

# Fault Diagnosis with Adaptive Control for Discrete Event Systems

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## Summary

Discrete event systems interact with the external environment to decide which action plan is adequate. Some of these interactions are not predictable in the modelling phase and require consequently an adaptation of the system to the metamorphosed behavior of the environment. One of the challenging issues is to guarantee safety behavior when failures tend to derive the system from normal status. In this paper we propose a framework to combine diagnose technique with adaptive control to avoid unsafe state and maintain the normal behavior as long as possible.

## Key words:

*Diagnose, Discrete event systems, Control, Finite State Machines*

## 1. Introduction

When modeling systems, it is important to reason about faulty behavior issues, particularly knowing that fault occurrence may lead to serious damage. Indeed, in order to design resilient systems, we have to think not only about how to detect faults [1, 2, 17], but also about how to react to them. The adaptive control can be seen as an alternative to answer the question "what to do when a fault occurs?". Actually, adaptive systems are reconfigurable systems which are able to respond to environmental changes or interacting changes by behavior reconfiguration [19]. However, before thinking about how to react to fault occurrence, we have to answer a more important question, that is: how to detect faults efficiently? In this context, fault diagnosis, consists of detecting faulty system behavior, localizing its origin and identifying its causes [3, 4, 5, 6], can widely help with this issue. Failure detection and identification can be state-based [11, 12, 14], language based [3, 4, 5, 6, 15], or Petri nets based [13].

Control theory [7, 10, 19] answer to the question "how to force the system respect the safety requirement?". Indeed the controller is able to force some controllable events to avoid any unsafe state [20, 21]. The plant system generates some events that correpond mostly to sensor feedback and are uncontrollable by nature [23, 24]. Besides, the

controller action have to be optimal [22] in a way that it performs the least restrictions to the system activities.

The main issue is to recover from errors when they are not tractable [14, 17, 18]. In this case, the controller has no information to detect reaching any unsafe state. Thus, it is interesting to combine the controller with diagnoser action in order to detect any system failure and allow the controller to switch the system to desired safety specification.

In this paper, we propose a frmework that benefits from diagnoser detection and identification of failure that are unobservable sothat the controller guide the system via controllable action events to exit any unsafe state and respect as long as possible the safety specification of the system behavior.

This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we characterize basic concepts and notations to be used. In section 3, techniques for diagnose are presented and studied. Section 5 presents the control theory using finite state machines. In section 5 we illustrate the proposed technique for adaptive control combined with diagnosis. We conclude in section 6.

## 2. Basic Concepts and Notations

The following notations are adopted.  $\Sigma$  represents a finite set of actions or events.  $\Sigma^*$  represents an infinite set of all possible strings (sequence or concatenation of actions) built with symbols from  $\Sigma$ .


Modelling discrete event systems (DES) frequently uses formal languages or finite state machines. In this work, we use finite state machines (FSM) according to the following definition.

A finite state machine is the tuple  $P = (Q, \Sigma, \Delta, q_0)$  where

- $Q$  is a finite set of states
- $\Sigma$  is a finite set of events (or actions)
- $\Delta \subset Q \times \Sigma^* \times Q$  is a finite set of transitions
- $q_0 \in Q$  is the initial state

An FSM is nondeterministic where more than one action may be possible in the same state. This allow the FSM to model a larger class of DES.

In Figure 1, an example of FSM is presented.



**Fig. 1:** Example of DES modelled by FSA

In this example, the FSM is described by the following information.

- $Q = \{1, 2, 3\}$
- $\Sigma = \{a, b, d\}$
- $\Delta = \{(1, a, 2), (2, b, 3), (3, d, 1)\}$
- $q_0 = 1$

### 3. Techniques of Failure Diagnose


In general, diagnose technique is used to determine when it is possible if the system is in a faulty state. When there is a certainty that the system is in a faulty state, the controller attempt to guide the system to exit failure status and reach a safe state. The diagnoser observes events that are generated by the system to identify the current state. However, there are some issues that make this task more complicated when some of the events are not observable by the diagnoser.

The main goal of a diagnoser is to detect any abnormal behavior and identify the origin of the failure. A failure is considered as malfunction of the system that derives from normal behavior and generates consequently errors. This means that an error is a direct consequence of a failure.

The occurrence of a fault is usually associated with the emission of a set of signals from the system sensors. These signals represent the symptoms that allow the detection and the identification of the error.

The framework architecture of diagnoser is represented in Figure 2. Lower layer corresponds to the physical process

or system operational component while the upper layer is the supervision component of the system. Communication between both layers is possible via an interface which transfer command actions from the upper layer to the physical system, and forward visible sensor signals from the physical process to the supervisor. These visible signals are called observable events. The role of the supervisor is to use its computational power with the feedback of the lower layer to detect and identify any possible failure.



**Fig. 2.** failure diagnosis architecture

Usually, events that are the direct cause of failure are unobservable. This makes the task of the diagnoser more complicated and require an estimation of all possible states of the system in order to deduce the faulty behavior when it happens.

We use the following notations

- $\Sigma$  is the set of all events
- $\Sigma_{uo} \subseteq \Sigma$  is the set of unobservable events
- $\Sigma_o \subseteq \Sigma$  is the set of observable events.
- $\Sigma_f \subseteq \Sigma_{uo}$  is the set of failure events

**Remarks:**

- $\Sigma$  is portioned into  $\Sigma_{uo}$  and  $\Sigma_o$ . This means that  $\Sigma_{uo} \cup \Sigma_o = \Sigma$  and  $\Sigma_{uo} \cap \Sigma_o = \emptyset$ .
- Failure events are unobservable since observable failure events are easy to detect immediately when they occur.

The failure detection and identification are based on the comparison between observable behavior from physical process and expected behavior from system model [1, 2, 3, 6] in order to analyze the discrepancies between these two behaviors and deduce possible errors as shown in Figure 3.




Fig. 3 : Model-based Diagnose

The main idea is to design a framework model of the process behavior with finite state machine or any equivalent model. This model describes the normal behavior as well as the failure behavior of the system. Therefore, the diagnoser builds a state estimator according to the received observable events in a form of finite state machine. This process is depicted in Figure 4.




Fig. 4: Diagnoser tasks

The Figure 5 illustrates an example of discrete event system modelled by finite state machine. This DES is represented by the following action sets.

- $\Sigma = \{a, b, c, d, f1, f2\}$
- $\Sigma_{uo} = \Sigma_f = \{f1, f2\}$  is the set of unobservable events
- $\Sigma_o = \{a, b, c, d\}$  is the set of observable events.

According to  $\Sigma_f$ , transitions labeled with  $f1$  and  $f2$  lead to failure states. This means that the states 4, 5 and 6 corresponds to failure behavior.




Fig. 5: Example of DES modelled by FSA

The diagnoser is represented by the FSM in Figure 5. The initial state of the diagnoser FSM and is labeled by  $N$  indicating a normal behavior. The state labeled  $2N$   $4F$   $5F$  indicates that the system may be in state 2 (with normal behavior) or in states 5 or 6 (with failure behavior). If a diagnoser state is labeled exclusively  $F$ , the state is qualified **Fi-certain**. By opposition, if the diagnoser state is labeled exclusively  $N$ , the state is qualified **Normal**. Otherwise, the state is qualified **Fi-uncertain**.




Fig. 6 : Diagnoser FSM

The Table 1 illustrate the diagnoser state qualifications according to failure certainty.

**Table1:** Failure certainty of the diagnoser


Diagnoser state	Failure certainty
q <sub>0</sub>	Normal
q <sub>1</sub>	Fi-uncertain.
q <sub>2</sub>	Fi-uncertain.
q <sub>3</sub>	Fi-certain.

Note that no failure is detected if a diagnoser cycle does not contain any Fi-certain state.

#### 4. Control of Discrete Event Systems

The supervisory control theory is based on Ramadge & Wonham theory [10, 20, 23, 24]. The main idea is to inhibit the production of any action event that may lead to unsafe state as mentioned in Figure 7.

Typically, the controller is able to produce only controllable actions (referred to as  $\Sigma_c$ ). Events that are not managed by the controller are uncontrollable (referred to as  $\Sigma_{uc}$ ) and corresponds usually sensor feedback. The control Algorithm is based on FSM [25]. Each state is considered forbidden if it does not meet the safety specification. Besides, any state that can lead to a *forbidden* state by a sequence (one or more) of uncontrollable events is considered to be *weakly forbidden*. The controller is constructed by truncating any possibility to reach forbidden states and weakly forbidden states by acting on controllable events to avoid (weakly) forbidden states and obtain the most permissive controller.




**Fig. 7.** Supervisory control architecture

Note that  $\Sigma$  is partitioned into  $\Sigma_c$  and  $\Sigma_{uc}$ . This means that in controller perspective, an event is either controllable or uncontrollable. The complexity of

controller action resides in avoiding weakly forbidden states since they may lead spontaneously to forbidden state without any reaction from the controller. A system is considered to be controllable when the controller succeeds to avoid forbidden without reducing the scope of the system. In some cases the controller is brought to reduce some important and critical behavior. In this case, the issue is reported to the system designer which have to take the necessary actions in redesigning to avoid any misbehavior.

#### 5. Adaptive Control combined with Failure Diagnosis

It is interesting to combine the computational power of the diagnoser with controller actions to seek safe and normal behavior. The system architecture is represented in Figure 8. The diagnoser reports any failure behavior to the supervisor, then the controller consider all states reported by diagnoser as forbidden states and apply the control algorithm to avoid reaching those states.



**Fig. 8.** Supervisory control architecture

Consider that

- $P = (Q, \Sigma, \Delta, q_0)$  is the FSM of the physical process model
- $D = (Q^D, \Sigma_o, \Delta^D, q_0^D)$  is the FSM of the diagnoser
- $F \subset Q$  is the set of forbidden states
- $WF \subset Q$  is the set of weakly forbidden states

We present in what follows the adaptive control algorithm. The first step is to explore the system FSM to construct the diagnoser FSM. The states of the diagnoser FSM are composed of possible system states according to observable actions and their failure status (N or F).

Once the diagnoser is built, it is possible to identify all failure states that will be reported to the controller. Then, the controller marks all failures as forbidden states. The next step is mark all states that lead to forbidden states by uncontrollable events as weakly forbidden states. Lastly, the controller acts on controllable events to avoid all forbidden and weakly forbidden states.

**Algorithm of Failure diagnosis with  
adaptive control**

```
Initially  $Q^D = \{q_0^D\} = \{(q_0, N)\}$ 
Push ( $q_0^D$ )

While ( $q^D = \text{pop stack}$ ) is not empty
  foreach  $\sigma \in \Sigma_o$  do
    foreach  $q$  from  $q^D$ 
      if  $(q, w\sigma w', q') \in \Delta$  such that  $w \in \Sigma_{uo}^*$ 
        and  $w' \in \Sigma_{uo}^*$ 
        then generate/update state  $q'^D$  with
          the appropriate status N or F
        endif
      end for
    push  $q'^D$ 
     $Q^D = Q^D \cup \{q'^D\}$ 
     $\Delta^D = \Delta^D \cup \{(q^D, \sigma, q'^D)\}$ 
  end for
end while

foreach  $q^D \in Q^D$  such that  $q^D$  is Fi-certain
  mark each failure state  $q$  as forbidden
   $F = F \cup \{q\}$ 
end for

foreach  $q \in F$  with  $(q', w, q) \in \Delta$  and  $w \in \Sigma_{uc}^*$ 
  mark  $q'$  as weakly forbidden
   $WF = WF \cup \{q'\}$ 
end for

foreach  $q \in F \cup WF$ 
  for each  $(q', \sigma, q) \in \Delta$  such that  $\sigma \in \Sigma_c$ 
    remove  $(q', \sigma, q)$  from  $\Delta$ 
  end for
end for
```

The aforementioned algorithm guarantees the safety specification properties. This is based on the diagnoser construction followed by adaptive control that benefits from diagnoser outputs. This Algorithm ensures that all forbidden and weakly forbidden states are unreachable by controller actions. In this case the adaptive control is successful.

Note that this process allows the controller to be maximum permissive since only forbidden states are removed and any state that reach forbidden states by uncontrollable events.

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a method for adaptive control that consists of combining diagnose power with the controller to guarantee that the system remains as much as possible in safe state to guarantee reliability properties. The controller collaborates with the diagnoser in order to identify and detect failure states which are unobservable in most cases.

Future works focuses on the same problem in the context of real-time systems. Modelling is based on Timed Automata with some restriction to avoid the general undecidability of this problem when time is considered in dense context.

## Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the approval and the support of this research study by the grant N°CIT-2018-3-9-F-8037 from the Deanship of the Scientific Research in Northern Border University, Arar, KSA.

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