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A study on Countermeasures by Detecting Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper Malicious Code

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Abstract

There are various ways to be infected with malicious code due to the increase in Internet use, such as the web, affiliate programs, P2P, illegal software, DNS alteration of routers, word processor vulnerabilities, spam mail, and storage media. In addition, malicious codes are produced more easily than before through automatic generation programs due to evasion technology according to the advancement of production technology. In the past, the propagation speed of malicious code was slow, the infection route was limited, and the propagation technology had a simple structure, so there was enough time to study countermeasures. However, current malicious codes have become very intelligent by absorbing technologies such as concealment technology and self-transformation, causing problems such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), spam sending and personal information theft. The existing malware detection technique, which is a signature detection technique, cannot respond when it encounters a malicious code whose attack pattern has been changed or a new type of malicious code. In addition, it is difficult to perform static analysis on malicious code analysis difficult. Therefore, in this paper, a method to detect malicious code through dynamic analysis and static analysis using Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper malicious code was showed, and suggested to malicious code detection and countermeasures.

Keywords: Malicious code, Dynamic analysis, Static analysis, Malicious code detection, Countermeasures

1. INTRODUCTION

As the spread of personal PCs increases and the use of the Internet increases, the routes of infection by malicious code have diversified into the web, affiliate programs, torrent and P2P, illegal software, router DNS tampering, word processor vulnerabilities, spam mail, and storage media. In addition, the evasion technology according to the advancement of the production technology is also improved and the malicious code is produced more easily than before through the automatic generation program. In the past, the propagation speed of malicious codes was slow, the infection route was limited, and the propagation technology had a simple structure, so there was enough time to study countermeasures. However, current malicious codes have become very intelligent by absorbing technologies such as concealment and self-transformation, causing problems such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), spam sending and personal information theft [1]. In general, the way to deal with malicious code is to analyze the malicious code and propose a solution

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based on the analyzed data. Therefore, in order to cope with malicious code, analysis of malicious code must be preceded [2]. One of important concerns in information security is to control information flow. It is whether to protect confidential information from being leaked, or to protect trusted information from being tainted [3]. A user is cheated to download android application from 3rd party app store as the installed mobile apps are updated after downloading malicious code from Command and Control (C&C) server activated by using attacker-oriented server-side polymorphic malware. Because the mobile apps downloaded by each user who undergoes this process are installed with slightly different code, those mobile apps can't be detected though conventional mobile anti-virus S/W [4, 5]. Unlike in the past, the types of malware damage are also diversifying due to system destruction through DDoS attacks, in addition to simple information leakage. Therefore, it is very important to prevent damage by detecting such malicious codes in advance. However, the signature detection technique, which is an existing malware detection technique, cannot respond when encountering malicious code with a changed attack pattern or new malicious code. In addition, it is difficult to perform static analysis on malicious code to which code obfuscation, encryption, and packing techniques are applied to make malicious code analysis difficult.

Therefore, in this paper, it is showed a method to detect malicious code through dynamic analysis and static analysis using Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper malicious code. Through this, it is showed a method to suggest to malicious code detection and countermeasures.

2. RELATED WORK

2.1 Dynamic Analysis

Analyze the behavior of the malicious code itself. In order to detect changes in the operating system, in the analysis environment, API functions are hooked in user mode and kernel mode, and when a specific event occurs, the system automatically calls A method of monitoring an event notification routine or the like is used.

Based on the relevant information, all executable files are executed in the order in which they are logged. And it measures how similar the behavior is to the execution type of the malicious code. If the executable file is diagnosed as malicious code, the system is restored in the reverse order of execution based on log values. There are emulators and sandboxes based on dynamic analysis. Virtualization technology is a technology that creates a virtual execution space on security equipment or security software and executes all suspicious files in this space. It protects the actual user environment by running the suspicious file on a virtualization basis before actually running it on the user's PC. The advantage of dynamic analysis is that it operates indirectly on virtual hardware, so it does not affect the real system.

As a disadvantage, it consumes a lot of system resources. A sandbox is also called an application emulator. Unlike an emulator, it runs a program on a real computer system. When the unknown program is executed, the CWMonitor.dll file is injected and all procedures of the executable file are traced. By hooking all Windows APIs, it determines whether it is a malicious code based on the collected information and return values [6, 7].

2.2 Static Analysis

Signature detection technology, which is a static analysis, analyzes the characteristics of already collected malicious code and generates a signature to detect the malicious code. Methods such as judging known malware by AV (Anti-Virus) scan or analyzing character strings in file headers and binaries are used. More professionally, it is determined whether there is a malicious code by a method such as an API call relationship analysis through a debugger. AhnLab developed 'Smart Defense' technology that manages a large-scale file

DB on a central server and collected more than 600 million normal and malicious file DBs. In addition, more than 50 billion malicious code features are extracted from this file DB and patterned to create a malicious code 'DNA map', and new and variant malicious codes are diagnosed through this 'DNA map'. The disadvantage of static analysis is that it is difficult to defend against new exploits. To overcome this, many packers are commercially available to bypass the static analysis base [8].

3. MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS

Malicious code was analyzed using Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper malicious code, and through the malicious code execution flow chart configured through IDA, three stages of initial analysis, dynamic analysis, and static analysis were performed. The tools used were PEiD, UPX, BinText, Ollydbg, IDA pro for dynamic analysis, Process Explorer and Wireshark for static analysis were used.

3.1 Analysis Target

The malware is a Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper malware, and most of the vaccines have updated detection patterns. The detailed information about the malicious code is as Table 1.

File Name	m1012.exe
Source File Name	m1012.exe
Diagnosis	Dropper/win32 OnlineGameHack.R39769 (AhnLab)
File Size	22,528 Byte
SHA256	B0245bb10d53f4c30256d3b6c916666b8dc22e1f7a1357f67490f5c6b4e6b28b

Table 1. Detailed inforr	nation of	malicious	code
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3.2 Malicious Code Execution Flowchart

The malware was analyzed as an online game hack as a Trojan-type Downloader/Dropper malware. Currently, most vaccines are updated and can be treated, and the progress of the malicious code is as follows.

1) When the first distributed malicious code file is executed, a duplicate file (xxxxx.tmp) is created according to the reserved command, and the original file is deleted and terminated.

2) After that, the cloned file (xxxxx.tmp) creates a specific process, terminates the antivirus process, creates a file similar to that of the existing .dll file (usp10.dll), and attempts to connect to a specific URL address.

3) When the connection is successful, the path of the temp file is created. Afterwards, it attempts to transmit to the specific URL address by hooking the keyboard input through the Keylogger function in the changed .dll file through the information values obtained from the URL. At this time, it is expected that another command will be executed from the accessed URL. Figure.1 is a flow chart of malicious code constructed through IDA.

3.3 Initial Analysis

In the initial analysis, the information of the malicious code was checked and whether the file was packed before detailed analysis was checked. The malicious code is an executable file in the form of an .exe and scanned through Virus Total to check whether the file has already been diagnosed. As a result of checking through Virus Total, it was confirmed that it was already diagnosed as a Trojan type of malicious code. Figure 2 shows the result of malicious code checked through Virus total.



Figure 1. Execution Flowchart of malicious code

SHA256:	b0245bb10d53f4c3025	56d3b6c916666b8dc22e1f7a1357f57490f5c5b4e6b28b	
File name:	m1012.exe		
Detection	ratio: 54/61		🕑 0 🥶 0
Analysis d	ate: 2017-05-11 09:10:41 U	/TC (3 months, 1 week ago)	
🗑 Analysis	Q File detail X Relation	ships • O Additional information • Comments •	QVotes EBBehavioural information
		Based	lindate
ntivirus		Result	
ntivirus d-Aware		Trojan Generic 13046393	20170511
untivirus Id-Aware IegisLab		Trojan Generic 13046393 Troj Downloader W32 Genericic	20170511 20170511

Figure 2. Malicious code through Virus total

3.4 Dynamic Analysis

In the dynamic analysis, it was checked whether there was a change in the process and network traffic when m1012.exe was executed. It was confirmed that the 02de080.tmp file was registered in the process list like Figure 3 when the program was executed.

After a few seconds, the program was run again to confirm that the .tmp file was terminated in the process. When you see that the name is different from the initially created .tmp file (02de080.tmp), you can guess that the .tmp file is created with a random file name by m1012.exe, and when you check the process operation of the .tmp file It was confirmed that the registry value was modified and the usp10.dll file was created in the C:\ Windows path. As a random .tmp process was registered, registry modifications and file creation were confirmed as Figure 4.

System Idle Process	98,44	οĸ	28 K	0
System		0 K	296 K	4
Interrupts	1,56	OK	0 K	n/a Hardware Interrupts and
smss.exe		168 K	404 K	536 Windows NT Session M.,. Microsoft Corporation
Coros,exe		2,264 K	5,472 K	600 Client Server Runtime P.,, Microsoft Corporation
R minlogon,exe		7,064 K	4,968 K	624 Windows NT Logon Appl., Microsoft Corporation
services.exe		3.380 K	5,180 K	668 Services and Controller Microsoft Corporation
ymacthlp.exe		700 K	2,640 K	844 VMware Activation Helper VMware, Inc.
sychostexe		3,136 K	5,112 K	872 Generic Host Process L., Microsoft Corporation
wmipryse.exe		2,964 K	4,904 K	1644 WMI Microsoft Corporation
sychostexe		1.848 K	4.332 K	960 Generic Host Process f., Microsoft Corporation
a sychostexe		27.028 K	39.784 K	1072 Generic Host Process L. Microsoft Corporation
-twscotty.exe		684 K	2.644 K	1100 Windows Security Cent. Microsoft Corporation
sychostexe		1.564 K	3,796 K	1128 Generic Host Process L. Microsoft Corporation
sychostexe		2.328 K	5.008 K	1284 Generic Host Process L. Microsoft Corporation
appolay eve		3,836 K	5.956 K	1552 Spooler SubSystem App Microsoft Corporation
watoolad eve		8 196 K	11 424 K	256 VMware Tools Core Ser VMware Inc.
algere		1.204 K	3.640 K	1676 Application Laver Gate Microsoft Corporation
In and and		4 464 K	1 712 K	690 LSA Shell (Export Versi Microsoft Corporation
		20 160 K	28 172 K	1455 Windows Explorer Historeft Corporation
3 UM VMwareTrav eve		1.848 K	4 400 K	17% Vidware Tools trav appli Vidware Inc.
untooled ave		9 704 K	14 700 K	1744 VMware Tools Core Ser VMware Inc.
Settmoneye		1 004 K	4 116 K	1752 CTE Loader Microsoft Corporation
		10.972 K	13 160 K	1032 Susinternals Process F Susinternals - www.s
Copine eve		052 K	3 994 K	4064 Console IME Microsoft Corporation
		1 000 K	5,000 K	Microsoft Corporation
And a state of the		1,820 K	3,036 K	

Figure 3. Register in process list

📽 🖬 횏 🖗	5 🗢 🛆 😌 🗉 🛤	
Process No	PID Operation	Path
m1012,exe m1012,exe m1012,exe m1012,exe m1012,exe	4860 Process Create 4860 ReadFile 4860 Thread Exit 4860 Process Exit	C #Windows#SysWOW64#cmd,exe C #Windows#SysWOW64#cmd,exe
008d487.tmp 008d487.tmp 008d487.tmp 1.008d487.tmp	2912 To RegSetValue 2912 To RegSetValue 2912 To RegSetValue 2912 To RegSetValue 2912 To RegSetValue	HRLAWNSystem#ComentControlSet#ControlWSESSION MANAGERWExcludeFromKodwnDita HRCUWSGtwaretMalcroso thrwindow WCorrentYersion#Exploret#Advanced#Hidden HRLWNSGTH AAE/W NowKSKiodetMilcroso thrWindowsWCurentVersionWexploret#Advanced#Folder#Hidden#Typ C#WindowsWusp10.dtt
008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp	2912 WriteFile 2912 Thread Create 2912 Thread Exit 2912 Thread Exit 2912 Thread Create 2912 Thread Create	C WWindowsWusp10.dll
008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp	2912 RegSetValue 2912 RegSetValue	HKCLWSoftwareWMicrosoftWWindowsWCurrentVersionWinternet SettingsWProxyEnable HKCLWSoftwareWMicrosoftWWindowsWCurrentVersionWinternet SettingsWConnectionsWSavedLegacySettings
 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 008d487,tmp 	2912 Thread Create 2912 Thread Create 2912 Thread Create 2912 Thread Create	

Figure 4. Registry modifications and file creation

In addition, as a random .tmp process was registered, changes in network traffic were confirmed as Figure 5.

Filter:	ar: DNS			Expressio	on, Clea	r Apply S	ave		
No.		Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length In	oto		
	1	0.00000000	192.168.100.18	192.168.100.2	DN5	72 1	Standard	query	0x16b7 A joshua.or.kr
	2	0.01364500	192.168.100.2	192.168.100.18	DNS	167 :	standard	query	response 0x16b7 A 211.234.63.232
	3	0.80760600	192.168.100.18	192.168.100.2	DNS	75 5	Standard	query	0x2175 A tj1012.h5gy.com
	4	0.83825400	192.168.100.2	192.168.100.18	DNS	148 :	Standard	query	response 0x2175 No such name
	5	0.83865000	192.168.100.18	192.168.100.2	DNS	87 5	standard	query	0xd46e A tj1012.h5gy.com.localdomain
	6	0.85318700	192.168.100.2	192.168.100.18	DNS	87 5	Standard	query	response 0xd46e No such name

Figure 5. changes in network traffic

Network traffic trying to access two sites, Joshua.or.kr and tj1012.h5gy.com, was detected, and the IP address could not be found in DNS, so the request failed.

Sea	rch Filter	He	P					
	File to scan	C:V	upx394w\m101	2.ехе			Browse	<u>G</u> o
V	Advanced	view			Time taken :	0.047 secs	Text size: 4664	bytes (4.55
E	ile pos		Mem pos	ID	Text			
A	00000003	182	000000403D8	2 0	Sleep			
4	00000003	18A	000000403D8	A 0	IstropyA			
4 4	00000003	196	000000403D9	6 0	GetTickCount			
	00000003	1A6	000000403DA	6 0	GetTempPathA			
4	00000003	186	000000403DB	6 0	SetFileAttributesA			
A	000000003	1CC	000000403DC	C 0	CopyFileA			
	000000005	9E6	0000004073E	6 0	UspFreeMem			
4	00000005	A74	000000407474	. 0	208.67.220.123	1		
4	00000005	A88	000000407488	a o	208.67.222.123			
A	00000005	A9C	000000407490	0	8.8.8.8			
1 1	00000005	ABO	0000004074BI	0 0	8.8.4.4			
4	00000005	AC4	0000004074C	1 Ö	208.67.220.220			
A 1	00000005	ADS	0000004074D	3 0	208.67.222.220			
4	00000005	AEC	0000004074E	0 0	208.67.220.222			
A	000000005	B40	000000407540	0 0	InternetOpenA			
1 1	000000005	B60	000000407560	0 0	InternetOpenUrlA			
4	000000005	880	000000407580	0 0	InternetCloseHandle			
						-		

Figure 6. Suspected values of malicious purposes

3.5 Static Analysis

A String value is output to predict the execution of the program before reversing. Values suspected of malicious purposes such as forced termination and access to a specific URL were identified as Figure 6.

As a result of reversing, it was confirmed that a random file was created as Figure 7.

0044021F7 .385C08 FF CMP EVTE PTR DS:[EAX+ECX-1],BL 0044021F8 .53 .54 .54 0044021F8 .53 .54 .54 0044021F8 .53 .54 .54 0044021F8 .64 .64 .53 004402265 .53 .53 .53 004402265 .64 .64 .64 004402265 .53 .53 .54 004402265 .65 .60000000 .55 004402265 .53 .53 .55 004402265 .65 .60000000 .55 004402265 .65 .60000000 .55 004402265 .65 .55 .60000000 00402265 .55 .64 .55 .64 00402265 .55 .64 .55 .64 .64 004020404 .55 .64 .55 .64 .55 .55 004020404 .55 .64 .55 .55 .55 <th>hTemplateFile Rttributes = NORMAL Hode - CREATE_RLWAYS pSecurity ShareHode = FILE_SHARE_READ Rocess = GENERIC_READIGENERIC_WRITE FileHame -CreateFileR</th>	hTemplateFile Rttributes = NORMAL Hode - CREATE_RLWAYS pSecurity ShareHode = FILE_SHARE_READ Rocess = GENERIC_READIGENERIC_WRITE FileHame -CreateFileR
COLUMN B0949CDR8 FileHame "C.LOCUME Application 0012FR44 C00000000 Access = GENERIL_RENDISTINT NILLCURITE 0012FR50 00000000 ShareHode FILE_SHARE_READ 0012FR54 00000000 ShareHode FILE_SHARE_READ 0012FR56 000000000 ShareHode FILE_SHARE_READ 0012FR56 000000000 Hode FILE_SHARE 0012FR56 000000000 HTemplateFile NULL 0012FR56 00141F65 00141F65 NULL	"INTennNlad6478.tng"

Figure 7. Creation of a random file

Afterwards, the m1012.exe file is deleted by itself, and the analysis of the m1012.exe file ends with selfdeletion. Afterwards, the generated random .tmp files were analyzed. When executing a file, it was confirmed that a specific process was searched and terminated. Considering the process name, it can be inferred that the anti-virus process is terminated. After that, the usp10.dll file was created in the C:\Windows path. It also tries to connect to a specific URL (http://joshua.or.kr/data/m1012.txt). When the connection is successful, a .temp file with a random file name is created in the designated path. Data received from a specific URL (http://joshua.or.kr/data/m1012.txt) is recorded in the created .temp file. After running the .temp file in hidden mode, it was confirmed that an attempt was made to communicate with a specific URL as Figure 8.

00401C44 00401C4E 00401C51 00401C51 00401C53 00401C59 00401C59 00401C59 00401C59 00401C61 00401C61 00401C61 00401C62 00401C60		ES C4FDFFFF 68 68CD4000 8045 EC 58 8005 E0FBFFF 58 8005 E0FDFFF 58 8005 D8F9FFF 68 08C84000 59 5715 C810400	CPLL 002e05.00401000 PU5H 002e05.0040CD60 LEA EXX,UNGRD PTR S5:(EBP-14) PU5H ES1 LEA EXX,UNGRD PTR S5:(EBP-420] PU5H EXX LEA EXX,UNGRD PTR S5:(EBP-320] PU5H EXX LEA EXX,UNGRD PTR S5:(EBP-620] PU5H 002e05.0040C300 PU5H 002e05.0040C300 PU5H 002e05.0040C300		(%s) = "*p" (%d) (%s) (%s) (%s) format = "%s?d10=%s&d11=%s&d21=%d&d22=%s" sprintf	
00401073		BUBS DBESER	LEH EHK, DOURD FIR SSILEBP-628J	-		
00401079	•	50	PUSH EHX			
00401C7H	•	E8 49FHFFFF	CHLL 002e005.004016C8	- 1		
00401C7F	•	83C4 30	ADD ESP, 30	- 1		
Ctack add			DSCII White://til812.bEau.com/til812/pr		are2d18-88-80-29-29-E6-0Ptd11=uex-ex-1814uuu	uuu 8.421-E68.422-ue#1
Stack add	100	s=0050F98C, (HSCI1 "http://tj1012.h599.com/tj1012/pd	225	.asp/d10=00-00-29-29-F6-HBsd11=0er-02-1014999	8888021=568022=8p ⁻¹
CHV=09000	966					

Figure 8. Attempt of communication with a specific URL

4. COUNTERMEASURES AND CONCLUSION

Suspected malicious code, m1012.exe creates a duplicate file, creates a process, terminates the antivirus process, and continues to execute malicious commands along with data downloaded through the induced URL connection. Therefore, it has the characteristics of a dropper and a downloader, and it is impossible to access the two URLs according to the analysis standard, and it is expected that there will be no additional damage as a vaccine patch for malicious code is made.

As a countermeasure, the malicious code already has a vaccine patch, so when the code is executed, the vaccine program itself deletes the executable file. Also, when a malicious code executable file is executed when the vaccine program is not running, the vaccine program that scans at a scheduled time can detect it. If it is not the case, there is a way to delete all the usp10.dll, arbitrary .tmp, and .temp files in the path, find the changed registry value, and manually restore it to before the execution of the malicious code.

The prevention method is that the malicious code does not work by itself unless the executable file is executed. It is important to improve the level of individual security awareness through education, because only security education can sufficiently prevent suspicious file downloads and unauthorized files from being installed and executed indiscriminately.

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