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The Effect of Firm Characteristics and Outside Directors Characteristics on Fraud : Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

기업특성 및 사외이사 특징이 기업의 부정행위에 미치는 영향: 중국상장기업을 중심으로

  • Xiao, Wei-He (Department of Business, Chungnam National University) ;
  • Paik, Hye-Won (Department of Business, Chungnam National University)
  • 소유하 (충남대학교 경상대학 회계학과) ;
  • 백혜원 (충남대학교 경상대학 회계학과)
  • Received : 2021.08.31
  • Accepted : 2021.09.21
  • Published : 2021.09.30

Abstract

Purpose - Our study examines the determinant factors of corporate financial fraud and whether the characteristics of outside directors tend to decrease the fraud in China. Design/methodology/approach - The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The multiple regression analysis were hired in order to analyze the data. Findings - Firms that have smaller size, higher debt ratio, or lower return of assets are associated with the incidence of fraud. However, the firms that have a high proportion of outside directors on the board or whose outside directors have a high compensation are less likely to engage in fraud. Our results show that outside directors monitor the actions of managers and thus help deter fraudulent acts. On the other hand, fraud is more associated with the local outside directors rather than outside directors who are from other locations. Since local outside directors tend to be more related with managers of firms, they can lose their independence. Research implications or Originality - Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate outside directors systems for China-listed firms. Moreover, our results imply that recruiting outside directors from other regions can improve the expertise and independence of outside directors in China. Our study contributes to provide more useful information about investors' investment decisions or management oversight and regulators' decisions on audit activities by disclosing information relating to the characteristics of outside directors.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

이 논문은 충남대학교 학술연구비 지원에 의한 논문임.

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