Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue (한국심리학회지 : 문화 및 사회문제)

Korean Psychological Association of Culture and Social Issues (한국문화및사회문제심리학회)
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The Effect of confirmation bias on Intentionality Judgment: The Role of Crime Typicality and Seriousness

고의성 판단에 확증편향이 미치는 영향: 범죄의 전형성 및 심각성의 역할

  • 최승혁 (광운대학교 방위사업연구소)
  • Received : 2020.07.31
  • Accepted : 2020.08.31
  • Published : 2020.08.31
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Abstract

Confirmation bias is well known to be the cause of widespread misjudgment in the field of forensic decision-making. In this study, we examined the psychological mechanisms by which confirmation bias affects intentionality judgment in serious injury and death cases that combine the moral characteristics of the perpetrator and victim differently. As a result, participants perceived the case as a more typical criminal case when both the perpetrator and victim were bad people, and gave higher intention to perpetrators' actions in these typical crimes. In particular, it was found that people with a high degree of confirmation bias highly judge the intention of the offenders in a consistent way with the stereotype of criminal cases. However, in serious criminal cases, the moderate effect of confirmation bias has disappeared and only the effect of crime typicality has existed. Finally, we discussed implications of this study and ways to reduce bias in intentionality judgment.

본 연구는 형사사법판단 분야에서 광범위하게 판단 오류를 발생시키는 확증편향이 고의성 판단에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 확인하기 위해 수행되었다. 이를 위해, 사건 가해자 및 피해자의 도덕적 특성을 다르게 조합한 중상해 사건과 사망 사건에서 확증편향이 고의성 판단에 영향을 미치는 심리적 기제를 확인하였다. 연구 결과, 참가자들은 사건 가해자와 피해자 모두 나쁜 사람들이 연루된 사건을 더 전형적인 범죄사건이라고 지각했고, 이러한 전형적인 범죄사건의 가해자에게 더 높은 고의성을 부여하였다. 특히, 확증편향이 높은 사람들은 더욱 범죄사건에 대한 고정관념과 일관된 방향으로 사건 가해자의 고의성을 높게 판단하는 것으로 나타났다. 그런데, 심각한 범죄사건에서는 이러한 확증편향의 조절효과가 사라지고 범죄의 전형성 효과만 나타나는 경향이 있었다. 마지막으로, 본 연구의 의의와 함께 고의성 판단을 왜곡시키는 편향을 감소시킬 수 있는 방안에 대해 논의하였다.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

이 논문은 2017년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2017S1A5B5A07064731).

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