아태비즈니스연구 (Asia-Pacific Journal of Business)

  • 제12권3호
  • /
  • Pages.87-99
  • /
  • 2021
  • /
  • 2233-5900(pISSN)
  • /
  • 2384-3934(eISSN)
강원대학교 경영경제연구소 (KNU The Institute of Management & Economy Research)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

기업경계에 관한 세 이론의 비교

A Comparison of Three Theories of Firm Boundaries

  • 투고 : 2021.08.31
  • 심사 : 2021.09.21
  • 발행 : 2021.09.30
PDF 다운로드
⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

Purpose - In this study, I attempt to clarify three theories of firm boundaries (vertical integration): the principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory, and property rights theory. Although these theories have been widely cited and much discussed, it has been found that understanding the commonalities and distinctions of these seemingly familiar theories is difficult. Design/methodology/approach - I present the three theories about the decisions that firms make concerning their boundaries. Then, I compare elemental versions of the theories of the firm. Findings - Comparing the ingredients of the elemental property rights and principal-agent theories shows that they provide a unified account of the costs and benefits of vertical integration. However, the property rights theory in no sense formalizes the transaction cost theory. Research implications or Originality - Clarifying the three theories of the firm can help to construct empirical models and interpret its results.

키워드

참고문헌

  1. 김영세 (2020), 게임이론: 전략과 정보의 경제학 (제9판), 박영사.
  2. Bhattacharyya, S. and F. Lafontaine (1995), "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts", RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4), 761-781. https://doi.org/10.2307/2556017
  3. Coase, R. (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica, 4(16), 386-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
  4. Gibbons, R. (2005), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58(2), 200-245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010
  5. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404
  6. Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  7. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1119-1158. https://doi.org/10.1086/261729
  8. Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320
  9. Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 297-326. https://doi.org/10.1086/466922
  10. Lafontaine, F. and M. Slade (2001), "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision". In K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (Eds.), Game Theory and Business Applications, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 133-188.
  11. Lafontaine, F. and M. Slade (2007), "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence", Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3), 629-685. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.629
  12. Mirrlees, J. (1976), "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization", Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), 105-131. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003192
  13. Nash, J. (1950), "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
  14. Whinston, M. (2003), "On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/19.1.1
  15. Williamson, O. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations", American Economic Review, 61(2), 112-123.
  16. Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press.
  17. Williamson, O. (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261. https://doi.org/10.1086/466942
  18. Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.
  19. Woodruff, C. (2002), "Non-contractible Investments and Vertical Integration in the Mexican Footwear Industry", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(8), 1197-1224. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(01)00085-6