}$ C' is inductively justified is based on a misunderstanding of the way in which indicative conditionals are justified. In this paper I argue that Choi's objections are all based on misunderstandings of my view. First, I do not deny the validity of modus ponens (as a form of deductive reasoning). Second, the fact that the inductive warrantability of 'A ${\therefore}$ C' does not imply the truth of '$A{\supset}C$' does not show that the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional is weaker than those of a material conditional. Third, Choi's claim that a contingent conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' is true only when 'C' can be deductively derived from 'A' in conjunction with a hidden premiss is not well grounded, nor does it fit the facts.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.38 no.5
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• pp.721-738
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• 2018

Nature of Science(NOS) has been a well-organized focus of science education and one of the key elements in defining and cultivating scientific literacy for more than a century. In recent years, a specific description of NOS, which is often known as 'the consensus view of NOS', has become very influential and has gained ready acceptance as an arrangement for both curriculum building and research into understanding of NOS by students and teachers in many countries around the world. This study has two purposes; one is to review some debates and criticism on the consensus view of NOS which consists of a list of sentences to describe nature of refined and general science, which have been heated up for the last few years by many prominent science education researchers, and the other is to consider alternative perspectives on NOS for the purpose of a new direction of NOS education. As a result of an investigation into such views as 'Teaching about NOS', 'Critical NOS', 'Critical Thinking-NOS', 'Whole Science', 'Features of Science' and 'Reconceptualized Family Resemblance Approach to NOS', some implications which focus on the generality and plurality of content knowledge of NOS based on current philosophy of science and sociology of scientific knowledge are suggested for the improvement of teaching and learning NOS.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.54
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• pp.349-386
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• 2014

Noju Oh Hui-sang(1763-1833) is one of the neo-Confucian scholars representing with Hong Chik-pil the Kiho-Nak School from the late 18th to the early 19th century. He did sincerely not only succeed theories of Kiho School originated from Yulgok, but also strengthened the main view of the Nak faction by clarifying the theoretical stance of it derived from Kim Chang-hyop. Not only he does suggest critical points of view against Ho faction in terms of Horak Controversy, but also criticizes heterodox account, which raised by an inner circle of Nak faction. In this vein, Oh established the neo-Confucian ways of realization of morality and ideal society by setting up his own points of view on mind and bright virtues that are followed by various issues of Horak Controversy. My paper will examine the values of Oh's account of Nature-Principle in the light of intellectual historical context by paying a special attention to his critical views of Ho faction. Oh's main idea is how to systematize practical foundation of realizing morality. Thus, he wants to theoretically explain both the practice of morality and the reality of pure moral mind in order to establish concrete practices of them in the real world. In doing so, he pays attention to mutual inclusive relationship between Principle and Matter(ki:氣). The mutual inclusive relationship between them can be exactly applied into the relationship between mind and Nature. So, the realityof moral principle explicitly implies the pure goodness of moral agency. Furthermore, his elucidation of logical relationship between mind and Nature and its values via the ontological understanding of them is to set up a system of cultivation, i.e., realizing practical foundation of pure moral mind. In conclusion, we can evaluate that Oh's account of Nature-Principle, at least, aims not only at establishment of moral agency and its reality in a theoretical dimension, but also at a guarantee of their realization in the world.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.141-170
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• 2009

We can witness the recent surge of interest in the controversy over the scientific status of mathematics among Jesuit Aristotelians around 1600. Following the lead of Wallace, Dear, and Mancosu, I propose to look into this controversy in more detail. For this purpose, I shall focus on Biancani's discussion of scientiae mediae in his dissertation on the nature of mathematics. From Dear's and Wallace's discussions, we can gather a relatively nice overview of the debate between those who championed the scientific status of mathematics and those who denied it. But it is one thing to fathom the general motivation of the disputation, quite another to appreciate the subtleties of dialectical strategies and tactics involved in it. It is exactly at this stage when we have to face some difficulties in understanding the point of Biancani's views on scientiae mediae. Though silent on the problem of scientiae mediae, Mancosu's discussions of the Jesuit Aristotelians' views on potissima demonstrations, mathematical explanations, and the problem of cause are of utmost importance in this regard, both historically and philosophically. I will carefully examine and criticize some of Mancosu's interpretations of Piccolomini's and Biancani's views in order to approach more closely what was really at stake in the controversy.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.407-436
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• 2013

I examine the notion of truth in the intuitionistic type theory and provide a better explanation of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that of Dag Prawitz. After a brief explanation of the distinction among proposition, type and judgement in comparison with Frege's theory of judgement, I examine the judgements of the form 'A true' in the intuitionistic type theory and explain how the determinacy of the existence of proofs can be understood intuitionistically. I also examine how the existential judgements of the form 'Pf(A) exists' should be understood. In particular, I diagnose the reason why such existential judgements do not have propositional contents. I criticize an understanding of the existential judgements as elliptical judgements. I argue that, at least in two respects, the notion of truth explained in this paper is a more advanced version of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that provided by Prawitz. I briefly consider a subjectivist's objection to the conception of truth explained in this paper and provide an answer to it.