France, Tolerance and Populism: Diagnosis and Anlalysis of the Rise of the Far−right and Spread of Hatred Against Immigrants*

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine how France became a representative country for far-right European populism, despite its tradition of tolerance. To achieve this goal, we examine, first, how the concept of tolerance developed in France after the 16th century. Through this process, we find that within the political system, the tolerance of the liberal tradition met with universalism, a republican value, and developed into an 'institutional tolerance' that allowed 'differences' from an authoritarian perspective rather than on an equal level. This 'assimilation' policy, reflecting a 'patriarchal' and 'oppressive' institutional tolerance, formed the keynote of the immigration policy of the 20th century, which continued until the 1980s, and shows that the French government did not take practical steps for the social integration of immigrant groups under the republican universal value that does not allow 'differences.' The government came up with an 'integration' immigration policy that embraces cultural 'differences' only after encountering problems with immigrant groups. However, this was not enough to calm the antipathy towards immigrants in French society and the discontent of immigrants in French society. Also, universalism, a republican value with deep roots in France, prevented the French immigration policy from escaping its assimilationist nature even in the 21st century. In the midst of this, far-right parties have gained power by promoting xenophobic sentiments centered on immigration problems. Finally, this study also looks at how far-right populism is currently changing the French political environment.

Keywords

France, Tolerance, Populism, Far-light, Hatred against immigrants, Immigrant Policy, French Media

Ⅰ. Introduction

In 2022, it became clear that Europe's political environment was changing. In September 2022, a right-wing coalition led by the Brothers of Italy party (FDI) won the general election, securing 43.8% of the vote. The neo-fascist FDI became the largest party in Parliament, winning 26% of the vote, and in October, Giorgia Meloni, leader of the FDI, became Italy's Prime Minister. "For natural families, against LGBT, against gender ideology⋯for border security, against mass immigration⋯ against EU officials" were their leading political slogans. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refused to accept refugees in 2015, in opposition to the EU's refugee resettlement program. In July 2022, Orbán said "We are not a mixed race, and we don't want to become a mixed race." He added that countries where European and non-Europeans mingle are "no longer nations." Accordingly, in September 2022, the European Parliament stated in a parliamentary report that Hungary is no longer considered a full democracy. Sweden, which has deep roots in social democracy, is no exception to this trend. In September 2022, a right-wing coalition that includes the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD), won the Swedish general election and became the ruling party, while the SD became the second-largest party in parliament. The Sweden Democrats, a party with neo-Nazi roots, garnered many conservative votes by advocating for zero refugees, along with anti-Islamic, anti-immigration, and nationalistic policies, claiming to "make Sweden great again" (Cho, 2022).

The National Rally(RN), considered the vanguard of the European

far-right, held the banner for the right wing by beating the mainstream conservative Republicans(LR) in the June 2022 French general election.[1] In April's presidential election, Marine Le Pen, leader of the RN, advanced to the second round after winning 23.2% of the votes in the first round. Although she was not elected president, she received 41.5% of the votes in the second round, showing how the power of the far-right parties has grown. Compared to 20 years ago, when Jean-Marie Le Pen (Marine Le Pen's father) only received 17.79% of the votes in the second round of the 2002 presidential election, the 2022 presidential election results show how French politics and society are changing, and indeed have already changed.

Currently, the academic world and researchers are gaining interest in the far-right phenomenon and populist momentum of European politics. Notably, the far-right phenomenon in French politics and society is raising concerns among many. Italy had already experienced fascism in its politics, and the possibility of its return could have been foreseen because of the continuation of populist regimes like Berlusconi's regimes. However, the rise of the extreme right in France, which did not have such a history and indeed, as a victim of Nazism and fascism had previously taken the lead in eradicating it, is raising many questions. In particular, France was known as an anti-fascist country, or a nation of 'reason' which practiced the concept of 'tolerance' socially and politically, so questions about this movement are bound to grow. France's right-wing parties built up their political influence in the 1980s

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1) The RN won 89 out of 577 seats, ranking third after Ensemble (bringing together the presidential majority of Emmanuel Macron) and NUPES (coalition of political parties of the French left).

by promoting the spread of hatred against immigrants.[2] After the 2000s, they strengthened their position and received public support with the discourse of '(French) national identity.' As of 2023, the far-right has reached the edge of political power. Meanwhile, the more mainstream right-wing parties also began to vote in favor of policies instigating anti-immigrant sentiment in the mid-2000s to avoid losing their voters to far-right forces. In other words, the recent history of French society has moved far away from the principle of 'tolerance.'

On this background, this study investigates how and through what process French politics and society, which embraced the value of tolerance (the outcome of French Enlightenment), reached the current populist wave. In other words, we will examine how French society has changed from the spirit of 'tolerance' from a historical perspective, why a social hatred has formed against immigrants who were accepted to develop France's national economy, and how the French state and society responded to this phenomenon.

To this end, this study will first examine the changes in the concept of tolerance after the 16th century and review French immigration policies of 'assimilation' and 'integration' in the 20th century to analyze how they have influenced the formation of xenophobia in France. Finally, it will analyze the political and social conflicts over French immigration policies since the 2000s to assess the current situation of French populism.

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2) The Front National, the predecessor of Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National, was founded in 1972. The party began to gain support from the people in the 1980s, and began to see political results in the 1986 general election.

II. From Tolerance to Hatred

1. France, the country of 'tolerance'

1) From religious tolerance to rational tolerance

Tolerance was first used as a noun with a specific meaning in the 16th century. Religious conflicts emerged as a serious political and social problem as the religious revolutions took place in Europe and the confrontations between French Catholics and Protestants intensified in the late 16th century. In response, Henry IV issued the Edict of Nantes, allowing extensive religious freedom to the protestant 'Huguenots'; the term symbolizing this act was 'tolerance.' In other words, it means 'not suppressing but allowing those who have forms of worship or rituals that are inconsistent with the monarch's religion or the religious beliefs or rituals of the majority of the people' on matters related to religion, meaning religious tolerance.

Through the 17th and 18th centuries, the meaning of this tolerance expanded from the religious realm into the secular, political, and rational realms(Lee, 2016) In particular, through the 18th century Age of Enlightenment, the meaning of tolerance extended from the 'state's behavior' towards people with different political beliefs and ideas to including the 'private and internal attitudes' of individuals. At the time, the Jean Calas incident served as an opportunity to expand the meaning of tolerance in France, and Voltaire practiced the concept of 'tolerance' in the controversy surrounding it. Religion was still extreme in 18th-century France, and Catholics committed fanatical acts of violence

against Protestants. The Jean Calas incident is a prime example of religious madness. Rumors had it that Jean Calas (a Protestant) had killed his son because he intended to convert to Catholicism. The parliament of Toulouse sentenced Jean Calas to death. After watching the trial and execution of Jean Calas, Voltaire published 'Traité sur la tolérance' in 1763, and wrote about tolerance again in the 'Dictionnaire philosophique' in 1764(Lee, 2007). Voltaire emphasized tolerance as a rational attitude during this process and asserted that society should have tolerance and acceptance for 'differing views and opinions' while establishing the value of individual freedom based on 'shining' reason.

Through the French Revolution and the 19th century, tolerance became a principle of coexistence that enabled people to coexist in a community based on individual liberalism and equality. In other words, it was understood as allowing freedom to others with an attitude of accepting the differences of others and viewing altruism positively rather than negatively, and then gradually progressing to freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of action. Through this period, tolerance became the practical and philosophical value of intellectuals. Émile Zola's position on the Dreyfus affair[3] in the

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3) On January 13, 1898, Emile Zola published <J'accuse'>, an open letter in the newspaper to the president about the Dreyfus affair, in which Jewish officer Dreyfus was convicted of being a German spy and sentenced to life imprisonment. This letter soon aroused public outrage, and in the following year (1899), Dreyfus was pardoned and released. He was later exonerated in 1906. The Dreyfus affair was a complex tangle of antisemitism and power struggles within the French political environment, which divided French society for several years in the late 19th century. At the center of such social conflicts, many intellectuals, including Zola, who opposed vested interests, promoted public opposition with 'reason' at the forefront. Since then, their practical practice, or their spirit of participation and criticism in social issues, became an important tradition in French intellectual society.

late 19th and early 20th centuries is a typical example of intellectuals practicing tolerance. At the time, anti-Semitism was a reminder of the religious madness of the past, which paralyzed reason and dominated public opinion(Choi, 2013). Against this madness, combined with the military's unwillingness to admit errors and the obsession of the Catholic Church with defending its vested interests, Emile Zola published his 'J'accuse' to confront racist public opinion and militarism.

The concept and value of tolerance have been recognized as a practical virtue by intellectuals or philosophers concerned with French politics, history, and society in modern times. As it accepted immigrants and formed a multi-racial society, France had no choice but to face pluralism and cultural diversity. So, social consideration of the concept of tolerance was a necessary process to solve these problems. During this process, the meaning of tolerance as a 'political value of reason and freedom' expanded and developed into a 'modern value of peace and coexistence.' However, this philosophical practice of tolerance did not lead to the institutional practice of tolerance. The actual implementation of this value within political and social systems was a different matter from its practice within the philosophical and discursive realm.

2) 'Institutional' tolerance in modern nations

The value of tolerance, established during the development of liberalism in the Age of Enlightenment, had in fact a discriminatory point of view. In liberal political philosophy, there was a clear distinction between those with reason (i.e., those with political or social power) and those without reason (i.e., those who passively benefited from power). Tolerance was considered a 'giving' attitude of those with

reason to the public who did not. In other words, it is the logic that only those with power can be tolerant(Guérard de Latour, 2013). The best example of this relationship between tolerance and power is the colonialist policies of modern states, where the 'arrogant' paternalistic attitude of the colonists toward the natives was regarded as tolerance. In other words, tolerance born from the liberalism tradition is fundamentally not interested in the acceptance of 'differences' of cultures or races, as it allows these different cultures or races to be 'assimilated' into society with the dominant power(Aubert, 2019).

To understand this intimate relationship between tolerance and power, it is necessary to look back on John Locke's concept of tolerance. John Locke advocates an institutionalized model of tolerance in his book A Letter Concerning Toleration, published in 1689. Through his book, he explains that toleration is an attribute of political authority, and only it can rightfully limit the authority of the church within the territory of the state due to its sovereignty(Locke, 1689). In the very relationship between tolerance and power, we can see that tolerance is being used as a tool of (political) interventionism by political power. After Locke, liberal political philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls also studied the principle of tolerance in relation to the protection of freedom, or the social recognition of minorities(Rawls, 1971). However, despite the differences in their arguments and ideas, these philosophers, including Locke, have been subject to the same criticism concerning the subject of tolerance. Western liberal discourse has not only monopolized the approach to the concept of tolerance but also has presented relatively identical directions in its analysis. More specifically, liberalism has been criticized for hiding the structural inequality created by the liberal order,

and putting tolerance in the forefront without keeping the promise of equal freedom above all else(Aubert, 2019).

Also, concerning cultural 'differences,' these liberal ideas claimed that they have a fair or ethically neutral attitude toward other cultures and asserted that this attitude was directly related to tolerance, which also received criticism. When the mainstream culture (major cultures) is socially, economically, and politically enforced and regarded as the national identity or recognized as a universal culture, political or social institutions (logically speaking) cannot help minority cultures develop because of their neutral character, which becomes a problem(Audard, 2013).

The tolerance of this liberal tradition naturally settled in the systems of modern states formed based on liberalism. Also, modern nations, which relied on the republican value that 'the state is one and must not be divided,' or universalism, naturally used as a political tool this position of tolerance that does not recognize cultural 'difference' and 'individuality' within society. This was referred to as 'institutionalized' or 'repressive' tolerance. Similarly, modern France advocated for 'institutional' tolerance based on universality and became accustomed to forcing a common 'social culture' on society instead of acknowledging 'different' cultures (Kymlick, 1995). In the 20th century, such institutional tolerance continued even after France accepted immigrants as industrial workers on several occasions and became a multiracial country. This 'discriminatory' and 'arrogant' tolerant attitude eventually left critical problems in France, with the stigma of failure of immigration policies and social integration.

Since the 2000s, 'multiculturalism' has been proposed as an alternative

to such 'intolerant tolerance' and applied in the 'integration' immigration policies. However, there were limits to its effective practice in French society, where anti-immigrant sentiment was already prevalent.

2. 20th century France and immigrants

1) Immigration policy under the Third Republic (1870-1940)

France officially entered the industrial era during the Second Empire (1852-1870) under the rule of Emperor Napoleon III and began to accept the labor immigration necessary for industrial development from the late 19th century. At this time, France had no specific immigration policy. Based on their experience of imperialist colonialism, French politicians believed that once immigrants settled in French territory, they would naturally become close to French culture and 'assimilate' into French society, to the extent that they would be indistinguishable from the French. They thought it would be a natural process, or that immigrants would naturally abandon their original culture and traditions as they 'assimilated' into French society (Safi, 2006). In the 19th century, the concept of 'assimilation' used in colonial policies was also applied to French immigrants. It was a clear reflection of the republican spirit of French politics, which regarded the emergence of cultural 'differences' or 'diversity' as a threat to society and emphasized a 'universal' single culture (Silverman, 2007).

The fact that most of the immigrants at this time were 'white' immigrants from other European countries, played a role in why the immigration policy during this period was 'naturally' assimilationist. Immigrants in the early 20th century came from countries neighboring

France, such as Italy, Portugal, Poland, and Belgium. So, the government believed that the 'cultural assimilation' desired by the Republic would proceed easily, as these immigrants did not have many differences in culture and appearance, and had many similarities to the French. In 1927, the Minister of Justice, Louis Barthou, was concerned about the depopulation of France at the time. So, he promoted immigration policies and announced that France would welcome "members of foreign origin with a high possibility of assimilating into French culture, easily and quickly integrating into French society because they have frequent kinship relations with French people or are related to French families." His policy statement considered the immigration of 'similar races.'

During this period, these 'similar races' lived in closed communities, like the Muslim immigrants from North Africa who would arrive later, and experienced conflicts with the native French. However, the immigrant policy based on assimilationism at the time was not subject to critical or social discussion because it did not cause social problems serious enough to threaten universalism, the ideology of the French Republic, due to the aforementioned similarities in culture and appearance. In this process, the assimilationist view of foreigners, i.e., 'institutional' tolerance, or the view of rejecting 'cultural differences' and accepting others from a superior position, naturally spread into French society. People also started to take for granted the universalist stance of the French Republic, which rejected cultural differences to achieve social integration centered on a unified culture. In other words, France accepted foreigners into the mainland based on a concept of assimilation in colonial policy. However, the immigration policy at the time did not become a problem, because their settlement did not cause too much

discomfort as there was not much heterogeneity among European races. Also, as it was a cohabitation between white people who were the pioneers of colonialism, racist perceptions based on a 'ruler-ruled' governance structure were not formed at the time. While cohabiting with these 'similar races,' the assimilationist view of foreigners, or the universalist view that rejects cultural differences and pursues cultural-social integration, implicitly sank into French society(Chemin, 2016).

2) Immigration policy and the manifestation of social hatred during the post-colonial period

After World War II, France once again brought in foreign labor for economic reconstruction. So, between the late 1950s and early 1960s, many immigrants from North African Muslim cultures came to France. In the 1960s and 1970s, when these North African immigrants settled in France, French society thought these foreigners would stay for a while and then leave. They thought this immigration phenomenon would only be temporary. Nobody imagined that these immigrants would permanently settle in France and claim their rights as citizens. However, these immigrants did not leave France. They brought the families they had left behind in their hometowns to France, and began to live together with them. Their children, born in France, attended French schools and grew up as French citizens. In the 1980s, the children of these immigrants became more visible in society. They started to question whether they belonged to France, and demanded their rights as French citizens. These movements led to large-scale demonstrations, such as the 'la Marche pour l'égalite des droits et contre le racisme' in 1983, and the 'Convergence pour l'égalité' in 1984(La Direction de l'information légale

et administrative, 2022).

As the children of immigrants who had been regarded as outsiders and foreigners started to become French citizens, French society began to feel uncomfortable with this unexpected situation. The existence of these 'French people who did not look French' with different appearances and wearing traditional Islamic clothing, was kind of a 'threat' to the French mainlanders. This period was in the early 1980s, which coincided with the time when the Front National, the predecessor of the RN, the leading far-right political party in France, began to gain social attention and public support. At the time, the FN increased its support by using the public's rejection of immigrants as a political weapon. Also, xenophobia, which began to be openly expressed in society from this time, became more severe throughout the 1990s-2000s under the lukewarm response of the French government.

Concerning this phenomenon, Max Silverman criticized the French Republic system during the 19th and 20th centuries for rejecting 'cultural differences' under a universalist view that emphasized social uniformity and politically used the concept of 'cultural differences' to unify French civil society. For social integration, the state has implicitly emphasized French mainstream(majority) culture as a French cultural norm and planted the seed causing a rejection of 'cultural differences' in civil society(Silverman, 2007). He also argued that France's immigration policy had no choice but to take an assimilationist approach within the universality of the Republic that rejects 'difference,' and criticized the French republic system for fundamentally having 'racist' characteristics.

Beginning in the 1980s, French people reacted sensitively because the existence of Muslim immigrant groups was changing their society.

Recognizing that their policies did not reflect reality, the French government responded by introducing a new concept of 'Intégration,' which acknowledges and accepts 'difference' into their policies (see ⟨Table 1⟩). Thus, the 'Le Haut Conseil à l'Intégration' was established in 1989. According to HCI, integration, unlike assimilation, does not completely eliminate differences but integrates them into 'common life.' In other words, the purpose of integration is 'to allow women and men to live together for a long time on French soil while acknowledging the existence of cultural peculiarities without any prejudice and pursuing harmony in the equality of rights and duties.' ⟨Table 1⟩ compares the meanings of assimilation and integration based on HCI data and various research data. Entering the 1990s, the term 'integration' frequently appeared in public policy or social discussions, and the French government worked hard to develop various alternatives to reduce discrimination and social hatred against immigrants. In 1998, HCI published a report titled 'Struggle for Discrimination: Ensuring Respect for the Principle of Equality.' It pointed out that discrimination based on racial origin exists in France, and emphasized the need for integration policies for the second or third generation of immigrants(Chemin, 2016).

〈 Table1. French immigration policy,

comparison of 'assimilation' and 'integration' 〉

Assimilation	Integration
Denies all cultural characteristics of immigrants	Allows some of the cultural characteristics of immigrants
The receiving society does not change	The receiving society changes as it encounters immigrants
Pursues cultural convergence (absorption)	Pursues democratic participation, national unity, and living together
No negotiation between immigrants and the receiving society	Building a common culture
One-way: Immigrants must unilaterally follow society (many mainstream groups)	Two-way: Immigrants move toward society, and society moves toward immigrants (Bertossi 2016)
	For the integration process to work, society must step up and lead the movement against discrimination (racism)

source: summary of Chemin(2016)

3. 21st century France, the vanguard of populism?

1) The re-emergence of 'assimilation' and the failure of 'integration' in the 2000s

In 2000, Martine Aubry, then Minister of employment and solidarity, gave a speech acknowledging the existence of (racial) discrimination in French society. She emphasized that these discriminatory acts had the potential to shake and bring down the republic. In 2001, the Anti-Discrimination Act was passed, after which the Diversity Charter was launched in 2004, and the French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission (HALDE) was established in 2005. However, the French government's 'integration' immigration policy,

promoted throughout the early 2000s, did not have much effect.

During the same period, hatred against immigrants and conflicts between immigrants and French society deepened, and such social conflicts became more severe in the wake of the 2005 French riots in the suburbs of Paris. Also, beginning in the early 2000s far-right forces openly raised the issue of 'national indentity(identité nationale)' against the government's integration policy, and succeeded in bringing the old concept of 'assimilation' back into public debate. Here, 'national identity' refers to the feeling of being part of France. However, in the 2000s, the expression was used as a political weapon to attack immigrants who followed and preserved the culture of their country of origin in French territory.

After the 2005 French riots, these far-right views gained much public support. The right-wing government at the time also turned to an 'assimilation' immigration policy instead of 'integration' so as not to lose supporters to the far-right. Thus, the social debate on immigration became more heated than ever, fueled in part by the French government's denial of citizenship to a Muslim woman wearing a burqa in 2008 and the issues related to 'national identity' in 2009. In the end, the French parliament passed a law banning citizen from wearing a full-face veil in public in 2010 because of the government's support for 'assimilation.' With this series of events and controversies, the concept of 'assimilation' gained legitimacy in French society once again.

During this time, the far-right politicians who advocated for an 'assimilation' immigration policy argued that immigrants who do not accept French culture and insist on their own culture and religion should leave France because they violate the universal values of the Republic,

which emphasize unity, and aggravate division in French society. In other words, they believed French nationality should be granted only to foreigners willing to give up their own culture and fully accept French culture and values, to be reborn as "true" citizens of France. This was exactly the same principle as the assimilation policy of the early 20th century, 100 years earlier.

Historian Gérard Noiriel gave the following assessment of French society, which cannot adapt to the existence of immigrants and cultural differences and refuses to live with them. He places the responsibility for this situation first and foremost on the mass media and political parties. His position is different from Silverman, mentioned earlier, who criticized the nature of the French Republic system. First, Noiriel argues that the media played a major role in creating a negative image of immigrants in France. The news of incidents and accidents involving immigrants has traditionally been an element that promotes the consumption of media information, but this trend has intensified since the media became subordinate to capital. The mass media frequently exaggerated reports on immigrants and raised the issue of immigrants' national identity, and spread a narrative alienating these immigrants within French society to gain interest from the entire nation, or French media consumers. In other words, the media reinforced a negative image of immigrants (stereotypes) by reporting suggestive 'stories' based on a binary confrontational structure of 'them (others) vs. us' or 'attackers vs. victims.' He also pointed out that the xenophobic view of immigrants produced by the mass media significantly influenced the direction of the political discourse.

Noiriel also argues that political parties have been preoccupied with

scapegoating foreigners or immigrants to win votes or to strengthen their cohesiveness throughout the 20th century. In other words, many political parties tried to brand immigrant groups as problems or threats, gain support from voters through the logic of excluding immigrants, and further achieve the task of integrating French society around them(Noiriel 2007).

Noiriel's analysis of the media and political parties explains the deepening of anti-immigrant sentiment in French society since the 2000s and effectively explains the current populist situation in France. In fact, in the 2000s, French mass media, especially the broadcasting media, frequently hosted far-right political journalist Eric Zemmour on various talk shows, at a time when the immigration issue was emerging as a grave social problem, providing him opportunities to make racist or hateful remarks against immigrants. Eric Zemmour became famous for his frequent appearances on television and radio and bold hate speeches, and even ran for the French presidential election in 2022 due to his popularity(Shin, Kim & Kang, 2022).

2) France steeped in populism?

Populism is a hot topic in France right now. Not only the populism of the extreme right but also the populism of President Macron and the left are the subject of social discussion. Many studies are also being conducted on this phenomenon. However, far-right populism is always at the forefront of such debates.

The most distinctive feature of French far-right populism is its focus on race or ethnicity. It is obsessed with French national identity, emphasizing the expression and concept of "native French(les Français de

souche)" or "true French(le bon Français)." So, while promoting universality (the French Republic's value) as the highest national value, the far-right populists emphasize that the French should always be united as 'one,' and should never be separated or distinguished socially or politically. This principle of unity is the far-right's fundamental logic that underpins the discussion of "national identity" and their advocacy of an "assimilation immigration policy." French far-right populism is also called national-populisme for this reason.

However, French far-right politicians, who have built a solid foundation of public support centered on the ostracism of immigrants, are currently not as serious about immigration issues or the concept of ethnicity as they used to be. Although immigration issues have played a significant role in expanding their power, there is no reason to keep using this old political tool now that support for the French far-right has grown to the point where it cannot be ignored. Therefore, far-right politicians are now attempting to attack a new target and deviate from their old political strategies (anti-immigration strategies) that may have become a cliché. Their new target is elite bureaucracy(Park & Kim 2022).

Marc Lazar says there are three reasons for the 'epidemic' of far-right populism in France. The first reason is the downturn of the current system of liberal and representative democracy. He argues that the distrust of the current government and politicians and dissatisfaction with the outdated democratic election system that cannot represent the people's intentions is causing the public to listen to the voices of far-right populism. Second, life is getting harder for people because social problems such as unemployment, inequality, and livelihood

instability have not been resolved, so the people have become disappointed with the current regime and turned to far-right populism. Third, the 'integration' immigration model did not work, so social conflicts over immigration issues have intensified, increasing support for the far-right(Chemin, 2016).

Lazar explains that these three reasons eventually led the French to turn their backs on the existing political environment and gravitate toward far-right populists because they presented a clear solution to these problems. However, this solution is abolishing elite bureaucracy. French far-right parties accuse the elite bureaucrats and power groups of being the main culprits of destroying democracy in France, and claim that they have taken democracy from the poor, powerless people. They also argue that they are the ones who can practice true democracy and promise to rebuild democracy for the people. Currently, many French people support these claims(Semo 2019).

III. Conclusion

Currently, populism in France cannot be explained by just the logic of far-right parties, as mentioned earlier. Populism in itself has neither far-right nor far-left tendencies. Populism is a tool to instigate the public, and as its long history shows, it has been actively used by leftists, rightists, centrists, and socialist and democratic countries (Rosanvallon, 2022). In France, with the influx of foreign immigrants since the mid-20th century, extreme conservatives have instigated xenophobia since

the 1980s and provoked the public with the logic of populism. This nationalist-populist logic of far-right parties has completely changed the political environment in France and many other European countries. Since then, far-left populism has emerged in France. This is how populism is evolving. Many studies currently being conducted on populism seek to redefine this evolution of populism.

Although research and redefinition of populism are currently underway, far-right forces have obviously been at the center of French populism since the mid-20th century, and hatred toward foreigners and immigrants has been firmly established at the center of its logic. And now, the far-right's logic based on a hatred against those who are 'being different' is gaining tremendous social and public support. This study questioned the current situation of French society and investigated how this repulsive exclusivism has evolved. France is known to have strong roots in the concept of tolerance, which actively recognizes and accepts altruism. The purpose of this study was to examine in detail how France became a representative country for far-right European populism, despite its tradition of tolerance.

To achieve this goal, this study first examined how the concept of tolerance developed in France after the 16th century. Through this process, we found that within the political system, the tolerance of the liberal tradition met with universalism, a republican value, and developed into an 'institutional tolerance' that allowed 'differences' from an authoritarian perspective rather than on an equal level. This 'assimilation' policy, reflecting a 'patriarchal' and 'oppressive' institutional tolerance, formed the keynote of the immigration policy of the 20th century, which continued until the 1980s, and shows that the French government did not

take practical steps for the social integration of immigrant groups under the republican universal value that does not allow 'differences.' The government came up with an 'integration' immigration policy that embraces 'differences' only after encountering problems with immigrant groups. However, this was not enough to calm the antipathy towards immigrants in French society and the discontent of immigrants in French society. Also, universalism, a republican value with deep roots in France, prevented the French government's immigration policy from escaping its assimilationist nature even in the 21st century. In the midst of this, far-right parties have gained power in France by promoting xenophobic sentiments centered on immigration problems. Finally, this study also looked at how far-right populism is currently changing the French political environment.

France is currently suffering from the populism of the far right, the far left, and President Macron. Although the populism of these different parties has different characteristics, one thing they have in common is that they promote hatred against other groups to expand their footprint. Socialists have aroused collective hatred against the bourgeois and capitalist classes. Based on their solid logic, far-right parties created extreme hatred against not only immigrant groups but also refugee groups, LGBTQ groups, and feminist groups. Studies assessing and analyzing the populist phenomenon based on hatred in France will provide directions for understanding and analyzing Korea's current political and social situation. Nowadays, anger and disgust are being mass-produced in Korea, such as conflicts between generations, genders, and classes due to capital ownership. Many political parties are leveraging these conflicts and hatred for their populist politics. However,

there is a lack of sincere social discussion on this matter, and analysis and research on this field are also insufficient. Although the discussion on tolerance and immigration policy in this study may lack some details and need to be developed, it will help us to understand and analyze 'Korean populism' more specifically.

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