Korean Journal of Logic (논리연구)

Korean Association for Logic (한국논리학회)
권호 표지

Can Impossible Possibility Save Modalism?

불가능한 가능성은 양상주의를 구원할 수 있는가?

  • Lee, Jaeho (Department of Philosophy, Chung-Ang University) ;
  • Kim, Minseok (Department of Philosophy, Chung-Ang University)
  • Received : 2018.04.11
  • Accepted : 2018.06.15
  • Published : 2018.06.30
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Abstract

Since Kit Fine's influential paper, Essence and Modality (1994), many philosophers have doubted the prospects of modalism, according to which we can analyze the concept of essence with that of de re modality. However, some philosophers have tried to save modalism against Fine's counterexamples seriously. In this paper, we examine two such attempts which appeal to some kind of 'impossible possibilities.' We argue that such attempts have strong tendency to end in either a metaphysical picture which is very similar to Fine's or a concept of essence which is quite different from Fine's. For this reason, we claim that Fine has no reason to worry about such attempts.

키트 파인의 영향력 있는 논문, Essence and Modality(1994) 이후 많은 철학자들은 양상주의, 즉 본질적 속성을 양상성, 특히 데 레(de re) 필연성 개념을 통해서 분석하려는 시도의 전망에 대해서 의심해왔다. 그러나 몇몇 철학자들은 여전히 양상주의의 옹호 가능성을 진지하게 고려하고 있다. 이 논문에서 필자들은 어떤 종류의 불가능한 가능성 개념을 통해서 양상주의를 키트 파인의 반례들로부터 옹호하려는 두 개의 시도를 검토한다. 필자들은 이런 시도들이 결국 키트 파인의 이론과 크게 다르지 않은 이론이 되거나, 아니면 고전적인 양상주의가 포착하려고 했던 본질 개념과는 상당히 다른 본질 개념으로 이끌어지는 문제를 갖는다는 것을 논증한다. 필자들은 따라서, 파인의 입장에서 볼 때, 이런 시도들은 별로 두려워할 필요가 없는 시도가 될 것이라는 것을 주장한다.

Keywords

References

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