아태비즈니스연구 (Asia-Pacific Journal of Business)

  • 제9권4호
  • /
  • Pages.49-65
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  • 2018
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  • 2233-5900(pISSN)
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  • 2384-3934(eISSN)
강원대학교 경영경제연구소 (KNU The Institute of Management & Economy Research)
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모바일페이사와 신용카드사의 경쟁

Competition between Mobile Pay and Credit Card Systems

  • 투고 : 2018.11.30
  • 심사 : 2018.12.26
  • 발행 : 2018.12.30
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초록

This paper illustrates the competition between the mobile pay and credit card systems by utilizing the theory of two-sided markets. Two firms, as platforms, maximize the profit collecting fees from consumers on one side and from retailers on the other side. Consumers pay to buy goods and services with mobile pay, credit card, or cash. The basic model is one that each platform maximizes its profit. We show that the fees for credit card holders and retailers are higher than the respective costs. The fee for retailers of the mobile payment is higher than its cost, while the buyer's fee may be higher or lower than its cost. Applied model is the one that employs the delegation game model. The total profit of the mobile pay system is composed of its profit and the weighted demand for the mobile pay. It is shown that buyers' fee under the applied model is lower than that under the basic model, resulting in an increase of the demand for the mobile pay. The fee for the retailers rises, albeit the sum of fees for the buyers and retailers falls. The profit for the mobile pay system is increased, while that for the credit card company stays the same.

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참고문헌

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