Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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The Effect of Management Forecast Precision on CEO Compensation -Focusing on Bad news Firm-

악재를 경험한 기업의 경영자 이익예측 정확성이 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향

  • Lee, Eun-Ju (Business School, Pusan Natiional University) ;
  • Kim, Ha-Eun (Business School, Pusan Natiional University)
  • Received : 2019.01.29
  • Accepted : 2019.04.20
  • Published : 2019.04.28
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Abstract

This study analyzes the effect of the accuracy of future management performance, which managers voluntarily announce in the previous year's disclosure, on managers compensation. In the case of a company that disclosed the bad news in the previous year, the ability to predict uncertain future will be more important, and expects executives with better predictability to receive more compensation. The results of this study show that there is a significant negative(-) relationship between the accuracy of the manager's earnings forecast and the performance - compensation of the firms that disclosed the bad news in the previous year. The accuracy of the manager's disclosure is important, and it is confirmed that the manager's compensation increases as the incentive of the manager's effort to reduce future uncertainty. The results of this study are as follows: there is a positive relationship between the managerial performance and the managerial competence of managers. It is important to note that there is a difference and that we have identified additional determinants of the manager compensation contract.

본 연구는 전년도 악재를 경험한 기업에서 경영자가 자발적으로 공시하는 미래 경영성과의 정확성이 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향에 대하여 분석하고자 한다. 전년도에 악재를 경험한 기업의 경우 불확실한 미래에 대한 예측 능력이 더욱 중요시 될 것이며 이에 따라 우수한 예측 능력을 가진 경영자에게 더 높은 보상을 지급할 것이라고 기대하였다. 본 연구의 분석결과 전년도에 악재를 경험한 기업의 경영자 이익 예측 정확성과 경영자 보상간의 관련성에 음(-)의 유의한 관계가 나타났으며, 이는 전년도에 악재를 경험한 기업일수록 당기 성과에 대한 경영자의 공시의 정확성이 중시되며, 시장에 경영자의 능력을 알리고자하는 신호 및 미래 불확실성을 줄이고자 하는 경영자의 노력 투입의 유인이 되어 경영 성과가 높아짐에 따라 경영자 보상이 높아지는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 본 연구는 우수한 예측능력을 가진 경영자가 많은 보상을 받을 것이라는 선행연구를 확장하여 전년도의 경영성과가 호재 혹은 악재인지에 따라 예측능력의 중요성이 차별적으로 경영자 보상에 영향을 미친다는 것을 검증하였다는 것에 차별성이 존재하며, 경영자 보상 계약에 영향을 미치는 결정요인을 추가적으로 파악했다는 것에 의의가 있다.

Keywords

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Fig. 1. Hypothesis 1

Table 1. Descriptive Analysis

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Table 2. Correlation analysis

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Table 3. Regression Analysis (hypothesis)

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Table 4. Regression Analysis (Additional analysis)

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