

The New Structure of Police Governance and Its Impact on Police Service Delivery in the UK

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〈Abstract〉

This article assesses the recent police reform strategy in England and Wales with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Police and Crime Commissioners have a responsibility not just for the police force but also for reducing crime in their area of responsibility. This ensures that their remit runs much more widely than their predecessor body, the police authority. The article goes on to evaluate the nature and extent of crime by making immediate use of survey of local police commanders. The surveys showed that police commands were swamped with minor crime and anti-social offences. The arrival of Police and Crime Commissioners has meant that now police priorities can be more closely aligned to those of the public and where anti-social behaviour is now recognised as impacting on the lives of many residents more significantly than criminal activity. The article highlights the changes introduced by government following the Winsor Review to police pay, pensions and conditions of service. It reflects on the impact of this on both police morale and professional motivation. It suggests that current government policy is now haemorrhaging the police service as increasing numbers of experienced officers are leaving the police service which could ultimately undermine its long-term resilience as a strategic emergency service.

Key words : Police Governance, Police Service Delivery, Police and Crime Commissioners, Anti-social Behaviour, Government Policy

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I . Introduction

Following the 2010 election and the arrival of the Coalition Government one noticeable feature in relation to public service delivery proved to be a shared commitment on the part of both coalition partners to devolving greater powers and responsibility for public services down from the centre to the localities. While this had been a long term aim for the Liberal Democrats devolution has been a relatively recent commitment for the Conservatives. However, in the course of what proved to be for this party an unusually long period in opposition (1997-2010) it was to provide them with the opportunity to re-evaluate their own position on public service delivery.

A period of reflection was to be reinforced by successive election failures and a recognition that a credible alternative to New Labour policies had to be found. This reflection was in part to ultimately lead by way of a White Paper 'Policing in the 21st Century' to the Policing and Social Responsibility Act 2011 within which directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were established within each of the 42 police force areas outside of London. These have been given responsibility for local

governance of the police by identifying local priorities and who act to make local police chiefs far more immediately accountable to local communities than, perhaps, they had been to date.

The PCCs were elected on a very low voter turnout in 2012 and became fully operational later that year. A Localism Bill planned to devolve many functions now controlled by the centre to local authorities failed to make traction as most cities rejected Coalition plans to create directly elected mayors for 12 of the largest cities in England and Wales. In 2015, however, many (northern) cities were on the basis of future devolution of funding from central government to sign up to the introduction of directly elected Mayors of the new 'city regions' (Loveday, 2015a).

II. Establishment of Police and Crime Commissioners

1. Background

In what proved to be a significant reversal of policy direction conservative party reformers recognised the need to explore alternatives to centrally directed top down public service delivery, a style which had characterised both the Thatcher and Major governments and which New Labour had subsequently (and very willingly) adopted after their election win in 1997. One consequence of this was to be the rise of performance measurement and performance management which was to ultimately both centralise public service delivery while also overwhelming this sector with an avalanche of narrowly set performance targets which individual services were required to meet (Flynn, 2007; Jenkins, 1996; Loveday, 2006).

One additional factor in driving the reorientation of this party's position on public service delivery was to be the work of a number of London based Think Tanks (Reform, Civitas, IPPR, etc). Among these the early research undertaken by Policy Exchange was to prove to be influential. In its first report published in 2003 entitled 'Going Local: Who should run Britain's police?' this think tank was to put the case

for radical reform of the structure of accountability of the police service in England and Wales. Based on research undertaken in 2002, which sought to identify and assess existing police accountability mechanisms, the research programme coincided with the introduction of the Street Crimes Initiative (SCI) which was to target street muggings in 10 police forces and which was centrally directed by way of a COBRA Cabinet Committee chaired by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary (Loveday & Reid, 2003).

The SCI served to effectively nationalise police service delivery in the 10 police forces involved. Each was to be given specific crime reduction targets which were to be closely monitored by the centre. Those police forces that were perceived to be 'failing' were also assigned individual government ministers to act as 'mentors' to those forces to improve their performance. One consequence of all this was the growing recognition that 'local' policing had ceased to have any real meaning and that the combination of central intervention and use of targets meant that police forces were 'local' in name only.

One further source of concern was perceived to be the weakness of local police accountability systems and the relative anonymity of police authorities which remained the third arm of the tripartite structure of police governance created by the 1964 Police Act. It had become increasingly apparent to many observers that the lack of powers and low public profile of these authorities had served to contribute to the erosion of effective local police governance which had been entirely overshadowed by central intervention.

2. The Rise of Direct Election

Prior to the 2010 general election the 'New Labour' government was re-positioning itself on the issue of direct election. In its 2009 Green Paper the Home Office laid out proposals for directly elected mayors to be given responsibility for local policing. Along with this was to go directly elected chairpersons of Community Safety Partnerships which would serve to strengthen local community influence over policing priorities. For a variety of reasons direct election was to be dropped by the Home

Office at this time, as a result of concern over potential political influence over 'policing' and the need to protect 'police operational independence'.

Such concern was not however to extend to the Conservative party within whose 2010 election manifesto a clear commitment was made to the introduction of directly elected police commissioners. This commitment has now been realised despite the open opposition of all of the major police associations and the public rejection of PCCs by Sir Hugh Orde, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers whose members would have responsibility for successfully working with the elected PCCs.

The concept of direct election has many critics not least those who work within local government. Here direct election has traditionally been seen as potentially divisive as single issue elected representation could undermine any integrated approach to local service management. Within the context of crime and 'law and order' potential dangers were related to PCCs with a single service responsibility being pressured by media or popular prejudice to prioritise certain types of offenders particularly where media interest amplified the vulnerability of potential victims.

Moreover, the revelations surrounding News Corporation and its apparent 'capture' of the top management team of the Metropolitan Police Service only served to emphasise the real and potential dangers of what remains in the UK a largely unregulated popular press. Despite the demise of the Murdoch Sunday News of the World it remains the case that the then editor, Rebecca Brooks, proved to be highly influential in the creation of 'Sarah's Law' which required the public identification of sex offenders along with their place of residence. In relation to Sarah's Law for example it was thought potentially difficult for the PCC as a single service representative not to be seen responding to popular concern and prejudices mobilised by the 'red top' media. Experience of the PCCs system has however demonstrated that these concerns were not to be realised.

3. Underlying Challenges

The commitment by the Coalition to direct election of PCCs had of course to be

seen against a wider political background. As was to be argued at the time by a senior Home Office Official the government perceived that there was a ‘disconnection’ between the police and the public along with a significant decline in the instinctive identification of the public with the police. Within government there was also a view at this time that the public currently did not know how to engage with the police and that senior police officers were not concerned by what worried the public.

This disconnect could they believed only be addressed by establishing locally elected PCCs who would focus on local crime and anti-social behaviour and who would have direct contact with the public and who would be perceived by the public as being ‘someone who is on their side’. Locally elected PCCs with control of the budget would also be concerned to ensure that council tax payers got ‘value for money’ in terms of police service delivery. Later analysis of the PCC elections was to question this (Mawby & Smith, 2017).

More significantly if the public proved to be less than satisfied with the work of their PCC then they would be at liberty to vote them out at election time. The power of dismissal was designed to reverse another feature of police governance which had arisen over past decades where police leaders had looked to the Home Office to lead or direct them on targets and priorities along with career advancement. It was intended that direct election of PCCs would mean future direction of the police would not be top-down but bottom-up as local crime panels and members of the public would be able to challenge PCCs which would be reinforced by the introduction of local crime maps made publicly available and from which police effectiveness could be evaluated. In the event some PCCs have gone further as in Staffordshire where local police command performance data will be made available to the public. Here the use of a ‘digital dash board’ will allow residents to access crime trends in the area and ‘will make police commanders more accountable as they will be also able to ‘compare area by area crime rate trends and officer visibility’ (Loeb, 2015).

Ending Home Office intervention with local police forces has been matched by a ‘hands off’ approach taken by the Home Secretary, to the work of PCCs. There has been no detailed direction or guidance provided to PCCs by the Home Office and it

has been left to them to establish a working relationship (or not) with local chief officers. Consisting of locally elected councillors, Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) have a limited scrutiny role (but no executive powers) in the oversight of the work of the PCC. As will be seen there is now increasing pressure to give PCPs greater ability to bring PCCs to account between elections (House of Lords Committee Standards in Public Life, 2015).

Taken together the policy of central disengagement represents a remarkable reorientation in police governance which is designed to rebalance responsibilities for the police between local and national governments. This development was to be emphasised by the Minister for Police in 2011 who argued that the centre had already gained too much power at the expense of the local and that reform had been designed to give 'a stronger voice to local communities and refocus central government on its proper role' (Herbert, 2011).

The policy position with policing adopted by the Coalition was identifiable in other contexts. While police forces have been encouraged to collaborate in terms of service delivery and purchasing arrangements, the professional objective of amalgamating police forces has proved to be entirely off the agenda. A planned amalgamation initiative between 2 local police forces- Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire- was to be stopped in its tracks. This position offers a decided contrast to developments in Scotland where the ruling SNP have recently amalgamated all 8 police forces into Police Scotland, a national police force.

Other reforms to policing to sustain the commitment to local policing have included the creation of the National Crime Agency (NCA) which assumes responsibility for all crimes that has a clear national dimension. This includes all those functions held earlier by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). The NCA has undertaken responsibility for the upper end of crime (Level 3 Crime-serious and organised crime) but not Anti-Terrorism which remains the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). This has taken pressure from local forces which are no longer required to demonstrate a service omni-competence particularly in relation to level 3 serious and organised crime. Yet the

later decision for the MPS to retain control of the Anti- Terrorism function may potentially have endangered the future status and success of the NCA (Loveday, 2013). This decision was to be made despite the cogent argument presented by a report from the House of Commons (Home Affairs Committee, 2011) which made the case for removing the national counter-terrorism role from the MPS. It believed the counter-terrorism role hampered the ability of the MPS to investigate 'other crimes' as demonstrated most convincingly with the phone -hacking scandal that rocked the MPS and which led to the departure of both the Police Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner (Laville, 2011). The report stated that 'fighting terrorism' would be better placed with the NCA and concluded that while London remained a primary target for terrorist attacks the terrorist threat is a national problem and there are advantages in placing responsibility for counter-terrorism in the NCA (Dodd, 2016; Home Affairs Committee, 2011).

To date however it has proved exceedingly difficult to create an organisation that begins to resemble the American FBI model which many policy makers seek to emulate. This issue has been compounded by the evident problems surrounding the short and rather undistinguished history of both the National Criminal Intelligence Service(NCIS) and its successor organisation, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency. When service responsibilities were devolved to local forces then much has depended on how effective the NCA structure proved to be. To date the creation of national police agencies has not been marked by much success- as the recent example of the NPIA so clearly demonstrates and it is fair to say that similar problems have recently arisen in relation to the NCA recently dubbed recently as the 'National Chaos Agency' by one national newspaper (Beckford, 2015).

III. The Impact of the New Structure on Police Service Delivery

1. Local Community Safety Partnerships and Police Services

In retrospect New Labour's early initiative in establishing local 'community safety' partnerships could be seen as an initial step towards a type of local 'municipal' policing. Although national police targets undermined this approach the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) did prove to be highly innovative in giving local authorities for the first time, a shared statutory responsibility with the police service to reduce crime in their areas. In doing so the CDA placed great emphasis on 'partnership' arrangements at a local level which involved local police commanders and local authority chief executives. Community Safety Partnerships have evolved over time and currently they also include as a lead authority a 'reformed' probation service.

As successive reports from the Police Superintendents Association (2004) was to argue the introduction of CSPs and the partnership approach was viewed as a highly positive development for local policing. Local police commanders for the first time could call on a range of services to develop local crime prevention and community safety strategies (Police Superintendents Association, 2004). The statutory requirement for all CSPs to undertake crime audits prior to devising local crime strategies provided the opportunity for the first time to engage with the public while also developing a more comprehensive picture of the nature and extent of the crime problem locally. It was to prove of interest that successive crime audits – for the first time requiring all local authority services to report damages to property or other loss- were to highlight the impact of what euphemistically was identified within police parlance as 'minor crime' or criminal damage. Yet the costs and impact of 'minor crime' particularly in relation to personal perceptions of public safety were also to be revealed. Moreover, as annual Crime Surveys demonstrated much minor crime was neither reported nor recorded by the police. The police argued at this time that resource constraints meant that the

service had to respond to serious crime. Yet it was also the case that a cultural perception within the police service was also clearly in evidence. This cultural bias was strongly orientated to action led and high-risk policing and invariably identified serious and violent crime along with organised crime and gun crime as being preeminent in terms of police response.

Yet the evidence coming up from Crime Audits and national Crime Surveys was to demonstrate that outside of a number of specific and highly deprived largely urban areas the incidence of this type of crime was relatively low. Far more significant was the nature and size of minor crime even though it was subject to under-reporting. The nature and extent of the 'crime problem' confronting the police was to be also identified in a survey of local Basic Command Unit police commanders undertaken jointly by the Superintendents Association and Policy Exchange in 2007 (Loveday, McClory, & Lockhart, 2007). This required local commanders (those who would best know) to identify the types and extent of crime which confronted them on a regular basis. The survey was to highlight a very different picture on the ground from that described within established police discourse.

It demonstrated that while serious and violent crime certainly did register-as did 'gang warfare and related killings'-these types of crime were almost entirely overshadowed by 'minor crime' and alcohol related disorder. As was to be also discovered, Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) was to also loom large within the survey with 96% of respondents identifying the incidence of ASB as either average or 'above average' (Loveday, et al., 2007).

When added together 'volume crime' (e.g., theft and burglary) alcohol related disorder along with ASB constituted the bulk of demand placed on local police commanders on a regular and highly predictable basis. Interestingly the survey results from 2007 almost exactly replicated the results of an earlier survey conducted by the Superintendents Association in 2002, indicating that the prevalence of ASB and alcohol related disorder was not an aberration recorded in 2007 but apparently an ongoing and consistent problem for local police commanders over time.

The recognisable gulf between professional police perceptions of crime and the reality

recorded within the surveys was in fact only to provide further evidence of a serious disjuncture between police and public perceptions of what should be given priority for police response. The nature and extent of this disjuncture was in fact to be identified many years before in a major review of policing undertaken jointly by the three police associations. The Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990) was to first record how much of a gulf existed between police and public as to how crime should be prioritised. The review was to find that the public gave high priority to ASB and for example low priority to crimes in which firearms were used—the latter perception based presumably on its very low incidence (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990). Within the police survey these priorities were to be entirely reversed.

Very similar differences were to be identified in relation to the perceived value of police patrol with the public according this function high value while the police very frequently viewed this activity entirely negatively (Draca, Machin, & Witt, 2011). The perceived limits to the value of police patrol have indeed been recently resurrected among professional police as the impact of 20% cuts in police budgets is experienced. First in line for cuts have proved to be resources directed at visible policing which has influenced neighbourhood policing (Babuta, 2017).

Yet as has been recorded most recently by Draca et al.'s (2011) research based on the police response to the July terror attacks in London in 2005 demonstrated that higher levels of visible policing had a very measurable effect on crime rates. This conclusion was ironically to be supported by the rise in recorded crime which followed on from the withdrawal of uniformed officers from the area post attack (Draca et al., 2011). The evidence from 2005 appeared to replicate the impact of high police presence on crime rates in the course of the Street Crimes Initiative in 2002. Yet despite this the number of PCSOs has been halved and some forces plan to eliminate this function entirely despite its proven record in relation to Neighbourhood Policing (Loveday & Smith, 2015).

2. The Impact of ASB on Public Perceptions of Personal Safety

The 2007 BCU survey was to highlight the nature of the crime problem confronting local police commanders. This evidence was to be reinforced by a report from HMIC in 2010 which drew attention to the significance of ASB and the importance attached to it among the public who experienced it (HMIC, 2010a). As this report was to note most ASB could not be classified as constituting criminal activity and may have been accorded little importance by the police as a result. This response could also have been influenced by the earlier performance target regime and within which, ironically, ASB was never to be identified as a suitable performance target for police forces.

Types of behaviour identified by the public as constituting ASB included 'street drinking and under-age drinking; teenagers and kids loitering in the street and vandalism and graffiti' (HMIC, 2010b). Most importantly perhaps the same report was to find that the public (unlike the police) did not make clear distinctions between ASB and 'crime'. While HMIC was to highlight within its survey that a majority of respondents believed the police were dealing with ASB effectively it was also immediately apparent that a very sizeable proportion of the public did not share that view at all (HMIC, 2010b).

The same report was to ask respondents to identify types of behaviour and incidents that most frequently occurred within the area and which they would report. This was to include vandalism, graffiti, damage to property, harassment/discrimination, drug use and drug dealing. Other incidents that would be reported would include noisy neighbours, and public drunkenness /rowdiness; rowdy/inconsiderate behaviour. Where the police did respond a significant number of respondents were dissatisfied with feedback from the police. 22% of respondents were to be 'very dissatisfied' with information provided by the police.

It was of interest that while a large majority of the public view dealing with ASB as, overwhelmingly, a police responsibility survey data showed that there was strong public support for partnership working across local public services. Survey data showed a significant increase in satisfaction rates among those who called for assistance if the

response included the police and one other local public service (HMIC, 2010b). Elsewhere the 2010 report was to identify one factor that could explain low report and recorded rates for ASB. It was discovered that 1 in 5 (19%) respondents stated that 'fear of intimidation or repercussions had stopped them from reporting ASB in the past' while 1 in 3 respondents (32%) said that they 'had actually experienced intimidation or repercussions as a result of reporting ASB' (HMIC, 2010b).

3. The Current Situation

Any doubt as to the continuation of the PCC role in police governance was to end with the general election victory of the Conservative Party in 2015. It has indeed led to further and quite radical plans for further devolution of central government functions (and spending) to local authorities. In his 2015 White Paper the then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne outlined his plan for devolving services and spending powers initially to the 'northern powerhouse', the larger cities within the centre and north of England.

Starting with Greater Manchester a deal has been made to give this city responsibility for inter-alia transport, housing, planning and public health. Along with that will also go responsibility for the police force. However, in order to take on these functions the constituent districts have had to accept the introduction of a directly elected Mayor. With remarkable speed all of the cities that previously rejected the introduction of elected mayors within the Localism Act (2011) were to unanimously agree to their introduction.

It is also intended that within the new city regions the elected mayor will take responsibility for policing which will be surrendered by the PCC in the area (Loveday, 2015a). It is fair to say that this development represents even within a city region a major movement towards municipal government and with it municipal policing even if there are remaining questions about both budget cuts and the implications of these on future spending plans. For policing this development could prove to be of great value for both local communities and police forces as the police service is once again

integrated into local government service delivery. After four decades of relative autonomy where the police service sought to isolate itself from local government by espousing the importance of police operational independence it will finally be required to re-establish closer links with other city services.

Outside of the city regions most counties will of course retain the PCCs. These will remain responsible for crime and policing in the area in what will be 'combined' (or unitary) authorities. The experience of PCCs has proved to be very revealing and clearly suggests that the rebalancing of power between chief police officers and democratic agencies has been, to a large degree, realised. This is best identified by the change in relationship between police chiefs and PCCs. Thus, if in the past chief officers viewed themselves as Principals and the police authority as the Agent this situation has been reversed by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011).

Early on PCCs were to use the powers given to them under the Act. The first evidence of this was to arise in Avon and Somerset where much to his surprise the chief constable's contract was not to be extended by a further two years. He was instead told to apply for his own job which, in HR terms was tantamount to being shown the door. A later unsuccessful appeal to the Courts to reverse this decision only served to highlight the significant powers given to PCCs in relation to hiring and firing chief officers (Loveday, 2015a).

However, this incident was to be quickly followed by another this time involving the chief constable of Gwent and the PCC. In response -inter alia to an internal memorandum informing her officers that the only channel of communication with the PCC would be through the chief constable, the PCC raised questions as to the chief's competence and the overall efficiency of the force. In what became a direct confrontation between the chief and PCC the outcome proved to be the early retirement of the chief constable. Other police casualties of the new governance have included the chief constable of Northumbria who was to take early retirement 'to spend more time with her family' and yet another chief constable of Avon and Somerset whose resignation resulted from the use of use of the PCC of Section 38 of the Police Reform Act where it states that:

‘The chief constable must retire or resign if called upon to do so by the relevant police and crime commissioner’ (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011).

It has, in some cases, proved difficult for chief officers to adjust to the new circumstances. However, in most police force areas (with some clear exceptions) relationships between chief officers and PCC remain harmonious. Yet as has also become clear the problem of lack of accountability of Chief Constables may now have been replaced by an equal concern about the accountability of PCCs (Bailey, 2015). A recent Report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) has strongly recommended strengthening PCP powers to bring the PCC to account between the four yearly elections. At the time seen as little more than an ‘after thought’, it is increasingly evident that effective PCP oversight of the PCC is much needed.

That such a reform is required is based on the very real powers now exercised by PCCs. These powers were of course in part predicated on those of the directly elected Mayor of London. As one incumbent in London was to demonstrate, there had been in his period of office, a much clearer process of public accountability and one that had not pertained in London since the late Nineteenth Century. The elected mayor was to oversee the departure of two Metropolitan Police Commissioners following evidence of significant professional misjudgement on their part. It is difficult to conceive of such outcomes within the realm of the old police authorities where the organisational culture proved to be overwhelmingly protective of chief police officers.

IV. Discussion

1. Thinking Outside the Box?

Inevitably within a short paper the exploration and analysis of municipal police governance must be somewhat circumscribed. However, it is argued here the initiatives now undertaken in England and Wales offer, for the first time since the missed opportunity of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, an opportunity for

establishing a fully accountable and publicly responsive police service. This can be, as in the past, more closely integrated with other local services and responsive to community need and public demand. In its commitment to 'Going Local' the present government has demonstrated a strength of purpose that has served to reverse the slide to centralisation within the police service. It has also reasserted the value of local and municipal authority service delivery and direct accountability.

Indeed, the reversal of the trend towards greater centralisation bucks a trend as evidenced in other European jurisdictions. This has been away from local toward national police systems as demonstrated in for example the Netherlands, Norway and Scotland (Fyfe, Terpstra, & Tops, 2014). In itself the introduction of directly elected mayors for the big conurbations can act to reinforce if not cement this commitment to local delivery of services. Once established directly elected executive mayors could prove difficult to remove. Already concern has been expressed about the level of future accountability of directly elected mayors between elections (Brady, 2015). This could extend of course to policing as the mayors can be expected to assume responsibility for the local police force.

At this time it is not clear how wide-ranging the Government intends the introduction of Mayors to be in England and Wales. The last time local government and police structures were reformed followed on from a report by a royal commission on local government which deliberated for three years (Redcliffe-Maud, 1969). This time major structural reform was apparently determined in just over three weeks (Loveday, 2015a). Yet the devolution of public spending will be potentially of such a magnitude that local authorities are now ready to accept arrangements that now set up a system to which in the past they refused to contemplate.

2. Structural Reform

The biggest loser with these developments could prove to be central government departments as the Conservative government now currently led by Theresa May moves ever closer to establishing the 'minimal state' through privatisation outsourcing and

devolution. It is also the case that reversing this trend could prove to be beyond the reach of any successor central administration. Local authorities will not be easily persuaded to relinquish new powers and responsibilities given to them. In terms of the immediate future this is however, unlikely. Now the direction of travel remains toward further devolution of powers which ultimately should extend to local determination of council tax raising powers.

Thus, ironically, the Conservative government once the party of 'law and order' and ever greater centralisation has proved to be the party which has done most to strengthen local policing and along with it sought to significantly enhance the status of local service delivery. Six metro mayors and combined authorities were created in 2017 and made responsible for transport, health and other strategic services. The movement to devolved government in England and Wales now provides an interesting contrast to developments elsewhere in the UK and rest of Europe.

In Scotland the creation of Police Scotland, a national police service, has demonstrated an alternative to localism. Police Scotland is overseen by an appointed, non-elected national police authority. Additionally, the police divisional areas are at no point coterminous with local authority boundaries. As a result, that will make inter-agency local partnerships difficult to sustain. This appears to have been a deliberate choice made by chief police officers involved in the immediate planning for a new police structure (Loveday, 2015b). Elsewhere in Europe police systems have been centralised as in the Netherlands. It was argued that larger units of policing would be more efficient and effective across northern and western Europe over the last 10 years (O'Neill & Fyfe, 2017).

Centralising trends, experienced elsewhere, appear not to have had much traction in the UK. Here the government remains committed to further devolution of powers. Most recently it has announced that Police and Crime Commissioner's will be able to take responsibility for all local fire and rescue services. There is also growing pressure for PCCs to also take responsibility for other local criminal justice agencies, not least probation local prosecution services and local magistrates' courts. This would it is argued enable PCCs to better coordinate the local criminal justice system and the work of individual agencies.

3. Policy Implications for South Korea

At the moment, South Korean police governance is facing a critical moment. Since the new president took office in May 2017, the new president has driven a comprehensive overhaul of the police governance. Historically, there has been more focus on local police governance in England and Wales (장광호·김문귀, 2018). Against this backdrop, the examination of the recent police reform in England and Wales provides some significant implications in that the movement to devolved police governance in South Korea resembles the recent history of England and Wales.

Firstly, the devolved police governance may be effective in dealing with minor crime and anti-social offences. As it is well known, Korean police have faced a huge difficulty in tackling those minor offences, such as public drunkenness, rowdiness, and inconsiderate behaviour. However, citizens are getting more sensitive about their neighborhood and it is imperative for a local government to meet the needs of its residents. In this context, the devolved police governance can contribute to effectively addressing safety needs of local residents.

Secondly, it should be considered how to maintain the police morale and professional motivation if the police governance is devolved. There are anecdotal evidence that rank and file officers are concerned about a possible loss of public support and social status if the devolvement is implemented. As reviewed, England and Wales have seen a dramatic decline in morale within the police service. Considering this, it is necessary for the Korean government to take these psychological issues of police officers seriously.

V. Conclusion

The nature and extent of police reform implemented following on from the Winsor Review of police officer and staff remuneration and conditions in 2011 has been unprecedented. Implemented very largely by Theresa May as Home Secretary from 2010 to 2016 there has now been a fundamental shift in the power position of chief of police

vis-a-vis the civilian authority. This has been matched by a commitment to significantly revise the terms and conditions of service and also the nature of recruitment of applicants to the police service. Over recent years the Home Office has also resurrected an earlier interest in recruiting chief police officers from abroad. Most recently the Home Secretary has stated that she will encourage civilian personnel to apply for the position of Chief Constable in all of the 43 police forces in England and Wales (Hamilton, 2017).

Earlier described by Conservative critics as the 'last large unreformed public service' the police service has since 2010 experienced the kind of reforms which were earlier meted out by the Major government to other public services. Along with that has gone the closure and sale of the highly prestigious Police Staff College Bramshill, which over many decades had trained potential police highfliers while also running command courses for many overseas police forces. Its successor, the College of Policing, appears to lack focus and has also failed to establish the professional reputation which earlier accrued to its predecessor the Bramshill Staff College. This along with the quite dramatic reduction in police establishment of around 20% since 2010 has characterised a public police service in retreat.

The end result not surprisingly has been a dramatic decline in morale within the police service. This has been most recently identified within a Police Federation Survey undertaken in 2017. The survey found that one significant factor in declining morale, other than the changes to pay and pensions, was the perception of 'how the police as a whole were treated' (Boag-Munroe, 2017). Over 80% of police respondents identified the treatment of the police as a major factor in explaining the low morale within the service.

This result can come perhaps as no surprise and reflects the government's commitment to its police reform agenda that has been relentlessly pursued over the last 7 years. One consequence of this has been a remarkable increase in the early departure of increasing numbers of longer serving officers deciding to leave the police force (Boag-Munroe, 2017; Weinfass, 2017). This does not exactly augur well for the long-term resilience of a strategic emergency service.

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【요 약】

치안 거버넌스의 새로운 구조와 경찰 서비스 제공에 미치는 영향: 영국을 중심으로

Barry Loveday · 정제용

이 연구에서는 잉글랜드와 웨일즈의 ‘2011년 경찰 개혁 및 사회적 책임에 관한 법’과 관련된 최근 경찰 개혁 전략을 평가하였다. 경찰 개혁 전략 중 가장 중요한 변화는 지역치안위원장에게 경찰인력 운용뿐만 아니라 관할 지역의 범죄를 줄이는 책임도 부여하였다는 것이다. 이로 인해 지역치안위원장은 지방 정부 및 지역 안전 파트너십과도 긴밀히 협력해야 하며, 그 전신인 지방경찰위원회보다 보다 많은 임무와 큰 권한을 갖게 되었다. 이 연구는 또한 지역 경찰 지휘관을 대상으로 한 설문 조사를 통해 범죄의 성향과 정도를 평가하고자 하였다. 이 설문 조사는 강력 범죄보다는 사소한 범죄 및 반사회 범죄로 인한 치안 수요가 급증한 것을 보여주었다. 지역치안위원장 제도의 도입은 경찰의 우선순위가 대중의 우선순위와 점차 일치하고 있으며, 반사회적 행동이 이제는 일반적 범죄보다 주민들의 삶에 더 큰 영향을 미치고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 그리고 이 연구는 윈저리뷰(Winsor Review) 이후에 경찰 연봉, 연금 및 근무 조건에 대한 변화도 조명하고 있다. 또한, 이러한 변화가 경찰 조직 내에서 경찰관들의 사기와 전문적인 동기에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 현재의 영국 정부 정책으로 인해 점점 더 많은 수의 경험 많은 경찰관들이 경찰 조직을 떠나고 있고, 이로 인해 궁극적으로 전략적 긴급 서비스로서 치안서비스의 장기적인 탄력성이 약해질 수 있다는 점을 논의하였다.

주제어 : 치안 거버넌스, 치안서비스 제공, 지역치안위원장, 반사회적 행동, 정부정책