Experiments for validation of surface reflectance produced by Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT-3A) were conducted using Chinese Baotou (BTCN) data among four sites of the Radical Calibration Network (RadCalNet), a portal that provides spectrophotometric reflectance measurements. The atmosphere reflectance and surface reflectance products were generated using an extension program of an open-source Orfeo ToolBox (OTB), which was redesigned and implemented to extract those reflectance products in batches. Three image data sets of 2016, 2017, and 2018 were taken into account of the two sensor model variability, ver. 1.4 released in 2017 and ver. 1.5 in 2019, such as gain and offset applied to the absolute atmospheric correction. The results of applying these sensor model variables showed that the reflectance products by ver. 1.4 were relatively well-matched with RadCalNet BTCN data, compared to ones by ver. 1.5. On the other hand, the reflectance products obtained from the Landsat-8 by the USGS LaSRC algorithm and Sentinel-2B images using the SNAP Sen2Cor program were used to quantitatively verify the differences in those of KOMPSAT-3A. Based on the RadCalNet BTCN data, the differences between the surface reflectance of KOMPSAT-3A image were shown to be highly consistent with B band as -0.031 to 0.034, G band as -0.001 to 0.055, R band as -0.072 to 0.037, and NIR band as -0.060 to 0.022. The surface reflectance of KOMPSAT-3A also indicated the accuracy level for further applications, compared to those of Landsat-8 and Sentinel-2B images. The results of this study are meaningful in confirming the applicability of Analysis Ready Data (ARD) to the surface reflectance on high-resolution satellites.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
Roy Huddle, having invented the coated particle in Harwell 1957, stated in the early 1970s that we know now everything about particles and coatings and should be going over to deal with other problems. This was on the occasion of the Dragon fuel performance information meeting London 1973: How wrong a genius be! It took until 1978 that really good particles were made in Germany, then during the Japanese HTTR production in the 1990s and finally the Chinese 2000-2001 campaign for HTR-10. Here, we present a review of history and present status. Today, good fuel is measured by different standards from the seventies: where
Experiments and investigations were done basically and practically for the purpose of labor saving in paddy rice cultivation especially on Homizil i.e. hoeing and herbicide, 1969. 8 concrete tanks were established on the open base of Keon Kuk University for comparison of percolation, dissolved oxygen and yield test of rice in the paddy plot of tank. The dimension of the bottom of each tank is square meter. Each of the 4 of the 8 tanks is 21cm in height and each of the remaining 4 tanks is 36cm. Each tank has a system that comprises 2 sets of tubes, each of which has 20 holes of 5mm in diameter scattered every side and is covered with nylon cloth taking water in the tank. One set consists of 4 P.V.C tubes. The first set is situated 8cm below the top of the tank and the second set is located at bottom layer inside the tank. The 4 tubes of each set are combined together and led to the glass tube which protects from inside to outside. And this inside-outside glass tube is connected to the small rubber tube. Also a glass tube is set 4cm below the top of the tank. Paddy loam was filled on sand in each of the tanks in the soil depth of either 15cm or 30cm. The depth of sand was 5cm in the soil depth of 15cm and 10cm in the soil depth of 30cm. (Fig. 1, 2 and 3). The paddy rice was grown in the tank. The percolation of water, the dissolved oxygen and the yield of rice were observed in the tank. And the dissolved oxygen was detected by Winkler method. A sandy paddy field of heavy percolation was selected at the field of the National Agricultural Material Inspection Center in Seoul. It was divided into 9 plots. These plots were given 3 treatments: (A) not hoeing, (B) hoeing one time and (C) hoeing two times. These treatments were replicated 3 times along the latin square design. The paddy rice was grown and sprayed with Stam F-34 in the all plots for the purpose of killing weeds before hoeing. The two types of paddy of field i.e. one for normal percolation and the other for ill drainage were selected at Iri Crop Experiment Station, Jeonla-Bukdo. Each field was divided into 24 plots for 8 treatments. They are: (A) not hoeing; (B) hoeing one time; (C) hoeing two times; (D) not hoeing but treating with herbicide, Pamcon; (E) hoeing one time and weeding two times also treating with herbicide, Pamcon; (F) hoeing two times and weeding one time a], o treating with herbicide, Pamcon; (G) hoeing two times and weeding two times also treating with herbicide, Pamcon, ; (H) usual manner. The labor hours and expenses needed for weeding in the paddy by hoeing were investigated in a farmer at Suwon and the price of herbicide and the yield of rice were taken out at Iri, Jeonla-Bukdo. The results obtained from the above experiments and investigations are as follows: 1. The relationship between percolation and dissolved oxygen shows that a very small amount of oxygen is detected in the soil water under 2cm below surface of earth in the paddy even when percolation is over 4.0cm per 24 hours (Tab. 1). 2. The relationship between percolation and yield of rice shows that the yield of rice increases in the percolation of 0cm and 1.5cm per 24 hours and decreases in the percolation of 2.5cm and 3.4cm in the plot of the 15cm ploughing depth and increases in the percolation of 1.4cm and 3.0cm and decreases in the percolation of 0cm and 4.0cm in the plot of 30cm ploughing depth (Tab. 1 and Fig. 5). 3. The yield of paddy weeded with Stam F-34 in the sandy field of heavy percolation in Seoul was 3.02 tons in the plot of not hoeing, 2.99 tons in hoeing one time and 3.05 tons in hoeing two times per hectare (Tab. 5). 4.1). 4. 1) The yield of rice per 10 ares in the field of normal percolation at Iri was 338kg in not hoeing, 379kg in hoeing one time, 383kg in hoeing two times, 413kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and not hoeing, 433kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing one time and weeding two times, 399kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing two times and weeding one time, 420kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing two times and weeding two times and 418kg in usual manner (Tab. 6-1). 2) The yield of rice per 10 ares in the field of ill drainage at Iri was 323kg in not hoeing, 363kg in hoeing one time, 342kg in hoeing two times, 388kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and not hoeing, 425kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing one time and weeding two times, 427kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing two times and weeding one time, 449kg in spraying herbicide, Pamcon, and hoeing two times and weeding two times and 412kg in usual manner (Tab. 6-2). 5. 1) The labor hours for weeding by hoeing was 37.1 hours but 53.5 hours if hours for meal, smoking and so on are included, and the expenses including labor cost needed for weeding by hoeing in the paddy rice was 2, 346 Won per 10 ares at Suwon (Tab. 7). 2) The labor hours for weeding by spraying herbicide with hand sprayer in the paddy rice was about 5 hours per 10 ares at Suwon and the expenses for weeding by spraying herbicide in the paddy rice was 750 Won but 1130 Won if the loss by decrement of rice in the paddy field of ill drainage per 10 ares is calculated in estimation at Iri (Tab. 8). From these observations and investigations it is known that using of some kinds of herbicides Saves labor and expenses of weeding, almost without giving damages to the rice itself, in the field of normal or heavy percolation comparing usual manner of hoeing.