Nuclear Engineering and Technology

  • 제52권3호
  • /
  • Pages.626-632
  • /
  • 2020
  • /
  • 1738-5733(pISSN)
  • /
  • 2234-358X(eISSN)
한국원자력학회 (Korean Nuclear Society)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

A strategic analysis of stationary radiation portal monitors and mobile detection systems in border monitoring

  • Coogan, Ryan (Department of Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University) ;
  • Marianno, Craig (Department of Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University) ;
  • Charlton, William (Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Texas at Austin)
  • 투고 : 2018.12.30
  • 심사 : 2019.08.16
  • 발행 : 2020.03.25
PDF 다운로드
⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) are our primary border defense against nuclear smuggling, but are they still the best way to spend limited funds? The purpose of this research is to strategically compare RPM defense at the border with state-side mobile detectors. Limiting the problem to a comparison of two technologies, a decision-maker can prioritize how to best allocate resources, by reinforcing the border with stationary overt RPMs, or by investing in Mobile Radiation Detection Systems (MRDs) which are harder for an adversary to detect but may have other weaknesses. An abstract, symmetric network was studied to understand the impact of initial conditions on a network. An asymmetric network, loosely modeled on a state transportation system, is then examined for the technology that will maximally suppress the adversary's success rate. We conclude that MRDs, which have the advantage of discrete operation, outperform RPMs deployed to a border. We also conclude that MRDs maintain this strategic advantage if they operate with one-tenth the relative efficiency of their stationary counter-parts or better.

키워드

참고문헌

  1. White House, National Strategy on Counterterrorism, 2011.
  2. IAEA, IAEA incident and traficking database (ITDB). https://www.iaea.org/resources/databases/itdb, 2017.
  3. K.R. Wood, Deterministic network interdiction, Math. Comput. Model. 17 (1993) 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(93)90021-P
  4. N. Dimitrov, D. Michalopoulos, D. Morton, M. Nehme, F. Pan, E. Popova, E. Schneider, G. Thoreson, Network deployment of radiation detectors with physics-based detection probability calculations, Ann. Oper. Res. 187 (2011) 207-228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0677-2
  5. J.Q. Cheng, M. Xie, R. Chen, F. Roberts, A latent source model to detect multiple spatial clusters with application in a mobile sensor network for surveillance of nuclear materials, J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 108 (2013) 902-913, https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2013.808945.
  6. E. Israeli, R.K. Wood, Shortest-path network interdiction, Networks. 40 (n.d.) 97-111. doi:10.1002/net.10039.
  7. DHS, CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels, OIG, 2012, pp. 12-132.
  8. N. Haphuriwat, V.M. Bier, H.H. Willis, Deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons in container freight through detection and retaliation, Decis. Anal. 8 (2011) 88-102, https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.1110.0199.
  9. IEEE, American National Standard Performance Criteria for Spectroscopy-Based Portal Monitors Used for Homeland Security, vols. 38-2015, 2016, pp. 1-45, https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7394937. ANSI N42.
  10. IEEE, American National Standard Performance Criteria for Handheld Instruments for the Detection and Identification of Radionuclides, ANSI N42.34-2015, 2016, pp. 1-60, https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7551091 (Revision ANSI N42.34-2006).
  11. DHS, United States Customs and Border Protection's Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports, 2013.

피인용 문헌

  1. State-of-the-Art Mobile Radiation Detection Systems for Different Scenarios vol.21, pp.4, 2020, https://doi.org/10.3390/s21041051