Analyses & Alternatives (분석과 대안)

Korea Consensus Institute(KCI) (사단법인 코리아컨센서스연구원)
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The Effects of Financial Sanctions on Dollar Hegemony Order

금융제재가 달러패권질서에 미치는 영향

  • Received : 2022.06.10
  • Accepted : 2022.07.11
  • Published : 2022.07.31
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to verify the practical validity of financial sanctions, which has recently emerged as the most powerful form of economic sanctions preferred by U.S. foreign policy tool. Based on the theoretical discussion, analyse this study the trend of de-dollarization appearing in connection with financial sanctions and argue that the effectiveness of financial sanctions erode the dollar financial hegemony, which is the source of its power can be degraded, so that its effectiveness could not be so great as most people likely think about. After World War II, there has been an increasing tendency in the international community to favor economic sanctions over the use of military force as an effective means of foreign policy. Among these economic sanctions, a distinct feature that has recently appeared is the remarkable increase in the frequency of use of financial sanctions. The country that favors financial sanctions most is the United States. The reason is that they believe that the power of their own dollar financial hegemony can exert deadly pressure on other countries. Financial sanctions favored by the United States are said to have increased the effectiveness of sanctions by upgrading the pressure of sanctions to the next level. Nevertheless, financial sanctions have a side that underestimates the cost. This problem is found in the signs that the backlash from not only countries subject to financial sanctions but also many countries with interests in these countries is leading to a tendency to de-dollarization. This study will try to see how likely this de-dollarization trend is to offset the effectiveness of financial sanctions.

본 연구의 목적은 최근 들어 미국이 선호하는 외교정책 수단으로 부상한 경제제재의 가장 강력한 형태, 즉 금융제재가 자신의 힘의 원천인 달러금융패권질서를 잠식하여 장기적으로 제재의 효과성을 떨어뜨릴 수 있다는 이론적 논의를 기반으로 현재 금융제재에 연계되어 나타나고 있는 탈달러화 경향에 대한 분석을 통해 그 현실적 타당성을 검증해보고자 하는데 있다. 2차 대전 이후 국제사회에서는 외교정책의 효율적인 수단으로 무력사용보다는 경제제재가 선호되는 경향이 증가되어 왔었다. 이러한 경제제재 가운데에서도 최근 들어 나타나고 있는 뚜렷한 특징은 금융제재 사용 빈도수의 현저한 증가 현상이다. 금융제재를 가장 선호하고 있는 국가는 미국이다. 그 이유는 자국이 가지고 있는 달러금융패권의 힘이 상대 국가에게 치명적인 압력을 행사할 수 있다고 믿고 있기 때문이다. 미국이 선호하고 있는 금융제재는 제재의 압력 강도를 한 단계 업그레이드시켜 제재의 효과성을 높였다고 얘기되고 있지만 그럼에도 불구하고 금융제재는 이에 대한 비용을 너무 과소평가하고 있는 측면이 있다. 이런 문제는 금융제재의 대상 국가들은 물론이고 이들 국가들과 이해관계에 얽혀있는 많은 국가들의 반발이 탈달러화 경향으로 이어지려는 징후들에서 발견된다. 본 연구는 이런 탈달러화 경향이 금융제재의 효과성을 상쇄시킬 가능성이 얼마나 큰지를 보고자 하는 것이다.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

이 논문은 2019년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임 (2019S1A5B5A07086758).

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