

Response of the International Community to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Isaac Owusu Frimpong University of Western Australia

논문요약

본 논문은 나이지리아 보코하람 소요사태를 다루는 과정에서 나이지리아 현 대통령 소령(rtd) 마하무두 부하리(mahamudu buhari)와 직계 전 대통령 굿럭 조나단(jonathan)의 역할을 분석하고자 한다. 나이지리아는 공정한 분쟁 분담이 없는 적이 없었다. 사실, 독립 후 10년 동안 어떤 나이지리아도 분쟁이 없었던 적이 없었다. 몇몇 쿠데타와 총파업 그리고 내전으로 나이지리아 사람들은 의견과 불신의 차이에서 비롯되는 가장 비참한 비극들 중 일부를 경험해야 했다. 나이지리아에서의 갈등이 지금처럼 필요한 관심을 받지 못했다는 얘기가 흥미롭다. 굿럭 조나단 지도부는 2015년 5월 취임한 무함마두 부하리 전 총리와 비교할 때 같은 노력과 협조를 받지 못했다. 본 논문은 두 나이지리아 지도자가 협력하는 것을 돕거나 방해하는 중요한 역할을 한다고 주장한다. 굿럭 조나단은 약하고 우유부단한 지도자로 인식되어 보코하람의 폭동을 효과적으로 다루지 못했다. 무함마두 부하리는 나이지리아 국민과 국제사회가 보코하람 반란을 타개할 큰 희망과 기대를 안고 취임했다.

주제어 : 보코하람, 반란, 간섭, 나이지리아, 아프리카 연합, 유엔, 미국

I. Introduction


This paper attempts to analyze the role of Nigeria's current President Major(Rtd) Mahammudu Buhari and the immediate past President Goodluck Jonathan in dealing with the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Nigeria has not been without its fair share of conflict. In fact, no decade of post-Independent Nigeria has been conflict free. With several coups, general strikes and a civil war, Nigerians have had to experience some of the most sordid tragedies arising from difference of opinions and distrust.

It is interesting to mention however that the conflict situation in Nigeria has not received the needed attention as it were. In 2011, the UN approved an intervention in Libya to oust the leadership of the despotic ruler Gaddafi. The UN took this decision with humanitarian considerations to avoid the loss of lives which was on the increase as a result of the conflict in Libya. The conflict in Nigeria is an example of a state's inability to protect civilians from organized killings conducted by a non-state insurgency group. It is clear that Boko Haram has extended its influence and ideology far beyond the country's borders. The group is gaining support and building up in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and has been associated with armed groups operating in Mali such as Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO. The situation demands for a more critical response by the international community to bring it under control.

Currently, the country is battling the ferocious and religious organized terrorist group, Boko Haram, which has tormented the country, mostly the northern part of Nigeria since 2009. The number of deaths resulting from the activities of Boko Haram

differs from various reports. However, it is estimated that a minimum of 7,500 to a maximum of 33,000 people have been killed from 2009, when Boko Haram started their offensive and serious suicide mission to date. The government of Nigeria has been fighting this terrorist movement as well as minimising major conflict in the country. Conflicts and terrorists operations of such nature usually attract international response, usually from the United Nations, or some regional bodies and in this case, the AU or ECOWAS. Interestingly, the response of these organizations to the situation in Nigeria has been quite different with regards to the current president Gen(Rtd) Muhammadu Buhari and his predecessor Goodluck Jonathan respectively. Below is a diagram showing the death toll associated with the Boko Haram insurgency between 2010 and 2015.

Reported civilian deaths by Boko Haram, Sept 2010-Jan 2015



Note: Fatalities up to 10 Jan, includes provisional 150 deaths for attack on Baga

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof Clionadh Raleigh, Uni of Sussex

1. Main Argument


The Nigerian government has made efforts in trying to combat this terrorist group. However, the progress made by the government of Nigeria leaves much to be desired. As a member of the UN, AU and a strategic partner of the US in Africa, one would have expected the close collaboration of these institutions and the US in helping Nigeria deal with Boko Haram. The leadership of Goodluck Jonathan sought for US intervention to which the latter refused on grounds of not being able to take a unilateral decision to intervene. UN offered to intervene in the latter part of his administration which his government refused. The AU also approved the sending of troops just a few months to the end of his leadership. The US had in the past demonstrated their support to fight terrorism and insurgency in some parts of Africa. For instance the US had been very instrumental in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group based in northern Uganda. In 2009, US President Barack Obama signed into law the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, legislation aimed at stopping Joseph Kony and the LRA. This was followed by several strategies and assistance aimed at defeating the LRA and capturing its leader. The US also offered bounties of up to \$5m each for Kony and some of his top LRA aides in April 2013. These developments clearly show the commitment and willingness on the part of the US to deal with the LRA. Interestingly, the modus operandi of Boko Haram and the LRA are very much similar with abductions, forced recruitment, targeting civilians etc. The question then arises why the US will assist and actively be involved in fighting the LRA but will not or cannot show the same commitment to deal with Boko

Haram? To a very large extent, one can argue that Boko Haram has adopted and copied a lot from the LRA. The international community's response to Boko Haram's atrocities has been very slow and erratic as it was to the LRA. Competing for lucrative contracts has been an impediment on the part of global powers to speak against the Nigerian government about their inability neither to protect their citizens nor to ensure accountability for atrocities committed by state institutions.

The above response was not the case for Gen. Buhari who assumed office as President of Nigeria in May 2015. The US offered close partnership to his government to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency, the UN spearheading negotiation and mediation on behalf of his government and the AU is yet to deploy their troops to help in fighting Boko Haram. One would wonder why the former president Goodluck Jonathan, did not receive the same level of commitment in handling the Boko Haram insurgency even at a time that the government called for it or what factors prevented an earlier response by the UN, AU and the US.

This paper seeks to portray the paramount role of the two leaders in handling the Boko Haram issue. Goodluck Jonathan has been seen as a weak, indecisive leader and who acted too slowly with regards to issues related to Boko Haram. This has been coupled with excessive corruption of public officials under his regime; indiscipline and unbecoming conduct of the Nigerian military being accused of human rights violations and the declining relationship with the US especially on trade have all played a role to prevent collaboration. However, Gen. Buhari is considered as a dynamic, strict and ex-military ruler with strong stance on anti-corruption. He has also made major changes in the Nigerian military high command as

well as making progress with strengthening relations with the U.S. Gen. Buhari has also involved the UN in negotiating with Boko Haram which has resulted in the release of over 20 Chibok girls kidnapped during the reign of Goodluck Jonathan. These events cannot be explained or understood without a critical look at the role or personalities of the two presidents.



The picture above illustrates the main argument of this research.

2. Literature Review

Much work on conflicts related to Nigeria has focused on the role or response of the Nigerian governments over the years Campbell J. assesses the response of the Jonathan government in handling the Boko Haram insurgency and identifies some fundamental issues in his

regime which has been an impediment in dealing with this terrorist group(Campbell J. 2014, 3). He argues that the response of the Nigerian government has led many people especially the youth to support the group. Agbiboa focuses on understanding the group 'Boko Haram', why they rebel and the response of the Nigerian government over the years(Agbiboa 2013). Gourley analysed Boko Haram's association with global jihadist movements like al Qaeda and al Shabab and how this has 'enhanced' their impact(Gourley 2012, 1-14).

3. Theoretical Application: Actor Specific Theory

In International Relations(IR), much of the theories tend to neglect the role of individuals in international affairs. There is a dearth of literature on the influence of individuals in this area. In fact, less than 15% of literature examines the role of the first image(individuals) in the international system. A critical look at history reveals the important roles played by some individuals in the international system. Jordan argues that the most significant periods of the twentieth century are inexplicable without examining individuals(Jordan 2013, 7).

There are three levels or images which IR scholars provide as explaining the actions of states in the international system. The first image is the individual which deals with the beliefs, cognition, ideas, perception and values of individuals which come to bear in making decisions. The second image is the State which comprises institutions like the bureaucracies, legislature, executive, judiciary which are of prime importance in explaining the decisions and actions of states. The third image is the international system which they consider as

one of anarchy, a system of self-help and individual states preoccupied with the means of survival. This paper therefore uses the Actor-Specific theory to argue the important role and influence of the two Presidents in Nigeria towards the Boko Haram Insurgency.

II. What is Boko Haram?

Boko Haram which is literally translated as Western education is forbidden is the short form of the groups' original name "Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad." Unlike al-Qaeda and its affiliates, its focus is specifically on Nigeria and adjacent countries rather than international jihad(Campbell J. 2014, 1). Boko Haram is not in the same global jihadist bracket as Algeria's al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or Somalia's al Shabab. Despite its successful attack on the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011, Boko Haram is not bent on attacking Western interests (Walker A. 2012).


Defining Boko Haram is a very difficult phenomenon for scholars, researchers, agencies, international organizations and even the Nigerian government itself. Although the group portrays to be a religious movement to propagate the teachings of Islam, they also have political ambitions and uses social and economic issues to win many youths into their group especially in northern Nigeria. There exist debates among scholars and researchers on whether or not to define the Boko Haram situation as an insurgency, terrorist group or domestic conflict. It is important to mention that the group does not necessarily identify themselves as opposing anything 'western.' The name Boko Haram actually originated from neighbours and

observers who felt the group hated anything western. This cannot be entirely true as the group carries out their daily activities with the help of instruments, devices and mechanisms developed by westerners. The following statement is purported to have been released by the group sometime in 2011. We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims can be liberated. The group according to the beliefs of its founding leader is actually against some people in northern Nigeria who they refer to as “*yanboko*” which is literally translated as the ‘child of the book.’

These are people and for that matter Muslims who were mostly used by the British colonial authorities to rule Nigeria. Boko Haram fights such people because they believe they have been corrupted by western values and are used as puppets to serve their interests contrary to the will of Allah. The puzzle of defining Boko Haram is compounded by the inability to obtain accurate and verified information about the group and its activities. On the other hand, some Nigerian politicians accuse their opponents of using Boko Haram to make them unpopular.

The group directs its operations from the north eastern states of Borno and Yobe, but they have demonstrated their capacity by launching attacks throughout the country. There has been weekly attacks in public places, schools or churches since August 2011 which the group has claimed responsibility for most of these occurrences. Boko Haram was declared the most deadly terrorist group in the year 2015 accounting for about 6,644 deaths. The

number of deaths associated with the group's activities even surpassed that of the dreaded ISIS in 2015. This is seen in the information from the Global Terrorism Database.



III. Events during the Leadership of Goodluck Jonathan

Although Boko Haram is alleged to have pledged allegiance to the dreaded Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in March 2013, it took the abduction of over 270 school girls at Chibok before the UN named them as a terrorist group. Perhaps, the UN did not perceive Boko Haram as deadly or a group that could cause any havoc until April 2014. This may have informed their non-involvement in dealing with the group up to this point. The UN later offered to intervene by sending troops into Nigeria to fight Boko Haram. This request was declined by then President Goodluck Jonathan, who encouraged the UN mission to focus their efforts on partnering

other bodies to provide aid, technical support and assistance in handling the situation.

In April 2015, the UN unanimously adopted a resolution which stipulated that any international assistance should be provided “upon request and in close collaboration with the respective governments” of the countries most affected by the radical Islamist insurgency. Prior to this development, the Lake Chad Basin Commission(LCBC) countries and Benin had in October 2014 drafted a resolution aimed at getting the approval of the United Nations Security Council recognising and endorsing the deployment of the MNJTF. It is clear that the government of Goodluck Jonathan strongly opposed the idea of an intervention in Nigeria regarding the Boko Haram insurgency.

As has been indicated earlier by Campbell, the US and for that matter foreign powers did not have much leverage on the Nigerian government during the leadership of Goodluck Jonathan(Campbell 2014). This has principally been attributed to the country’s large economic size and influence on the African continent which did not make them rely on US aid. Other reasons also account for why the US could not do much in the administration of Goodluck Jonathan. Powerful Nigerian sentiments by some politicians and public figures prevented further collaboration between these two states.

Even though Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan refused UN intervention in fighting Boko Haram, he told The Wall Street Journal in Abuja during an interview of several requests made by his government to the US, which the latter had declined. The president said in the interview that he had been asking the US since early 2014 to send combat soldiers along with military advisers to Nigeria to battle Boko Haram. Citing intelligence reports, he said the militants were receiving “training and funds” from Islamic State, the

jihadist group whose leadership is based in Iraq and Syria.

On the other hand, US officials denied these requests and insisted the US was not in a position to unilaterally send troops into Nigeria. Apart from that, Washington had other concerns which to them prevented the US in helping Nigeria on the Boko Haram Insurgency. The US made reference to The Leahy Law, which prohibits them from offering assistance to countries engaged in human rights abuses. In May 2013, US Secretary of State, John Kerry confronted Mr. Jonathan about the issues of human rights abuses and gross misconduct of the Nigerian military in dealing with Boko Haram. President Barack Obama discussed same issues with him in September 2013 to which he denied claiming the reports were blown out of proportion and exaggerated.

IV. UN Response during the Leadership of Muhammadu Buhari

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari in his efforts to fight Boko Haram asked the U.N. to mediate negotiations between the government and Boko Haram regarding the more than 200 Chibok schoolgirls who were captured sometime in April 2014. This move shows a commitment by Buhari's government to work closely with the international community in combating the terrorist group.

Previous negotiations between Nigeria and Boko Haram regarding the girls, mediated by neighbouring Chad failed. President Buhari is reported to have told Mr. Ban Ki Moon that the Nigerian government is "willing to bend over backwards" to secure the girls' release, but is struggling to determine which Boko Haram leaders to negotiate with. As part of these arrangements, many of the Chibok girls were

released by Boko Haram due to the efforts of the UN.

Upon assuming office, President Buhari paid his first official visit to the US in an effort to amend the broken ties between the two countries under the erstwhile administration. Barack Obama praised President Muhammadu Buhari as a leader with a “reputation for integrity and a very clear agenda” for battling Boko Haram and said the US would work with Nigeria in its efforts to fight Boko Haram as well as help Nigeria become an anchor “of prosperity and stability” in Africa.

Relations between the US and Nigeria had deteriorated, stemming partly from Mr Jonathan’s botched handling of Boko Haram, which had killed and kidnapped thousands of Nigerians during his administration. A few days after Gen. Buhari assumed office as president of Nigeria, the US announced their willingness to send many advisers to Nigeria. This announcement was followed with a \$5 million financial aid set up by President Buhari’s government to strengthen ties with neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon. President Buhari publicly declared that his administration was determined to rid Nigeria off corruption and terror. He said military training and intelligence from allies especially the US will be very much needed in this drive.

V . Findings

1. Ineffective Leadership and Human Rights violations by Nigerian Military under Former President Goodluck Jonathan

In their attempt to fight or defeat Boko Haram, the Nigerian army is believed to have committed grievous crimes against their

population. Amnesty International asserts that it is implicated in war crimes and the Human Rights Watch describes it as almost evil as Boko Haram itself(Lunn & Harari 2015, 50). The government's seemingly indiscriminate killing of alleged Boko Haram members and many others who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time appears to be a driver of popular support for or acquiescence to Boko Haram according to Amnesty International, 2014 cited by Campbell(Campbell 2014, 3). In October 2013, Amnesty International released a disturbing report of over 950 people who died in military custody during the first half of that year(Campbell 2014). The Wall Street Journal also reported that the Nigerian military routinely deposited large numbers of corpse from the Giwa Barracks to the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital. These people were mostly detainees who had not undergone any form of trial.

In early 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan made major changes in the military high command by sacking the Chief of Defence Staff, chief of Army and Naval Staff. These changes were informed by reports that in-fighting among the chiefs had impeded the operations of the military in their fight against Boko Haram. By the end of 2014, these changes paid off as the military made some significant progress by gaining some territories which hitherto were held by Boko Haram including Adamawa state. The military however, still encountered major challenges. For instance by early 2015, they lost the border town of Baga in Borno state to Boko Haram.

The unprofessionalism and atrocities by the Nigerian military garnered support for Boko Haram and made more people willing to join the group. Much of the actions and strategies of the military under Goodluck Jonathan was counterproductive and did not yield the needed results. One can argue that the role of the president,

who is also the commander-in-chief, is of prime concern in analysing the situation.

President Buhari sacked all the personnel in the military high command who were seen to be presiding over an institution that had failed to contain the spread of the militants and which human rights groups say has committed atrocities against civilians during the failed operations against Boko Haram. He replaced the heads of the Nigerian army, navy and air force within six weeks after his inauguration and is reported to have said that the new appointees were made not because of their familiarity with top political figures but solely based on their experience and qualification. One thing which had characterised the appointment of the military high command was their affinity to political leaders regardless of the experience and qualifications. Major(Rtd) Muhammadu Buhari, an ex-military officer himself shifted from this trend when he assumed office. He also relocated the headquarters of the armed services to Borno State in northern Nigeria. The idea is to take the fight against Boko Haram closer to the stronghold of the group.

2. Corruption allegations levelled against Goodluck Jonathan's regime

Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 under former president Olusegun Obasanjo was characterised by a lot of euphoria, hopes and expectations. However, these aspirations were not met or perhaps cut short by several developments. According to Edikan and Emem, between 1960 and 2007, nothing more has ravaged the foundation of the nation than corruption (Edikan and Emem 2008, 1). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) vignettes corruption as an

abuse of office or trust for private benefit: and is a temptation indulged in by not only public officials but also by those in positions of trust and authority in private enterprise or non-profit organizations (IMF, 1998) cited from Ekpo Charles et al(Ekpo Charles et al 2016, 61-73).

Nigeria has a bad history of the country's executive arm of government at various levels manipulating security issues for political and economic gains. This practice leads to the decline of the economic and social wellbeing of the citizenry. It also affects the legitimacy of governments which forces them to be preoccupied with strategies to retain power. In the long run, the pursuit of national security which should promote economic wellbeing is reduced to one of enduring tactics to ensure regime survival.

Goodluck Jonathan's government appeared to have paid no attention to corruption and its scandalous manifestations. Jonathan's quest and ambition for second term in office be clouded his sense of judgment and totally bamboozled his political will from fighting corruption to cementing loyalists in all regions of the country through dubious transactions(Ekpo Charles et al 2016, 61-73). Several cases of misappropriation, embezzlements and diversion of public funds characterised his tenure in office. Jonathan so much pampered corruption and is on recorded to have vindicated one of his cronies by saying that "stealing is not corruption." Between 2010 and 2012 under Jonathan's watch as president over N5 trillion of government funds were stolen. According to the Nuhu Ribadu led Petroleum Task Force Report, Nigeria lost 250,000 barrels of crude oil daily at the cost of \$6.3 billion(N1.2 trillion) a year. This puts the total amount lost through oil theft in the two years of Jonathan

government at over \$12.6 billion(N2trillion)(Ekpo Charles et al 2016, 61-73). Corruption manifested in Jonathan's first two years in office such that KPMG, a global audit and financial advisory firm, resolved that Nigeria accounted for the highest number of fraud cases in Africa in the first half of 2012 Adeyemo, cited from Ekpo Charles et al(Ekpo Charles et al 2016, 61-73).

What is even more worrying about this trend is not only in the lack of accountability and proper procedure to ensure usage of the funds but also its continuous rise in terms of the amount. However, the fact that huge sums of money are budgeted and spent in the name of security votes does not make the practice illegal as per the requirements of the Nigerian constitution. The fundamental problem has been the fact that in Nigeria, security votes has little or nothing to do with security. It is rather used as an avenue by leaders to legitimize stealing from the public purse.

President Buhari who is believed to possess the personal desire, inclinations and political will to combat corruption in Nigeria was sworn-in on May 29, 2015. One of the immediate steps his administration took was to probe and trial individuals purported to have stolen public funds. As part of his efforts to fight corruption, the president on August 11, 2015 inaugurated a Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption. However, the expectation of the Nigerian populace was not met with the activities of this committee. This is primarily because the committee was concerned with investigating and arresting suspected individuals of looting state resources as opposed to developing mechanisms to deter such occurrences. Buhari has slightly deviated from his predecessors by placing utmost priorities on recovering looted public funds and even generating more funds through compromised court judgment and bail charges;

while the much anticipated fight against corruption is negated(Ekpo Charles et al 2016). Even in instances where public officials have been found guilty by competent courts of corrupt practices, they are set free once such officials return or are able to pay back the funds. This has been criticised by many as not fighting corruption in itself but rather a fight against the manifestations of corruption. It has the tendency to entice public officials to continue stealing so long as they can put in place stringent measures to cover their tracks. His decision to even keep the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission(EFCC) top executives and structure has been questioned by many critics who argue that the EFCC and its leadership were responsible for supervising corrupt activities in the erstwhile Jonathan government. There are also critics who argue that the president's efforts in fighting corruption have been targeted at officials in the Jonathan government without paying attention to corrupt practices in his own government.

VI. Conclusions

Nigeria has been argued by many as microcosm of Africa with a population of about 180 million people evenly spread between Christians and Muslims. The Muslims predominantly occupy the northern side of the country while the Christians occupy the south in broader terms. Nigeria's history is associated with clashes and conflicts between the Christians and the Muslims. However, while a pattern of Christian-Muslim violence, especially in the 'Middle Belt'(in the central region of the country), is not new, the appearance of the radical Islamic group Boko Haram, which burst

into prominence in 2009 threatens to inject an element of dogmatic violence into Nigeria not hitherto seen Cook(Cook 2011, 3). It is believed that Boko Haram was activated towards the end of 2003 partly because of the re-election of Obasanjo as president of Nigeria. This election was said to have been rigged and a second term for a southerner and a Christian perhaps would have threatened the predominant Muslim north. The paranoid atmosphere created the idea among the Muslims to arm themselves for protection. Many of the group's operations around 2011 were targeted at politicians and some religious leaders.

A critical look at the development of events in Nigeria reveals a gradual shift of policy or focus by the international community. The initial reaction or response of the international community to the Nigerian conflict was one of strictly non-intervention. It took the abduction of the Chibok girls in 2014 before Boko Haram was really tagged as a terrorist group. Cooperation and assistance under the erstwhile leadership of Goodluck Jonathan by the international community was questionable for various reasons. However, upon his election as president, Gen. Buhari has received tremendous support especially from the US and collaborated efforts in handling Boko Haram and the conflict situation in Nigeria. The UN became actively involved and even spearheaded negotiations with Boko Haram under the leadership of Buhari. The MNJTF whose operations were sanctioned by the AU but had failed to carry out any major activities resumed fully to work sometime in February 2016.

From the foregoing discussions, one can not underestimate the influence and important roles played by Nigeria's former president Goodluck Jonathan and his successor Major(Rtd) Muhammadu Buhari

in the fight against Boko Haram. Generally, Goodluck Jonathan painted a picture that the Boko Haram insurgency was an attempt by his political enemies to make his government unpopular. This may have informed how he treated issues related to Boko Haram. Again, his closest cronies and confidants who were mostly high ranking government officials and the military high command did not help him in tackling Boko Haram. The government bureaucracies and most public sector institutions were accused of corruption which his administration did little or nothing about, at the same time, the military was characterized with in-fighting amongst them which hindered coordinated efforts to handle Boko Haram.

Goodluck Jonathan refused an intervention or assistance from the UN. His government did not show much commitment in cooperating with regional and sub-regional bodies that were prepared to help in the fight against Boko Haram. At the same time, his government had been accused of excessive corruption among government officials which no firm actions were taken to either curb or bring the persons involved to book. The US as a partner of Nigeria could not do much under the leadership of Jonathan because of several reasons and relations between the two countries seemed to be on the edge.

On the other hand, Muhammadu Buhari, demonstrated a firm commitment to handle the Boko Haram insurgency when he assumed office. He had ruled as an ex-military leader and was known for his strict stance and dislike for corruption. He made the issue of handling the Boko Haram insurgency a matter of concern which needed an urgent attention. His administration's greatest achievement in handling issues related to Boko Haram is perhaps the release of some of the abducted Chibok school girls. A total of about 103 girls were released between October 2016 and May 2017. It must however be mentioned

that the release was in exchange for some of the group's members who were been held by the Nigerian security forces.

He also put in place measures to cooperate with Nigeria's neighbours as well the UN and AU. His first visit as president was to the US partly to restore the "broken" ties and seek their assistance in fighting Boko Haram. In assessing the role of the two Presidents, perception is very influential and cannot be downplayed. The perception and image of Goodluck Jonathan did a lot of damage to his administration which partly accounted for his inability to win the Nigerian general elections in 2015. A critical assessment of Muhammadu Buhari's first few months in office does not show any major changes with regards to the ills identified in the former administration. There are still reports of corruption among government officials, indiscipline on the part of the military and his government's inability to retrieve all the stolen government funds from the previous regime as he had campaigned to do.

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투고일 : 2019년 2월 14일 · 심사일 : 2019년 2월 21일 · 게재확정일 : 2019년 3월 11일
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* Isaac Owusu Frimpong is in the Doctoral course on International Relations from University of Western Australia, and He graduated from the Department of International Relations at China's Gillim University. He will also concentrate on studying the political system in Australia and Africa.

<Abstract>

Response of the International Community to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Isaac Owusu Frimpong
(University of Western Australia)

This paper attempts to analyze the role of Nigeria's current President Major (Rtd) Mahammudu Buhari and the immediate past President Goodluck Jonathan in dealing with the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Nigeria has not been without its fair share of conflict. In fact, no decade of post-Independent Nigeria has been conflict free. With several coups, general strikes and a civil war, Nigerians have had to experience some of the most sordid tragedies arising from difference of opinions and distrust. It is interesting to mention that the conflict in Nigeria has not received the needed attention as it were. The leadership of Goodluck Jonathan did not receive the same effort and cooperation as compared to Muhammadu Buhari who came into office in May 2015. This paper argues the important roles played by the two Nigerian leaders which either aided or prevented collaboration. Goodluck Jonathan was perceived as a weak and indecisive leader whose leadership failed to effectively handle the Boko Haram insurgency. Muhammadu Buhari assumed office with a lot of high hopes and expectations from the Nigerian population and the international community to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency.

Key words : Boko Haram, Insurgency, Intervention, Nigeria, AU, UN, US