Korean Journal of Logic (논리연구)

Korean Association for Logic (한국논리학회)
권호 표지

Bayesian Confirmation Theory and Hempel's Intuitions

베이즈주의와 헴펠: 베이즈주의자들은 헴펠의 직관을 포착하는가?

  • Lee, Ilkwon (Department of Philosophy & Institute of Critical Thinking and Writing, Chonbuk National University)
  • 이일권 (전북대학교 철학과, 비판적사고와논술연구소)
  • Received : 2019.05.28
  • Accepted : 2019.06.30
  • Published : 2019.10.31
Download PDF
⟨ Previous Next ⟩

Abstract

Hempel's original intuitions about the raven's paradox are summed up in three ways. The first is known as the paradoxical conclusion: If one observes that an object a - about which nothing is antecedently known - is a non-black non-raven, then this observation confirms that all ravens are black. The second is an intuitive verdict of the misled conclusion of the paradox: If one observes that an object a - which is known to be a non-raven - is non-black (hence, is a non-black non-raven), then this observation does not confirmationally affect that all ravens are black. The third is a comparative claim between the two intuitions: the degree of confirmation appearing in the first intuition is greater than the degree of confirmation in the second intuition. The Standard Bayesian Solution of the paradox is evaluated to fleshed Hempel's intuitions out by establishing the first intuition. However, such an evaluation of this solution should be further analyzed because Hempel's intuition is not the only one. The solution of paradox does not establish the second intuition in a strict sense. However, I think the Bayesian solution will establish the second intuition based on its typical strategy of quantitative vindication. If only quantitative vindication is accepted, this evaluation of the solution remains valid. Nevertheless, the solution fails to establish the third intuition. In this article, I propose a new way to apply the Bayesian method to establish Hempel's intuitions, including the third intuition. If my analysis is correct, the Standard Bayesian Solution of the raven's paradox could indeed flesh Hempel's intuitions out by denying one of the assumptions considered essential.

까마귀 역설의 역설적 결론은 입증에 대해 헴펠이 가지고 있던 직관이다. 베이즈주의자들의 표준적 해결책(SBS)은 이 직관을 포착함으로써, 입증에 대한 헴펠의 직관을 정교화 시켰다는 평가를 받는다. 하지만 헴펠이 제시한 직관은 그것만이 아니었다. 헴펠은 그 역설적 결론과 더불어 또 하나의 직관을 제시했다. SBS는 엄밀한 의미에서 이 두 번째 직관을 포착하지 못한다. 하지만 나는 베이즈주의자들이 그들의 전형적인 전략을 이용하여 이 두 번째 직관을 구제할 것으로 예상한다. 그런 전략이 인정된다면, SBS에 대한 긍정적 평가는 건재하다. 역설에 대한 헴펠의 해명은 이들 두 직관이 제공하는 입증관계를 비교한다. 헴펠이 제시한 두 직관을 받아들이면 그런 비교에 대한 헴펠의 또 다른 직관이 도출된다. 따라서 그 세 번째 직관을 포착하지 못한다면, 헴펠의 직관을 제대로 포착한다고 말할 수 없다. 나는 이 글에서 헴펠의 주요 직관들이 SBS와 양립불가능하다는 것을 보인다. 그리하여 결국 이들이 양립가능하기 위해서는 SBS의 중요한 가정 하나를 거부해야 한다고 주장한다.

Keywords

References

  1. 박일호 (2013), "조건화와 입증: 조건화 옹호 논증", 논리연구, 제16집 제2호, pp. 155-187. https://doi.org/10.22860/KAFL.2013.16.2.155
  2. 박제철 (2014), "헴펠의 역설에 대한 해결", 과학철학, 제17집 제3호, pp. 1-22.
  3. 여영서 (2010), "입증의 정도를 어떻게 측정할 것인가?", 과학철학, 제13집 제2호, pp. 41-69.
  4. 이영의 등 (2018), 입증, 서울: 서광사.
  5. 조인래 등 (1999), 현대 과학철학의 문제들, 도서출판 아르케.
  6. 최원배 (2018), "입증의 역설 다시 보기", 논리연구, 제20집 제3호, pp. 367-390. https://doi.org/10.22860/KAFL.2017.20.3.367
  7. 허원기 (2018), "까마귀 가설과 까마귀가 아닌 것", 과학철학, 제21집 제1호, pp. 39-67.
  8. Carnap, R. (1962), Logical foundations of probability, The University of Chicago Press.
  9. Crupi, V., Tentori, K., and Gonzalez, M. (2007), "On Bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues", Philosophy of Science 74(2), pp. 229-252. https://doi.org/10.1086/520779
  10. Crupi, V. (2015), "Confirmation", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/
  11. Earman, J. (1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Cambridge, ma: MIT Press.
  12. Eells, E. and Fitelson, B. (2002), "Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support", Philosophical Studies 107(2), pp. 129-142. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014712013453
  13. Fitelson, B. (1999), "The plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity", Philosophy of Science 66, pp. 362-378. https://doi.org/10.1086/392738
  14. Fitelson, B. (2006), "The Paradox of Confirmation", Philosophy Compass 1(1), pp. 95-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00011.x
  15. Fitelson, B. and Hawthorne, J. (2010a), "How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of Ravens", in E. Ells and J. H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 247-276.
  16. Fitelson, B. and Hawthorne, J. (2010b), "The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation", Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), pp. 207-241. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00191.x
  17. Good, I. J. (1950), Probability and the Weighing of Evidence, Charles Griffin and London, pp. 74-75.
  18. Good, I. J. (1960), "The paradox of confirmation", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11, pp. 145-149. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/XI.42.145-b
  19. Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, The Free Press. (번역 본: 칼 구스타프 헴펠 지음, 전영삼.여영서.이영의.최원배 옮김(2011)과학적 설명의 여러 측면: 그리고 과학철학에 관한 다른 논문들, 서울: 나남.)
  20. Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach, Open Court Publishing.
  21. Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (2010). "Bayesian versus Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation", in Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, pp. 222-267.
  22. Maher, P. (1999), "Inductive Logic and the Raven Paradox", Philosophy of Science 66, pp. 50-70. https://doi.org/10.1086/392676
  23. Maher, P. (2004), "Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation", in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, ed. C. Hitchcock, pp. 69-93, Malden: Blackwell.
  24. Milne, P. (1996), "Log[P(H/eb)/P(H/b)] is the one true measure of confirmation", Philosophy of Science 63, pp. 21-26. https://doi.org/10.1086/289891
  25. Milne, P. (2014), "Information, confirmation, and conditionals", Journal of Applied Logic 12(3), pp. 252-262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2014.05.003
  26. Park, I. (2014), "Confirmation measures and collaborative belief updating", Synthese 191(16), pp. 3955-3975. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0507-1
  27. Rinard, S. (2014), "A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens", Philosophy of Science 81, pp. 81-100. https://doi.org/10.1086/674202
  28. Vranas, P. (2004), "Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, pp. 545-560. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.3.545