한국융합학회논문지 (Journal of the Korea Convergence Society)

  • 제11권2호
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  • Pages.207-214
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  • 2020
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  • 2233-4890(pISSN)
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  • 2713-6353(eISSN)
한국융합학회 (Korea Convergence Society)
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내부회계관리제도의 품질이 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향 : 기업지배구조 조절효과를 중심으로

The Effect of the Quality of Internal Accounting Control System on Executive Compensation : Focusing on the moderating effects of corporate governance

  • 정우성 (부산외국어대학교 경영학부)
  • Jung, Woo-Sung (School of Business Administration, Busan University of Foreign Studies)
  • 투고 : 2019.12.10
  • 심사 : 2020.02.20
  • 발행 : 2020.02.28
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초록

본 연구의 목적은 내부회계관리제도의 품질이 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향을 분석하고, 내부회계관리제도의 품질과 경영자 보상 사이의 관계가 기업지배구조의 효율성에 따라 달라지는지를 확인하는 것이다. 분석을 위해 2011년부터 2016년까지 한국거래소에 상장된 6,343개의 기업-연(firm-year) 자료를 이용하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 내부회계관리제도의 품질이 낮은 기업에서는 경영자에 대한 패널티로 보상을 감소시키는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 내부회계관리제도의 중요한 취약점과 경영자 보상 사이의 음(-)의 관련성이 기업지배구조가 효율적일 때 더욱 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 내부회계관리제도의 품질에 대한 정보가 기업 내 경영자 보상 정책을 합리적으로 규명하기 위해 유용하게 사용될 수 있으며, 기업지배구조를 더욱 효율적으로 운영할 필요가 있음을 시사한다.

The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of the quality of the Internal Accounting Control System(IACS) on Executive compensation, and to determine whether this relationship depends on the effectiveness of corporate governance. For the analysis, 6,343 firm-year data listed on the Korea Exchange from 2011 to 2016 were used. The results are as follows. First, Executive compensation was decreased in companies with low quality of IACS to provide a penalty for management. Second, the negative relationship between the weaknesses of IACS and Executive compensation was found to be strengthened when the corporate governance was effectively operated. These findings suggest that information about the quality of the IACS can be usefully used to reasonably identify the executive compensation policy, and that corporate governance needs to be operated more efficiently.

키워드

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