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Internal Event Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Korea Research Reactor

국내 연구용원자로 전출력 내부사건 1단계 확률론적안전성평가

  • Received : 2020.12.07
  • Accepted : 2021.06.07
  • Published : 2021.06.30

Abstract

This report documents the results of an at-power internal events Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for a Korea research reactor (KRR). The aim of the study is to determine the accident sequences, construct an internal level 1 PSA model, and estimate the core damage frequency (CDF). The accident quantification is performed using the AIMS-PSA software version 1.2c along with a fault tree reliability evaluation expert (FTREX) quantification engine. The KRR PSA model is quantified using a cut-off value of 1.0E-15/yr to eliminate the non-effective minimal cut sets (MCSs). The final result indicates a point estimate of 4.55E-06/yr for the overall CDF attributable to internal initiating events in the core damage state for the KRR. Loss of Electric Power (LOEP) is the predominant contributor to the total CDF via a single initiating event (3.68E-6/yr), providing 80.9% of the CDF. The second largest contributor is the beam tube loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which accounts for 9.9% (4.49E-07/yr) of the CDF.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

This work was funded by the Korean government, Ministry of Science, ICT.

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